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RECENT CASES
Accountants-Auditors-Compliance with General Accounting
Principles Not a Complete Defense To Criminal Fraud
Defendants' are members of a certified public accounting firm
which was retained annually by Continental Vending Corporation
(Continental) to audit its financial statements. While conducting a
yearly audit, defendants learned that an affiliated company, Valley
Commercial Corporation (Valley),2 was not in a position to repay its
debt 3 to Continental. .The president of Valley, however, offered to
secure the debt personally. Defendants determined that if adequate
collateral' was posted, Continental's statements could be certified
without reviewing Valley's books.5 The collateral was obtained,, its
value was confirmed,7 and the receivable was entered on the balance
sheet 8 subject to an explanation in a footnote.' The statements were
1. Defendants are a senior partner, a junior partner, and a senior associate in the national
accounting firm of Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery.
2. The president of both Continental and Valley was Harold Roth, who owned about 25%
of the stock of each corporation. In a prior proceeding, he was charged with criminal fraud but
pleaded guilty and appeared at defendants' trial as a Government witness. Mr. Roth was
sentenced to 6 months in jail, with an added year suspended.
3. Valley, whose business was lending money to Continental and other vending machine
companies, had conducted numerous business dealings with Continental. Specifically, Continental
used Valley as a source of funds by borrowing money from Valley. In return, Continental issued
negotiable notes to Valley which were then discounted to local banks. By the end of the fiscal
year in question, Continental's debt to Valley was slightly over $1 million. In addition,
Continental had, for several years, lent cash to Valley. The debt owed by Valley amounted to
$3.5 million at the end of the fiscal year but had increased to $3.9 million by the date of
certification. Evidence disclosed that Roth had borrowed a large portion of this money and had
used it for private investments.
4. Defendants insisted that a satisfactory legal opinion be obtained and that Continental's
board of directors be apprised of the situation.
5. Valley was to be audited by another accounting firm and its statements were not yet
available.
6. Approximately 80% of the collateral was stock and convertible debentures of
Continental.
7. The collateral was confirmed by another member of the firm (not a party to this suit)
who arrived at a value of approximately $3 million. He failed to discover, however, that the stock
was subject to other encumberances and that the equity interest was really worth $1 million less.
8. Since the account payable (the amount owed by Continental to Valley) consisted of
negotiable notes, it could not be netted against the account receivable, which was a cash item.
9. Defendants' note provided: "The amount receivable from Valley Commercial Corp. (an
affiliated company of which Mr. Harold Roth is an officer, director and stockholder) bears
interest at 12% a year. Such amount, less the balance of the notes payable to the company, is
secured by the assignment to the Company of Valley's equity in certain marketable securities.
As of February 15, 1963, the amount of such equity at current market quotations exceeded the
net amount receivable." United States v. Simon, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,511, at 98,384
(2d Cir. Nov. 12, 1969).
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subsequently certified, 0 and, shortly thereafter, Continental failed. The
Government, alleging that the balance sheet was fraudulent" and that
the footnote was false and misleading,'" charged defendants with
conspiracy to commit criminal fraud 3 by knowingly drawing up and

certifying a false and misleading financial statement. The defendants
contended that since they had followed generally accepted accounting
principles," they could not be subjected to liability. Even if the
10. The typical certification statement reads: "We have examined the balance sheet or x
company as of [date] and the related statements of income and retained earnings for the year
then ended. Our examination was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards,
and accordingly included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing procedures
as we considered necessary in the circumstances.
In our opinion the accompanying balance sheet and statements of income and retained
earnings present fairly the financial position of the X company at [date], and the results of its
operations for the year then ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles
applied on a basis consistent with that of the preceding year." R. MAUTZ, FUNDAMENTALS OF
AUDITING 508 (1967) (emphasis added).
II. The Government contended that defendants were under a duty to disclose that the
money lent to Valley was subsequently channelledto Roth.
12. The Government claimed that if the defendants had included what they knew, their
footnote would have read: "The amount receivable from Valley Commercial Corp. (an affiliated
company of which Mr. Harold Roth is an officer, dire'ctor and stockholder), which bears interest
at 12% a year, was uncollectible at September 30, 1962, since Valley had loaned approximately
the same amount to Mr. Roth who was unable to pay. Since that date Mr. Roth and others have
pledged as security for the repayment of his obligation to Valley and its obligation to Continental
(now $3,900,000, against which Continental's liability to Valley cannot be offset) securities which
as of February 15, 1963, had a market value of $2,978,000. Approximately 80% of such securities
are stock and convertible debentures of the Company." United States v. Simon, CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP.
92,511, at 98,384 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 1969).
13. Defendants were charged under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 & 1341 (1964), and § 32 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1964). Section 1001 provides: "Whoever, in
any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly
and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or
makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false
writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or
entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both,"
Section 1341 makes criminal the use of the mails in aid of "any scheme or artifice to defraud."
Section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act renders criminal a willful and knowing statement in
any report which is false or misleadiig with respect to any material fact. A defense of no
knowledge, however, is available. The Justice Department, rather than the SEC, normally
prosecutes criminal proceedings.
14. Defendants produced eight expert witnesses: six accounting practitioners, a professor of
accounting, and a former Chief Accountant of the SEC, who testified that neither generally
accepted accounting principles nor generally accepted auditing standards required disclosure of
the nature of the collateral or of the increase in the receivable after the closing date of the balance
sheet. Likewise, the witnesses testified that disclosure of the Roth borrowings from Valley was
not required and would have been inappropriate on the balance sheet. The Government produced
two experts, an SEC staff accountant and the Chief Accountant of the SEC, who took a contrary
view. For an excellent discussion on generally accepted accounting principles, see Graham, Some
Observations on the Nature of Income, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, and Financial
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financial statement departed from generally accepted accounting
principles, the defendants maintained that a jury could not find
criminal fraud unless the Government demonstrated a willful disregard
of these standards with an intent to deceive. Defendants were convicted
by the jury on all counts. On appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed. Compliance with
generally accepted accounting principles is not an absolute defense to
criminal fraud when the certified statements do not fairly present the
financial position of the audited company. United States v. Simon,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,511 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 1969), cert.
denied, 90 S. Ct. 1235 (1970).
The standards of reasonable care which apply to auditors or public
accountants are the same as those applied to lawyers, doctors, and
other professional men.'" Generally, an accountant is not liable to third
parties for negligence when there is no privity. 7 Civil liability, however,
may run, even in the absence of privity, if there is a reckless
misrepresentation 8 or fraud.' 9 Fraud may be evidenced by either an
affirmative act 2 l or a failure to disclose. 2' On the other hand, although
criminal convictions have been returned against accountants who have
'
affirmatively misrepresented figures on a financial statement,22
criminal
liabilty for failure to make disclosures assertedly required by
professional standards is a case of first impression.
Reporting, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 652 (1965); and Pines, The Securities and Exchange
Commission andAccounting Principles,30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 727 (1965).
15. Although defendants were fined up to $7,000, no jail sentences were imposed.
16. Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 253, 72 N.W.2d 364, 367 (1955). See
generally Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Public Accountants, 12 VAND. L. REv.
797 (1959).
17. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931)
(accountants not liable for negligence to creditors and investors because of honest mistake). But
cf. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (sustaining negligence action by
beneficiary of will prepared by notary public).
18. State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938) (a representation of
knowledge when knowledge is lacking or a failure to investigate, if sufficiently gross, will create
third party liability even though no deliberate fraud is demonstrated).
19. O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1937) (accountants liable to investors only
for fraud and not for mistake, even if the mistake is a result of negligence).
20. State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938); see H.L. Green Co.
v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (false statements knowingly prepared to induce
merger deemed fraudulent); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 225 N.Y. 170, 176, 174
N.E. 441, 447 (1931).
21. See Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (nondisclosure held grounds
for deceit action); Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1st Dep't 1955) (failure
to report incurred but unposted liabilities, of which accountant had knowledge, was actionable).
See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 551 (1937).
22. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964) (conviction for mail fraud under
18 U.S.C. § 1341).
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In the instant case, the court held that generally accepted
accounting principles provide guidelines for an accountant when the
business affairs of a company are being conducted honestly. The court
concluded, however, that if dishonesty is suspected, the accountant
must extend his investigation. Furthermore, if his suspicions are
confirmed, the accountant must fully disclose the information he
obtains.2 After determining that the collateral securing Valley's debt
was completely inadequate,24 the court reasoned that a full description
of the collateral would have evoked inquiry into the final destination
of the money.2 5 Therefore, although generally accepted accounting
principles were followed, the failure to disclose the nature of the
collateral could be construed as a deliberate effort to conceal the
diversion of corporate funds. The court concluded that failing to report
the increase in the receivable 6 and "netting" the accounts 27 were further
evidence of a conscious suppression of information. In conclusion, the
court held that while the falsity of one item could not, by itself, support
an inference of knowledge, the totality of circumstances supported the
jury's finding of a deliberate and willful intent to defraud.
In the recent civil case of Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.,8
the court concluded that "[a]ccountants should not be held to a standard higher than that recognized in their profession." In the instant case,
however, the jury was allowed to find criminal- liability even though
defendants complied with the applicable professional standards." It
appears, therefore, that accountants have now been placed in an
anomalous position since it may be easier to support a criminal, rather
23. The court held that full disclosure would not be necessary if the situation were corrected
and adequate steps were taken to avoid repetition.

24. The court correctly concluded that the property most unsuitable to collateralize this
debt was securities of the corporation whose solvency was in question.

25. The court reasoned that since only Roth could have furnished such a large amount of
Continental securities, disclosure of the contents of the collateral would have implicitly

acknowledged Roth as the ultimate recipient of the loan. It is submitted, however, that such
disclosure would have only assisted parties who had an intimate knowledge of the financial

structure of the companies to trace the loans back to Roth.
26. Since the value of the collateral was determined as of February 15, the court concluded
that the amount of the liability should also be determined as of that date.

27.

While the figures which appeared on the financial statement were gross amounts, the

footnote actually referred to the net amount.

28. 283 F. Supp. 643, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also W. PROSSER,

LAW OF

TORTS 168 (3d

ed. 1964) (professional men held to standard of care that is customary and usual in that

profession).
29.

The district court instructed the jury that proof of compliance with generally accepted

standards was "evidence which may be very persuasive but not necessarily conclusive." CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP.

92,511, at 98,388.
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than a civil, prosecution against them. 30

O

n the other hand, a holding

that adherence to professional standards is an absolute shield to
criminal responsibility would provide a dangerous precedent that might

allow the unscrupulous to operate with impunity. The conflicting
testimony presented at the trial3' would seem to indicate a widespread
lack of understanding of the scope of an auditor's duty.32 The instant
case, however, does little to clarify the area since its treatment of the
precise extent of the accountant's newly acquired obligations is
extremely vague. The decision clearly indicates that while a mere
peccadillo need not be disclosed, a large diversion must be reported.
'The area between these extremes, however, is uncertain and could prove
to be highly litigious. Based on hindsight, a jury could easily deem
inadequate the actions of an accountant which appeared to be sufficient

at the time. Thus, if an auditor's suspicions are aroused during his
investigation, he faces a dilemma: an extensive investigation might

make his services too costly, 33 but a cursory probe may subject him to
criminal liabilities. 34 The accounting profession, therefore, needs to
30. It also appears that the effect of this decision will be to hold accountants to a higher
standard of care than other professions. For example, an honest error of judgment does not
provide a civil cause of action against physicians. See, e.g., St. George v. State, 283 App. Div.
245, 127 N.Y.S.2d 147 (3d Dep't), affd, 308 N.Y. 681, 124 N.E.2d 320(1954) (wrongful death
action for releasing killer from mental-institution dismissed); Loudon v. Scott, 58 Mont. 645, 194
P. 488 (1920) (no liability for erroneous judgment concerning the administration of anesthetic).
This also holds true for attorneys. See, e.g., Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954)
(no liability if reasonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed lawyers on the point of law).
See also Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755, 760-63 (1959)
(if law uncertain or doubtful, it is unlikely that-an attorney will be found negligent). In addition,
criminal liability based soley upon a mistaken professional opinion has been refused. People v.
Kresel, 243 App. Div. 137, 277 N.Y.S. 168, 175-76 (1935) (lawyer not criminally responsible for
mistaken advice on doubtful question of law).
31. See note 14supra.
32. There is a serious question whether defendants received fair warning as to what type of
conduct would invoke criminal sanctions. See United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)
(constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by criminal statute that fails to give a person
fair notice); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (if requirements are so
vague that men of common intelligence must guess at their meaning and differ as to their
application, due process is violated). See also Quarles, Some Statutory Construction Problems
and Approaches in CriminalLaw, 3 VAND. L. REV.531, 539-43 (1950).
33. Although costs to a customer should not be the sole criterion by which an accountant's
conduct is judged, economic reasonableness must be considered. See R. MAUTZ, supra note 10,
at 5.
34. When faced with only civil liability an auditor could balance the risks involved and,
based on his professional experience, make a determination as to the necessary scope of his
investigation. In addition, most professional organizations have insurance to cover the risks of
civil liability. It seems, however, that under the threat of criminal prosecution an accountant will
be very reluctant to stop short of anything less than an exhaustive, even though expensive,
investigation.
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establish more uniform standards with a narrowed range of alternatives
so that accountants, the public, and the courts will have a more objective

basis for evaluating an auditor's professional performance."
Furthermore, since the precise function of an auditor is generally

misunderstood by a majority of the public, 36 the accounting profession
should take steps to define the extent of the responsibility assumed by

the certifying auditor. Although cooperation between the accounting
profession and the Securities and Exchange Commission has raised

accounting standards over the past 35 years 37 improvements are still
needed. The improvements, however, should come through

professional, civil,3 8 or administrative actions, rather than through
criminal prosecutions.

Administrative Law-Standing to Challenge Administrative
Actions-Anyone Arguably Protected by Statute May Sue
Petitioners, sellers of data processing services for the general
business community, sought a declaratory judgment, an injunction, and
compensatory damages against respondents, American National Bank
& Trust Company and the Comptroller of the Currency of the United

States. Petitioners contended that a ruling by the Comptroller'
35. Analyzing the district court opinion in Simon, another author reached the same
conclusion. Note, Federal Criminal and Administrative Controlsfor Auditors: The Need for a
Consistent Standard, 1969 WASH. U.L.Q. 187. See also Bradley, Auditor's Liability and the Need
for IncreasedAccounting Uniformity, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 898 (1965).
36. An auditor is not a guarantor of the statements which he certifies. R. MAUTZ, supra
note 10, at 487. Financial statements are the assertions of management and are not the
representations of the auditor. Id. at 10. Although fraud may be discovered through normal audit
procedures, the detection of criminal acts is not an auditor's primary responsibility. See
COMMITrEE ON AUDITING PROCEDURE, AICPA, AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES 10-12
(Statements on Auditing Procedure No. 33, 1963).
37. Although the SEC is not bound to follow accounting principles it deems faulty, the
Commission's general policy is to require adherence to generally accepted accounting principles.
For the most part, the development and formation of new principles has been left to the
accounting profession. Sec L. RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2.14.39 (1966). The SEC, however, may prescribe whatever rules and procedures it deems necessary
for more accurate and informative financial statements. See, e.g., Accounting Series Release No.
73-in 4 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. %72,092 at 62,194 (Oct. 30, 1952).
38. Although it is difficult to formulate accounting standards in civil courts, civil liability
is probably the most effective means of enforcing compliance with developed standards and
providing sufficient incentive for the profession to undertake further self-regulation. But see W.
PROSSER, supra note 28, at 165 (courts should not burden a profession with liability based on an
uneducated judgment).
I.

"Incidental to its banking services, a national bank may make available its data
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permitting national banks to make data processing services available
to bank customers was threatening immediate economic damage to
their competitive interests and was in violation of the Bank Service
Corporation Act of 1962, which limits the activities of banking
corporations to "the performance of bank services for banks.' 2 The
district court rejected petitioners' claim of standing based on section
10 of the Administrative Procedure Act 3 and dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction.4 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed.5 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held,
reversed. Any party injured in fact by an administrative action adverse
to an interest arguably protected by a statute or the Constitution has
standing to challenge the action. Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38 U.S.L.W. 4193 (U.S. Mar.
6
3, 1970).
In its recent analysis of the policies behind the law of standing,
the Supreme Court in Flast v. Cohen7 stated that the constitutional
requirement of a case or controversy 8 limits "the business of federal
courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial
0
the Court reiterated its
process." 9 Quoting from Baker v. Carr,"
statement that "[tihe 'gist of the question of standing' is whether the
party seeking relief has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
processing equipment or perform data processing services on such equipment for other banks and
3500 (October 15, 1966
bank customers." COMPTROLLER'S MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS
ed.).
2. "No bank service corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance
of bank services for banks." 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1964).
3. "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV, 1969).
4. 279 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1968).
5. 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969).
6. In a companion case, Barlow v. Collins, 38 U.S.L.W. 4195 (U.S. March 3, 1970), the
Court held that tenant farmers eligible for payments under the Upland Cotton Program have
standing to challenge the validity of amended regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture.
7. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
8. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2. See, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943);
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Standing is but one aspect of the case or
controversy requirement. Other elements are: ripeness, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961);
advisory opinions, Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); mootness, California v. San
Pablo & T.R.R., 149 U.S. 308 (1893); the policy against friendly or collusive suits, Chicago &
Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892); and, political questions, Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
9. 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
10. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.' "It In the
area of administrative law, a troublesome question regarding standing

has been whether a person who asserts an adverse effect has standing
to attack an allegedly illegal administrative action. The courts have

complicated this problem by tending to confuse standing with
reviewability. 2 Presently, there are two views regarding who has
standing to seek a review of administrative decisions. 3 The narrower
and more traditional test has been that a party always has standing
when damage to a legal right is alleged." "Legal right"' 15 is a term of

art that includes property rights, rights arising out of contract, rights
protected against tortious invasion, rights founded on a statute that
confers a privilege, 6 and rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 7
According to this traditional view, economic injury resulting from
lawful competition cannot, by itself, confer standing on the injured
party in the absence of a statute reflecting a legislative purpose to
protect the party 8 or the class of which he is a member from

competition.

9

The more liberal test of standing, on the other hand,

requires only that the plaintiff allege injury in fact, even though the
11. 392 U.S. at 99.
12. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940). As a general rule, the right
to appeal from an administrative decision is dependent upon a statute, and it is for the legislature
to determine how the rights that it creates shall be enforced. See Switchmen's Union v. National
Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943). Davis suggests that to focus on the question of standing,
one "must assume that a legislative or judicial determination has been made that the particular
type of governmental action should be subject to review." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 398
(1959).
13. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 501 (1965).
14. See. e.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1968); Stark v. Wickard, 321
U.S. 288 (1944); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939); Chicago Junction
Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924).
15. "Legal right" may be distinguished from "interest." Every businessman has an interest
in freedom from competition that may reduce his profits; however, businessmen have no legal
right to be free from such competition. See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.
192 (1956) ("legal wrong" requires something more than an adverse personal effect); K. DAVIS
supra note 12, at 400.
16. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).
17. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
18. See, e.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 7 (1968); Perkins v. Lukens Steel
Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
19. Jaffe would phrase the question: "Is the plaintiff's continued well-being one of the
statute's concerns?" L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 510. He notes that various common law doctrines
of unfair competition and improper interference with advantageous relations act as limits on
competitive methods; however; not all illegal competition is unfair, and "the common law does
not transmute every illegality into a cause of action.
... Id. at 509.
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injury may not be to a legal right. 2 The leading case supporting this
view is FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station,2' where the Court
found that an existing broadcasting station with no legal right to be
free from competition had standing to challenge the grant of a license
to a competitor. In reaching this decision, the Court reasoned that
Congress must have intended a competitor to be "a person aggrieved"
under the relevant statute since there would be no one to be
"aggrieved" unless the competitor could object. 22 In recent decisions
involving challenges to the entrance of national banks into new fields
of business activity, courts have used both the legal right and the
damage in fact tests to determine standing.?
Most of the law of standing has been created by the courts, and
until recently few statutes contained provisions regarding standing.2 4
Statutes dealing with the problem normally provide that a "party in
interest," or any person or party "aggrieved" or "adversely affected"
by administrative action may have standing to sue.25 Similarly, the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) grants standing to "[a] person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute
...
* ."1 Much academic debate has centered around the meaning of
"adversely affected." Davis, after an examination of the legislative
history of the APA, concludes that "adversely affected" means
"adversely affected in fact." Jaffe contends that the words "in fact"
were not included in the statute and that Davis's view is logically
20. Davis, the chief proponent of this view, states that 3 strong reasons require that one
adversely affected in fact be able to challenge the action: (1) an elemental principle of justice is
that one injured by illegal action should have a remedy; (2) the artificiality and complexity of
the law of standing would disappear if his view were accepted; (3) the APA should be interpreted
to allow anyone adversely affected in fact to have standing. K. DAVIS, supra note 12, at 398. See
text accompanying notes 28-30 infra.
21. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
22. Id. at 477. The Court in Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942),
explained that in cases such as Sanders the "private litigants have standing only as representatives
of the public interest." Id. at 14. Sanders was further explained in Associated Indus., Inc. v.
Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943), where the court stated
that the plaintiff need not have a private interest; it is enough that a statute authorizes him to
represent the public interest as a "private attorney general."
23. See, e.g., Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, CCH FED. BANKING L. REP.
95,157
(D.C. Cir. July 1, 1969) (Bazelon, J., concurring); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp. 408 F.2d 1147
(1st Cir. 1969); Wingate Corp. v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969); Saxon
v. Georgia Ass'n of Ind. Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968); Baker, Watts & Co.
v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1966).
24. L. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 502.
25. K. DAVIS, supra note 12, at 400.
26. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV, 1969).
27. K. DAVIS, supra note 12, at 398.
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difficult to support. 28 The majority of courts considering this issue have
to alter the
concluded that this provision in the APA was not intended
20
rights.
legal
new
any
create
to
or
standing
concepts of
In the instant case, the Court stated that the first inquiry in
determining standing is "whether the plaintiff alleges that the
challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or
otherwise." 30 Analyzing petitioners' complaint, the Court found that
the allegation that respondent bank was performing or preparing to
perform services for two of petitioner's customers was sufficient to
meet this requirement. The majority found that the "'legal interest'
test goes to the merits." Consequently, it rejected the approach of
Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA ,'31 which required a showing of a "legal
interest." The second inquiry relating to the question of standing, the
instant Court continued, concerns "whether the interest sought to be
protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in question.1 32 Applying this test, the majority found that petitioners
were arguably protected from competition by the Bank Service
Corporation Act. 33 The Court justified this new two-part test for
standing by noting a trend toward enlargement of the class of people
who may challenge administrative actions." Treating the questions of
reviewability and the merits separately, the Court held that the
generous provisions of the APA3 5 provide for review of the
Comptroller's action and remanded the cause for consideration on the
merits.
Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice White, concurred in
the result but dissented from the Court's formulation of a new test for
standing.36 Rather than adopting the majority's two-part test, which
28.

L.

JAFFE,

supra note 13, at 529.

29. See, e.g., REA v. Northern States Power Co., 373 F.2d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1967);
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292, 295 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964);
Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 932 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.

884 (1955).
30. 38 U.S.L.W. at4193.
31. 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).
32. 38 U.S.L.W. at4194.
33. Section 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 1132, 12
U.S.C. § 1864 (1964). See text accompanying note 2 supra.
34. The Court noted that aesthetic, conservational, and recreational values as well as

economic interests may be alleged to gain standing under appropriate statutes. See Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conf. v. Federal Power Comm., 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965).
35. Text accompanying note 26 supra.

36.

Mr. Justice Brennan dissented to both the instant case, and its companion case, Barlow

v. Collins, 38 U.S.L.W. 4195, 4198 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1970). See note 6 supra.
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requires an allegation of injury, as well as an allegation that the injury
was to an arguably protected right, the minority would limit the
Court's inquiry to whether the plaintiff has alleged injury in fact. The
two Justices stated that injury in fact would assure the constitutionally
required adverseness since one injured in fact would have such a
personal stake in the outcome of the suit that he could be expected -to
litigate the issues intensely. Turning to the question of reviewability, 37
the minority noted that there must be a determination from the
statutory language, legislative history, and public policy considerations
that Congress has not precluded review. They suggested that any slight
indications that plaintiff's class is a beneficiary of a statute should
support the inference that Congress intended that the grievance be
reviewable by federal courts. In determining the merits, the dissenting
Justice stated that courts should consider "whether the specific legal
interest claimed by the plaintiff is protected by the statute and . . .
whether the protested agency action invaded that interest. ' 3 Finally,
the minority attacked the "arguably within the zone of interests" test
as being too obscure and as confusing a determination of the merits
with the issue of standing. They concluded that an approach that treats
standing, reviewability, and the merits as three separate issues is needed
to insure that judges will not use standing to prevent the hearing of
plaintiffs entitled to full consideration of their claims on the merits.
The law of administrative standing has been characterized as a
"complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction." 39 The fact that the
Court in the instant case stated that "[g]eneralizations about standing
to sue are largely worthless as such" 40 indicates that the present rules
of standing are unsatisfactory and that a reconsideration of the
fundamental rules is needed. The instant Court was presented with an
opportunity to reevaluate the law of standing in accordance with the
policies enunciated in Flast v. Cohen" and as a consequence, a new
standard has emerged. The pronounced requirement that a complainant
need only "arguably" show that he is "within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated by the statute" has in effect overruled the
long line of cases4 2 holding that the plaintiff must prove he is within a
class protected by a relevant statute. It must be determined, however,
37.
the three
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

The minority felt that consideration of petitioner's claim should involve treatment of
separate, discrete, and complicated issues-standing, reviewability, and the merits.
38 U.S.L.W. at 4200.
United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
38 U.S.L.W. at 4193.
392 U.S. 83 (1968).
See note 7 supra.
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if this new standard will yield any practical results. On its face, this
requirement would seem merely to postpone the determination of the
success of plaintiff's claim. It is doubtful whether the ultimate result
in any case will be different than it would have been prior'to this
decision because the plaintiff, in order to succeed on the merits, must
still show that a legal right as opposed to an interest has been
violated.43 Interpreted differently, it may be argued that the majority
intends that once standing has been granted the only appropriate
question on the merits is whether the alleged activity is lawful. 44
Whichever view of the instant case is adopted, it is inevitable that "new
and novel lawsuits" will result.45 The Court's emphasis on the trend
toward enlarging the class of people with standing to litigate
administrative actions and its emphasis on the fact that the interest to
be protected "may reflect 'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational'
as well as economic values" 46 indicates that challenges to agency
decisions on pollution and conservation issues as well as zoning,
highway, and mass transit matters may be forthcoming. This decision
may open the doors of the courts to those persons who have been
allowed to intervene in administrative actions but have been denied
standing in judicial actions; 7 these persons may well be deemed to
satisfy the "arguably within the zone of interests" requirement.
The Court seems to have found a middle ground between the
narrow legal right view and the more liberal injury in fact view.
However, the fact that the complainant has to allege only that he is
arguably within the statute indicates that the Court has gone almost
to the injury in fact test. The majority's statement that "[t]he question
of standing . . . . concerns, apartfrom the 'case' or 'controversy' test,
the question whether the interest sought to be protected . . . is

arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute
... .,,8 indicates that they view the question of standing as being
comprised of two parts-a constitutional inquiry to determine if a case
43. The instant case was remanded for a hearing on the merits. The dissent stated that on
the merits the plaintiff would still have to prove that a specific legal interest protected by statute

has been invaded.
44. This interpretation receives some logical support from the fact that both the majority
and the dissent spoke of enlarging the class of persons with standing and a need to gain relief

from the complexities of government. It may be inferred that in order for any new relief to be
granted,
granted.
45.
46.
47.
48.

the question of legal right must be removed entirely from consideration after standing is
Wall Street Journal, March 4, 1970, at 6, col. 2 (S.W. ed.).
38 U.S.L.W. at4194.
See, e.g., Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U.S. 249 (1930).
38 U.S.L.W. at 4194 (emphasis added).
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or controversy exists and a nonconstitutional inquiry into the zone of
statutory interests. From this language it may be surmised that while
injury in fact gives the appropriate constitutionally required
adverseness, there must also be a consideration of the nonconstitutional
element for judicial policy reasons. 4 However, the traditional
justification for this second inquiry-that it is good policy to limit the
number of persons challenging government action 5 -appears
inconsistent with the Court's indorsement of a trend toward
enlargement of the class of people who may protest administrative
action. Yet it is significant that the Court has recognized that the only
constitutional requirement for standing is injury in fact; any other
requirement for standing is of judicial construction and may be done
away with upon judicial discretion.
The majority's pronounced requirement that the complainant
arguably fall within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute
has done little to clear up the confusion in the area of administrative
standing. As the dissent points out, "the Court's formulation of its
nonconstitutional element of standing is obscure."'" The meaning of
"arguably" is uncertain; thus, in applying this formulation the courts
may continue to confuse the merits of the controversy with the question
of standing. 5 The approach of the dissent may offer the best resolution
of the law in this complicated area. By dividing the consideration of
the Court into three distinct issues -standing, reviewability, and the
merits-and requiring that standing be based only upon actual harm,
the constitutional requirement for a case or controversy would be met
and considerable confusion would be avoided.

Constitutional Law-Abortion-Standard Excepting Abortions
Done as "Necessary for the Preservation of the Mother's Life or
Health" Held Unconstitutionally Vague
Defendants, a nurse's aide and a physician licensed in the District
of Columbia, sought to dismiss indictments under a District of
49.

See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92 & n.6 (1968);

JAFFE,

supra note 13, at 502.

50. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 93 (1968); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487
(1923).
51. 38 U.S.L.W. at4201.
52. "What precisely must a plaintiff do to establish that 'the interest sought to be protected
. . . is arguably within the zone of interests .to be protected or regulated by the statute'? How

specific an 'interest' must he advance? Will a broad, general claim, such as competitive interest,
suffice, or must he identify a specific legally protected interest?" 38 U.S.L.W. at 4201 (Brennan,
J. dissenting).
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Columbia statute which provided a felony penalty for an abortion'
performed on any' woman unless "done as necessary for the

preservation of the mothe--s-life or health and under the direction of a
competent licensed practitioner of medicine." '2 The defendants asserted
that the statute in its entirety must fall since the "life or health"

standard was unconstitutionally vague and improperly limited the
physician in carrying out his professional responsibilities to the
pregnant woman. Furthermore, since hospitals differed in interpreting
the language, the statute denied equal protection to certain economic
groups and denied the constitutional right of a woman, regardless of

economic circumstances, to determine whether or not she shall bear a
child. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
held, judgment for the defendants. The "preservation of life or health"
standard was unconstitutionally vague since it did not provide the
physician with the certainty due process of raw considers essential.
Vuitch v. District of Columbia, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969),
appeal docketed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Feb. 5, 1970) (No. 1155).

At English common law, aborting a woman was an offense only
if done after "quickening ' 3 since only after the mother first felt fetal
movement was life considered developed enough to warrant protection
by the state. Early American courts accepted the "quickening"

distinction, 4 but as government performed an increasing role in
protecting health and safety, the states replaced the common law
formula with legislation prohibiting all abortions except those
performed under the few circumstances the legislatures felt justified.5
The prevailing pattern was an absolute prohibition except for the
1. Abortion is the expulsion of the fetus at so early a stage of uterogestation that it has
not acquired the ability of sustaining an independent life. A criminal abortion is the wilful
bringing about of an abortion without statutory justification or excuse. I Am. JUR, 2d
Abortion § 1 (1962).
2. The statute provides: "Whoever, by means, of any instrument, medicine, drug or other
means whatever, procures or produces, or attempts to procure or produce an abortion or
miscarriage on any woman, unless the same were done as necessary for the preservation of the
mother's life or health and under the direction of a competent licensed practitioner of medicine,
shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one year or not more than ten years, or if
the death of the mother results therefrom, the person procuring or producing, or attempting to
procure or produce the abortion or miscarriage shall be guilty of second degree murder." D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967) (emphasis added).
3. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 101 (1957). Quickening is the state of gestation, usually 16
to 20 weeks after conception, when the mother first feels fetal movement.
4. E.g. Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 204 (1879); Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass.
(9 Met.) 263 (1845); Commonwealth v. Bangs, 9 Mass. 387 (1812). For a discussion of the
common law see Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the
Fetus, 1664-1968:A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411,418-28 (1968).

5. See L. LADER,

ABORTION

86-87 (1966).
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purpose of saving the mother's life.' The District of Columbia statute
went further and recognized preservation of health as an independent
justification. 7 While there is no significant case law under the District
of Columbia statute, there are numerous decisions interpreting statutes
which contain only the language "necessary to preserve the life of the

woman." There is wide agreement that the words do not mean that the
peril to life must be imminent and certain but only that a dangerous
condition "be potentially present, even though its full development
might be delayed to a greater or less extent." 8 There is controversy,
however, whether the words go so far as to include the health and well-

being of the woman? Under the standard the determination that an
abortion is necessary to preserve the woman's life is regarded as a

medical decision, but the opinion of the individual physician is not of
itself authoritative. The diagnosis and performance of the operation
must conform to the recognized and approved standards of the
physicians practicing in the community. 10 In People v. Belous," the
Supreme Court of California questioned such a standard in ruling that

the state had not demonstrated a compelling interest which would
warrant interference with the fundamental constitutional right of the
6. Only Louisiana does not justify abortion on any grounds. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:87
(Supp. 1969). Massachusetts and Pennsylvania have statutes which prohibit any abortion
performed "unlawfully." MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 19 (1968); PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4716
(1963). The Massachusetts Supreme Court recently ruled that the word "unlawfully" was not
unconstitutionally vague because it has been made definite by judicial decisions which state that
a physician may lawfully perform an abortion if he acts in good faith and in an honest belief
that the operation is necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the woman. Kudish v.
Board of Registration in Medicine, 248 N.E.2d 264 (Mass. 1969).
7. Seven other states have a similar provision. See ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1958); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951 (West Supp. 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2-50 to 51 (Supp. 1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1201-02 (Supp. 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-410
(Supp. 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-1 (Supp. 1969).
8. State v. Dunkelbarger, 206 Iowa 971, 980, 221 N.W. 592, 596 (1928) (pregnant girl had
threatened to kill herself). See People v. Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204 (1959)
(abortion justified in the case of a woman who was very nervous, had 2 previous miscarriages
and menstrual complications); State v. Hatch, 138 Minn. 317, 164 N.W. 1017 (1917).
9. Compare People v. Abarbanel, 239 Cal. App. 2d 31, 48 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1965)
(psychiatrists recommendation is justification for performing an abortion), with State v.
Brandenburg, 58 A.2d 709 (N.J. 1948) (court of appeals upheld trial court's refusal to charge
the jury that protection of patient's well-being would constitute lawful justification for performing
an abortion).
10. Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 341 Mass. 675, 171 N.E.2d 850 (1961); Commonwealth v.
Nason, 252 Mass. 545, 148 N.E. 110 (1925); State v. Powers, 155 Wash. 63, 283 P. 439 (1929).
It is implicit that the physician have a good faith and honest belief that the abortion is
necessary to preserve the mother's life. The jury is allowed to infer from the circumstances
whether this is so. Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 53 N.E.2d 4 (1944).
II. 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194 (1969). The Supreme Court has refused to review the
merits of the case. 38 U.S.L.W. 3313 (Feb. 24, 1970).
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mother to life and to choose whether to bear children. Consequently,
the court held that the term "necessary to preserve" was not
sufficiently certain to satisfy due process requirements without
improperly infringing on the woman's constitutional rights.,'
In deciding the present case, the court first determined that the
exceptions which justified an abortion evidenced a concern with the
medical factors bearing on the circumstances of the pregnaht woman
and a belief in the clear necessity of placing the matter in the hands of
competent doctors. Since no evidence presented refuted the original
proposition of Congress that abortion cannot be safely and hygenically
performed at any stage of pregnancy except under medical direction,
the court ruled that the part of the statute prohibiting abortions not
performed by a qualified licensed practitioner of medicine was a
constitutionally valid exercise of the police power. The court found,
however, that the "life or health" exception was not sufficiently precise
to guide the physician. The word "health", undefined, did not indicate
whether the standard encompassed varying degrees of mental health as
well as physical health. More importantly, no body of medical
knowledge delineated what degree of mental or physical health or
combination of the two is required to make an abortion legal or illegal
under the standard. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the good
faith professional judgment that an abortion was necessary to preserve
a woman's health should not be open to challenge by a jury's
acceptance or non-acceptance of an individual doctor's interpretation
of the ambivalent and uncertain word. 3 Consequently, the standard
was unconstitutionally vague since it did not give the doctor the
certainty which is essential to due process in a criminal statute. The
12. The court found that the fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear
children followed from the Supreme Court's and the California court's repeated acknowledgement
of a "right of privacy" or "liberty" in matters related to marriage, family, and sex. 80 Cal. Rptr.
354, 359, 458, P.2d 194, 199-200. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (statute
prohibiting interracial marriages violated due process); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485-86 (1965) (state law prohibiting the use of contraceptives violated the constitutional right to
martial privacy), Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 536, 541 (1942)
(marriage and procreation involve a basic liberty).

Since California had already adopted a more liberal abortion statute at the time the case
reached the court, the case has had limited importance.
13. The words "unless necessary for the preservation of life or health" in the District of
Columbia statute are "intended to furnish the defense an opportunity for justification and are
no part of the description of the offense required to be proved by the prosecution." Peckham v.
United States, 210 F.2d 693, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1953). See also Williams v. United States, 138 F.2d.
81, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1943). For a survey of where other states place the burden of proof, see Harper,
Abortion Laws in the United States, in AnoRTIoN IN THE UNITED STATES 187 (M. Calderone

ed. 1958).
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court then ruled that striking this standard did not leave unprotected
the proper and separate legislative objective of protecting the pregnant
woman from incompetent medical treatment. Consequently, the statute
was severable, 4 and the court held that abortions may now be
performed under the statute only at the direction of a competent
physician.15
Unlike the Belous decision, the court found it unnecessary to stress
the tenuous constitutional right of women to choose to bear children,
but rather invalidated the preservation of life or health standard for a
more conspicuous weakness- vagueness from the physician's
viewpoint. The statute offers little assistance to the physican faced with
this delicate problem." There are no statutory guidelines to elucidate
what constitutes a threat to the pregnant woman's life or health and
the case law does little more than stress the inherent competence of the
medical profession for setting its own standards. 7 Yet, the medical
profession does not agree on the meaning of the words or the extent
to which they justify abortion.' 8 Consequently, it is unfair to reserve the
power to punish the physician when, in fact, the statute requires
14. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); Stewart v. Washington, 301 F.
Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1969).
15. The court acknowledged the defendants' argument that the statute denied equal
protection because the exception was more liberally applied in some private hospitals than in the
city hospitals, but added that eliminating the preservation of life or health standard removed the
principal basis for existing uncertainty so that now the statute would be evenly applied throughout
the city.
For a comprehensive examination of the constitutional questions raised by abortion statutes
see Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration of State
Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REv. 731 (1968).
16. Since the doctor is exposed to liability only if he performs the operation, he is likely to
be reluctant to terminate the pregnancy except in the most obvious case. This conservative
tendancy may deny a woman a justifiable abortion-a decison for which she has no legal recourse.
See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967). Furthermore, the doctor's position is
especially difficult when he knows that if he refuses, the woman may then seek out a criminal
abortionist who operates in conditions which are clearly dangerous to her life and health.
17. Beyond agreement that the woman does not have to be at death's door, there is little
valuable instruction for the physician. See notes 8 & 9 supra and accompanying text.
On the other hand, the California statute, which is one of the most permissive, specifically
excepts, among others, physical and mental health indices. The statute defines mental health as
intending mental illness to the extent that the woman is dangerous to herself or to the person or
property of others or is in need of supervision of restraint. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25954
(West Supp. 1970).
18. In one case study, II hypothetical applications for abortion were submitted to 29
California hospitals. Two clearly required abortion to save the mother's life; two were
questionable; and the remaining were delicate problems but in the researcher's estimation, were
not justifiable as necessary to save the woman's life. Results showed that each request would have
been accepted in at least one hospital. Packer & Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in
Law and Medicine, I I STAN. L. REv. 417, 444 (1959).
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nothing more than his medical determination that the woman's
circumstances fall within the exception." Not only has the growth of

psychiatry complicated the medical circumstances bearing upon the
abortion decision,20 but the advances made in modern medical practice

have rendered the standard archaic . 2 When abortion was a very
dangerous operation, the standard may have been meaningful. The
cases when that alternative was chosen were rare and could be

diagnosed consistently.22 Today, however, it is safer for the woman to
have a hospital abortion in the first three months of pregnancy than it
is to carry the pregnancy to term. 23 Interpreting the standard literally
then, the physician conceivably could act to preserve the woman's life

by terminating a statistically dangerous condition.
The documented uncertainty in the medical profession concerning
this type of statute and the inconsistency in its application evidence that
the life or health standard does not meet the first essentials of due
19. The Supreme Court has ruled that the delegation of decision-making power to a directly
involved individual violated the fourteenth amendment. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
The doctor's position vis-a-vis the statute is particularly sensitive since the authority
justifying falling within the exception is his exercise of discretionary judgment that the abortion
is necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman. While it appears that legislatures enacted
the statute primarily to provide the woman with the medically safer alternative, the popular conception is that the standard is a limitation protecting the fetus from destruction. See Means,
supra note 4, at 434-41. This confusion is crucial because it is the lay jury's responsibility to determine whether the physician's exercise of discretion was in fact justified. See note 9 supra.
A solution seems to lie in a procedure similar to the .one enacted by California which provides
an authoritative pre-operative procedure through hospital committees. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 25951-4 (West Supp. 1970). This not only enables the performing physician to predict
his potential criminal liability and shifts the burden of unjustifiable abortion to the committee,
but also reduces the inconsistency in granting permission to perform abortions. See also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). A recent survey, however, revealed serious
short-comings in many of the liberalized abortion laws, including California's. Interviews with
physicians and hospital officials indicated that many doctors were still uncertain of their liabilities
under the new law. N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1970, at 1, col. 6.
20. Guttmacher, The Shrinking Non-Psychiatric Indicationsfor Therapeutic Abortions, in
THERAPEUTIC ABORTIONS 12 (H. Rosen ed. 1954).
21. Many of the abortion statutes are over 100 years old-before the advent of antiseptic
surgery and the findings of Joseph Lister. The District of Columbia statute was enacted in 1901,
before curettage, the most widely used abortion technique, became routinely safe after the
development of antibiotics in the early 1940's. See authorites cited, People v. Belous, 80 Cal. Rptr.
354, 360-61, 458 P.2d 194, 200-01 (1969).
22. The evidence indicates that abortion statutes were enacted to protect women from the
inherent dangers accompanying the operation. Because of uncontrollable infection, any form of
surgery involving insertion of instruments into the body cavity was highly dangerous; abortion
was accordingly, an extremely dangerous procedure at the time the statutes were enacted. See
Means, supra note 4, at 434-41.
23. People v. Belous, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 361 n.7, 458 P.2d at 201 n.7 (1969).
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process.24 The immediate effect of striking down the standard is to
legalize abortion in the District of Columbia at the demand of the

pregnant woman; more importantly, the decision, if upheld, will nullify
abortion

statutes in the almost 40 states which have similar

provisions. Since the growing pressures for the repeal of all restrictions
on the abortion decision have been successful recently in reforming two

state abortion laws,21 it may be that legislatures will require no more
than the private decision between the woman and her physician to

justify an abortion. At any event, in the effort to make the statutory
provisions consistent with .modern medical practice, the re-examination
of abortion policy seems overdue.

Constitutional Law-Civil Rights- Discrimination by a Third

Party'in Connection with the Rental of Property Entitles the
Injured Party to a Private Right of Damages Under Section 1982
Petitioners, a Negro lessee and his white lessor, brought an action

for monetary and injunctive relief against defendant corporation,
alleging discrimination in violation of section 1982 of title 42 of the

United States Code.' The defendant, 'a Virginia corporation, was
organized to operate recreational facilities for the benefit of the

subdivision in which the lessor's house was located. A shareholder in
the corporation and his immediate family were entitled to use the
corporation's recreational facilities and the share could be assigned by

the shareholder to the lessee of his-residence, subject to approval by the
board. After receiving such an assignment of the lessor's shares in the
24. "[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process.
...
Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385,
391 (1926).
It is also important to note that the instant court indicated that the inconsistent application
of the statute denied poorer women equal protection of the law. See note 15 supra.
25. Both New York and Hawaii recently repealed statutes which were more than 100 years
old and had .authorized abortions only if the woman's life was in danger. The new New York
statute permits an abortion for any reason up to the 24th week of the pregnancy. After the 24th
week, abortions can be performed only to save the mother's life. N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1970, at
1,col. 1.The Hawaiian statute legalizes abortion at the request of the woman if performed by a
licensed physician or osteopath in a hospital licensed by the state or federal government. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 25, 1970, at 1, col. 6.
1. The section states: "All citizens of the United States have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964).
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corporation as partial consideration for the lease of the residence,
petitioner was refused admittance to the nonstock corporation and was
denied use of its facilities. 2 In addition, the defendant corporation
expelled the white petitioner from membership for his activities in the
Negro's behalf.3 The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals dismissed the

action on procedural grounds, stating that the appeal was not perfected
in the manner provided by the rules of court.4 On certiorari to the

United States Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded.
Discrimination by a third party in connection with the rental of
property entitles the injured party to a private right of action for
damages under section 1982. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396
U.S. 229 (1969).

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co.,5 section 1982 had been a relatively little-used civil rights
statute. Originally enacted as section one of the Civil Rights Act of
1866,6 the ambiguous language of the statute, 7 coupled with its unclear
2. After assignment of the membership share to the lessee, the board of directors for the
corporation refused to approve petitioner's membership. Since there were no membership
standards or previous patterns of exclusiveness, race was apparently the ground for exclusion.
3. Once the lessor learned of the refusal to admit his lessee into membership, he began a
campaign to convince the board to reverse its decision. As a result of his phone calls to board
members, letters to local clergy, and petitions circulated among residents, the board expelled him,
after tendering cash for his 2 shares.
4. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia originally dismissed the suit pursuant to VA.
Sup. CT. of App. R. 5:1, § 3(f), which requires reasonable written notice to opposing counsel of
the time and place of tendering the transcript of the trial and a reasonable opportunity to examine
the original copy. The court ruled that the appellant's counsel had not given respondent a
reasonable opportunity to examine the trial transcripts even though the respondent's counsel
examined the transcript and did not at that time complain that he lacked time to properly examine
them. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 209 Va. 279, 163 S.E.2d 588 (1968). The Supreme
Court then granted certiorari and remanded the cause to the Virginia court for further
consideration in light of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 392 U.S. 657 (1968). On remand, the Virginia court once again refused to
hear the merits of the case, relying on its former ruling. 209 Va. 279, 163 S.E.2d 588 (1968).
The instant case represents the second-time certiorari was granted. 394 U.S. 942 (1969).
5. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. This Act, passed over the veto of
President Andrew Johnson, was based on the thirteenth amendment, and passed in accordance
with the enabling clause of that amendment, which states that: "Congress shall have the power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CoNsT. amend XIII, § 2. Later, fearing
that the Act was unconstitutional under the thirteenth amendment, Congress re-enacted the 1866
Act in § 18 of the 1870 Enforcement Act, which was based on the fourteenth amendment,
Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964)).
7. See, e.g., Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. CT.
REv. 89, 96-99, 104, where the author argues that the word "right" as used in the statute is not
correlative with duty, thus limiting § 1982 to state-induced discrimination. Other ambiguities are
apparent within § 1982 itself. For example, the Court in Jones listed the areas of possible
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legislative history,' served as the greatest deterrent to its effective use.9
As a result, early Supreme Court cases under section 1982 assumed
that the section only prohibited discrimination by state action,10
although prior to Jones the Court had not faced squarely the issue of
private discrimination under section 1982.11 The earlier restriction to

state action came from two sources: (1)application of section 1982 to
the fourteenth amendment; and (2) restrictive interpretation of the

2
thirteenth amendment provisions. Although the Civil Rights Cases"

left open the question whether section 1982 was authorized solely by
the thirteenth amendment,' 3 one of the few cases before Jones which
actually relied on the statute intimated that the fourteenth amendment
provided, at least in part, the constitutional authority upon which

section 1982 was based,' 4 thus subjecting the section to the state action
discrimination which § 1982 purportedly did not cover, including discrimination in the provision
of services and facilities. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968). In the instant
case, however, the Court explicitly recognized that a cause of action exists against a third party
service facility which is not a party to the lease. 396 U.S. at 236-37. It has been suggested that
§ 1982, due to its all-inclusive language, could bar all discrimination in the sale of such widely
varying types of property as private franchises, corporate stocks, or consumer items. Note, Jones
v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment and the FederalAnti-Discrimination Laws, 69 COLUM. L.
R v. 1019, 1029 (1969). The Court's language in Jones would seem to support this view. 392 U.S.
at 443.
8. Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. Rev. 1323
(1952). Much of the confusion surrounding the Act arose from the re-enactment of the statute in
1870 under the fourteenth amendment. See note 6, supra. The problems in determining the
intention of Congress in passing the Act can readily be seen by comparing Justice Stewart's
opinion for the majority with the dissent by Justice Harlan in the Jones case. 392 U.S. at 409,
449.
9. The state action requirement, although not supported by the language of the statute
alone, evolved from the legislative and judicial confusion surrounding the Act. See, e.g., the court
of appeals' decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392
U.S. 409 (1968), which dismissed plaintiff's cause of action after an extensive investigation of
judicial and legislative history, holding that the section does not bar private discrimination. In
the same. opinion the court indicated, however, that this legislative and judicial history could
possibly support 3 other bases for which to bar private discrimination under § 1982 by using the
thirteenth amendment, the fourteenth amendment, or by relating private subdivision to a
government function. The Supreme Court in Jones selected the first alternative.
10. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78
(1917). See also Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
11. In Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), the only material application of § 1982 by the
Court before Jones, the Court upheld a racially restrictive covenant in Washington, D.C., but
stated that § 1982 prohibited its enforcement in federal courts. While this is the closest case on
the factsto Jones, it did not present a purely private discrimination question. The Jones Court
used this to distinguish Hurd. 392 U.S. at 419.
12. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
13. "Whether this legislation [the 1866 Civil Rights Act] was fully authorized by the
Thirteenth Amendment alone, without the support which it afterward received from the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . it is not necessary to inquire." Id. at 22.
14. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). In that case, the Court stated: "In considering
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requirement as enunciated in the Civil Rights Cases. Furthermore,

restrictive interpretation of the thirteenth amendment, the other
possible basis for the Act, 5 also had the effect of limiting the
application of section 1982 to state-induced discrimination. In those
early cases which had interpreted the amendment, the Court had stated
that private action did not have the effect of reducing the individual to

a condition of slavery, 6 which was then necessary for the application
of the thirteenth amendment.1 7 In the face of this judicial history, the
Court in Jones, analyzing the Act in light of its legislative history,'8
concluded that it was enacted pursuant to the thirteenth amendment
exclusively, which, in their interpretation, authorized legislation to
remove the "badges and incidences" of slavery. Holding that private
discrimination is such a badge or incident, the Court determined that
section 1982 prohibited private discrimination in the sale or rental of
real property.' 9 Even though section 1982 has no express remedial
provisions, 20 the Court declined to deal specifically with the issue of
damages indicating only that equitable relief would be permitted. 21
whether judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants is the kind of governmental action which
the first section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was intended to prohibit, reference must be made
to the scope and purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment; for that statute and the Amendment
were closely related both in inception and in the objectives which Congress sought to achieve."
Id. at 31-32.
15. See notes 7 & 9 supra. The Jones case has prompted considerable writing dealing with
the legislative history of the Act, the result of which has been a split of opinion as to whether
the legislature intended for the Act to rest on the fourteenth amendment and whether they intended
in 1866 for the Act to reach private discrimination. Compare Casper, supra note 7, at 99-125,
with Morris & Powe, Constitutionaland Statutory Rights to Open Housing, 44 WASH. L. REv.
1, 57-74 (1968).
16. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906). In that case, the Court declared that the
thirteenth amendment did not protect individual rights which were not connected with slavery.
The Court in Jones overruled Hodges to the extent that its interpretation of the thirteenth
amendment was inconsistent with the holding in Jones. 392 U.S. at 441 n.78. See Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883), where the Court stated that it would run the slavery argument
into the ground to apply it to private action. Contra, United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322, 330
(E.D. Ark. 1903) where the court stated that private discrimination involves an element of
servitude within the meaning of the thirteenth amendment if the denial of fundamental rights is
based solely on race or color.
17. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime. . . shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XIII, § I. Section 2 of the amendment gives the power to Congress to enforce § I by
appropriate legislation. The Court in Jones held that this enabling clause gave Congress the power
to enforce § I by removing all "badges and incidences" of slavery. 392 U.S. at 438-39.
18. 392 U.S. at 441-43.
19. In a collateral issue, the Court held that § 1982 was not superseded by the provisions
of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § § 3601-31 (Supp. IV, 1968).
20. See note I supra for the text of the statute. The language of the statute is declaratory
and is not framed in the form of a command or prohibition.
21. 392 U.S. at414 n.14.
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Since the decision in Jones, however, federal district courts have
allowed both damages and equitable relief, 22 relying on ample precedent
to the effect that the existence of a statutory right implies an
appropriate remedy.23 Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. section 1343(4)24 and 42
U.S.C. section 19882 have provided a basis upon which damages can

be awarded by giving the federal courts original jurisdiction to award
damages and other relief necessary to effectuate the policy expressed

by these statutes. 2 Since these statutes are bottomed on federal rights,
actions originating in state courts would also be governed by the
appropriate remedies. 2 Later cases in the lower federal courts have
extended the Jones principles to the sale of used residences,2 8 and the
22. See, e.g., Pina v. Homsi, I RACE REL. L. SURVEY 183 (D. Mass. July 10, 1969);
Newbern v. Lake Lorelei, Inc., I RACE REL. L. SURVEY 185 (S.D. Ohio April 22, 1969). In the
Newbern case, the court found that the property owners' association, from which the plaintiffs
had been excluded on the basis of race, was an alter ego of the real estate corporation which
refused to sell land to the plaintiffs because they could not obtain membership in the association.
In this manner, the court managed to avoid the question which was decided in the instant
case-whether discrimination by a third party to the property transaction violates § 1982.
23. See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (judgment in
personam allowed although not provided by statute); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311
U.S. 282 (1940) (equitable relief granted although the act did not state the procedure the claimant
was to employ); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) (civil cause of action given under
act giving only a penal remedy).
24. The section states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person . . . [t]o recover damages or to secureequitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights,
including the right to vote." 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1964). This section does not require that the
amount in controversy exceed $10,000.
25. The section states: "The jurisdiction in civil . . . matters conferred on the district
courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all persons in the United
States in their civil rights . . . shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the
United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where
they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the
constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or
criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of
the cause ....
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1964).
26. See, e.g., Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921
(1961); Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961). Both cases, utilizing § 1988, involve
the application of state survival statutes in determining survival of a cause of action under federal
civil rights statutes.
27. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), where, in an action originating in state
court under the Emergency Price Control Act, the court stated: "If an act of Congress gives a
penalty to a party aggrieved, without specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason
why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some act of Congress, by a proper
action in a State court." Id. at 391. The Court also pointed out that states are not free to refuse
enforcement of a federal law if it has jurisdiction.
28. Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. I11.1969).
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leasing of houses2 and apartments."0
In the present case, the Court, noting that section 1982 reached
discriminatory actions by private parties, held that the defendant's
conduct was clearly prohibited. The Court found that the membership
share, whether it was considered to be either realty or personalty, was
within the protection of section 1982, since a portion of the purchase
price for the leasehold was in consideration for the assignment of the
share. Holding that the right to lease is protected from the
discriminatory actions of third parties as well as the immediate lessor,3
the Court found that the defendant's "action in refusing to approve the
assignment of the membership share to be clearly an interference with
the right to 'lease'. 13 In addition, the Court found that the expulsion
of the lessor was also a violation of 1982, reasoning that punishment
for trying to vindicate protected minority rights would serve to
perpetuate racial restrictions on property. Although 1982 has no
provisions for damages, the Court held that "the existence of a
statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate
remedies." ' Analogizing from section 1988, the Court directed that
both state and federal rules of damages could be utilized to fashion a
remedy consistent with federal policy.3' In his dissent Justice Harlan
objected to the Court's ruling, considering it unwise to expand a vague
statute in an area where Congress has already provided comprehensive
legislation.3 5 Furthermore, the dissent felt that the Court's
interpretation of section 1982 was not definitive on either the issue of
statutory coverage or damages and added further confusion to an
already vague statute.
29. Vaughn v. Ting Su, 1 RACE REL. L. SURVEY 45 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 1968); Bush v.
Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
30. Taylor v. Castagna, 1 RACE REL. L. SURVEY 43 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1968); Pina v.
Homsi, I RACE REL. L. SURVEY 183 (D. Mass. July 10, 1969).
31. "There has never been any doubt but that Freeman paid part of his $129 monthly rental
for the assignment of the membership share in Little Hunting Park." 396 U.S. at 236-37.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 239.
34. "[A]s we read § 1988 . . . both federal and state rules on damages may be utilized,

whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes." Id. at 240.
35. Justice Harlan, relying on Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955), was of
the opinion that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted in light of
the 1968 Fair Housing Act. In that case, a statute, which did not govern the petitioner's case,

but which decided precisely the same issues as were before the Court, caused the writ of certiorari
to be dismissed. The Court stated that its jurisdiction should not be utilized "for the benefit of
particular litigants." Id. at 74. The Jones Court dismissed this contention by pointing out that

the 1968 Fair Housing Act and § 1982 have remarkably different coverage. 392 U.S. at 417 n.21.
For a comparison of the coverage of the 2 statutes, see Smedley, A ComparativeAnalysis of Title
VII and Section 1982, 22 VAND. L. REV. 459 (1969).

1970]

RECENT CASES

Rights created by. statute would be meaningless if there were not
a judicial remedy provided for the disregard of such rights when no
explicit remedy exists within the statutory framework itself. Rights are
dependent upon remedies for their redress; denial of such relief would,
in effect, transfer the consequences of the legal wrong to the victim,
causing him to suffer in his innocence. To infer such a purpose to
Congress would be paradoxical-recognizing a right while denying its
effectiveness. This assumes, of course, that the right recognized is the
right which the legislature intended to protect. Arguable ambiguities
aside, it is not unusual that the Court, holding that protecti6n against
private discrimination was the right created by Congress in 1866,
provided monetary and equitable relief commensurate with the broad
scope of the Act.36 Accepting, arguendo, that section 1982 bars private
discrimination, the Court was not really breaking new ground by
allowing damages, but was applying an established legal principle to
section 1982. It has long been held that
[t]he power to enforce implies the power to make effective the right of recovery
afforded by the act. And the power to make the right of recovery effective implies
the power to utilize any of the procedures or actions normally
available to the
3
litigants according to the exigencies of the particular caseY.

Furthermore, when the statute which condemns the act is bottomed on
a federal right, it becomes the duty of any court of competent
jurisdiction, whether it be a state or federal court, to afford a remedy
for breach of the statutory duty consistent with federal policy.
Conflicting state law and policy must yield. In this respect, federal
policy can be inferred from other statutory authority. As mentioned
earlier, section 1343(4) confers original jurisdiction upon federal
district courts for damages or other equitable relief for violation of any
civil rights statute." Section 1988 also allows these courts to use
whatever other remedies are available to protect these rights where the
statute does not provide an adequate remedy.3 9 In utilizing section
1988, a simple test evolves: "what is needed in the particular case...
to make the civil rights statutes fully effective?" 40 The reasoning
process is relatively simple: first look to federal law; if it is not
sufficient, then apply state law. State law may be used whenever it is
appropriate to supplement the federal remedy. Congress, having the
36. 396 U.S. at 238-40. The Court also extended the application of § 1982 to third parties
to the lease, when their actions amount to an interference with the right to lease.
37. Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940).
38. See note 24, supra.

39. See notes 25 & 27 supra and accompanying text.
40. Brazier v.Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 409 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
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power to create the right, also has the power to prescribe the remedy.
"It [section 1988] reflects a purpose on the part of Congress that the
redress available will effectuate the broad policies of the civil rights
st-atutes." 4 1 In order to carry out the purpose of Congress under 1982,
or any other civil rights statute, both state and federal courts should
apply a remedy with protection of the individual's civil rights as the
overriding consideration. Unfortunately, the Court failed to set any
guidelines for the measure of damages and has apparently left this to
the discretion of the lower courts on a case-by-case basis. As a result,
widely divergent remedies have been utilized, with no consistent
patterns developing.4" While flexibility is desired in the area of
compensatory damages, the application of a federal right requires some
degree of uniformity in determining the other types of damages to be
awarded, in order to assure an equal application of the laws to all
citizens. The problem is especially apparent in the areas of punitive
damages and awards of attorneys' fees. It is submitted that these
awards are proper and should be allowed with the Court setting the
guidelines for their application. For example, actions evincing an
element of maliciousness or wantonness could be used as the standard
for allowing punitive damages. Attorneys' fees should also be awarded
since this has been one of the greatest obstacles to bringing an action
to enforce civil rights. Such relief would equalize section 1982 with the
1968 Act in this area.4
41.
42.

Id.at408.
An analysis of the cases which have been decided in federal district courts under § 1982

since the ruling in Jones demonstrates this fact. Some courts have allowed: attorneys' fees, e.g.,

Pina v. Homsi, I RACE REL. L. SURVEY 183 (D. Mass. July 10, 1969); damages for mental

distress, e.g.. Vaughn v. Ting Su, I RACE

REL.

L.

SURVEY

45 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 1968); and

punitive damages, e.g., Newbern v. Lake Lorelei, Inc., I RACE REL. L. SURVEY 185 (S.D. Ohio

April 22, 1969). On the other hand, damages have been denied altogether in Lee v. Southern
Home Sites Corp., I RACE REL. L. SURVEY 131 (S.D. Miss. April 7, 1969), on the basis that
the plaintiff suffered no harm since he was allowed to purchase the lot under court order. The
court in Harris v. Jones, 296 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Mass. 1969), refused any monetary relief,
applying a de minimus rule. In these last 2 cases, apparently the courts were concerned only with

compensatory damages, not considering relief for. mental distress, attorneys' fees, or punitive
damages.

43. The 1968 Act allows the court to award attorneys' fees. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (Supp.
IV, 1968). For a good discussion of the possible guidelines for remedies under § 1982 and a

comparison with remedies provided in the 1968 Fair Housing Act, see Note, supra note 7, at 103554. The author also suggests that punitive damages could be given as an alternative to attorneys'
fees. Id. at 1039-40.
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Constitutional Law-Double Jeopardy-Benton v. Maryland
Applies Retroactively to State Criminal Convictions
Appellant was acquitted of a first degree murder charge, but was
convicted of first degree manslaughter.' On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Kansas, the conviction was reversed because of an erroneous
instruction. 2 The trial court, on remand, rejected appeliant's contention
that she could be reprosecuted only for first degree manslaughter and
charged her with first degree murder. The jury again returned a first
degree manslaughter conviction which the Supreme Court of Kansas
affirmed.3 Appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus with a federal
district court contending that the Supreme Court's decision in Benton
v. Maryland applied retroactively to prevent state courts from twice
subjecting one to jeopardy for the same offense.5 The district court
*dismissed the petition. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, held, reversed. The constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy applies retroactively to state criminal convictions. Booker v.
Phillips,418 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1969).
Supreme Court decisions involving a constitutional rule carry no
constitutional mandate that the rule must be applied either
prospectively or retrospectively.' At common law, the Blackstonian
view (the declaratory theory) applied judicial decisions retroactively
1. Appellant, Edna Mae Booker, was charged with the murder of her husband, James
Booker, after an argument concerning her extramarital relations.
2. State v. Booker, 197 Kan. 13, 415 P.2d 411 (1966). The erroneous instruction involved
a statute which prohibited anyone other than a law enforcement officer from carrying a concealed
weapon. Since appellant was not charged with carrying a concealed weapon, the instruction was
found to be prejudicial to appellant's rights.
3. State v. Booker, 200 Kan. 166, 434 P.2d 801 (1967). After this decision, appellant began

serving her sentence from which she now seeks a release.
4, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment applicable to states
through the fourteenth amendment).
5. Appellant claimed protection under the fifth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V:
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb ....
6. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966) (Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), do not apply retroactively). At least
one author has suggested that a prospective decision is one which only operates in the future and
has no effect on the parties in the case, while a retroactive or retrospective decision looks
backward to the rights of convicted parties. See, e.g., Note, Criminal Procedure-Retroactivity
And The Linkletter Case, 39 TaMp. L.Q. 81, 82-84 (1965). Even though this strict definition of
prospectivity would not have included the defendant in Benton, the Supreme Court applied its
decision to the defendant. Consequently, this comment uses "prospective" to mean a decision
affecting parties in their case and in the future. Retroactivity can have different meanings
including "limited" and "unlimited" effect. For an analysis, see Annot., 14 L. Ed. 2d 992, 993
n.4 (1965).
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because judges were viewed as discoverers of law which had always
existed. 7 Consequently, overruled decisions were never law, and new
rules demanded retroactive application. The concept of prospectivity,
which was a subsequent development, is premised on the assumption
that prior decisions are valid law until judges make new law. Therefore,
a change in judicial interpretation necessitates only prospective
application.8 American courts exercised an almost exclusive preference
for the retroactive view9 until Justice Cardozo contended that a state
could choose to apply a principle either backward or forward."0
Recognizing this choice, the Supreme Court rendered numerous
criminal law decisions in the 1960's which necessitated a ruling as to
their retroactivity. Initially, the Court reasoned that if the new
constitutional rule affected the integrity of the fact-finding process, it
must be given retroactive treatment. Various rules which have fallen
within this category and have been applied retroactively are as follows:
the right to counsel at trial," at some forms of arraignment, 2 or on
appeal; 3 the inadmissability of clearly coerced confessions;'4 and the
availability of transcripts to indigents. 5 Despite this general guideline,
the Supreme Court faced the prospect of answering numerous
retroactivity questions without a clear cut standard. In order to
expedite this determination, the Court established a test in Linkletter
v. Walker" that balances three criteria: "(a) the purpose to be served
by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new
7.
COMm

See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-24 (1965); I W. BLACKSTONE
rARIES 69 (3d rev. ed., T. Cooley ed. 1884); Note, supra note 6.

8. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-24 (1965); Note, supra note 6. The
best example of the reasoning behind a prospective ruling is a contract made in reliance upon a
court decision. The validity of the contract should not be adversely affected by future court
decisions.
9. See, e.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886) (an act held unconstitutional
was treated as though it had never been passed).
10. Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932) (states may decide
whether to apply new inteipretations of common or statutory law prospectively or retrospectively).

See, e.g., Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940) (an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified).
11.
12.
13.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963):

14. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
15. Eskridge v. Washington, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
16. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). The Court denied retroactivity to its holding in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), that illegally seized evidence must be excluded in state prosecutions.
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standards.' 7 This more specific test suggests that if the purpose of the
new rule affects the fairness of a trial, the rule will be applied
retroctively. Since Linkletter, however, the trend has been to utilize the
three factors and deny retroactivity to numerous decisions: for
example, the right to trial by jury in state criminal cases; 8 the right to
counsel at a pretrial lineup; 9 the violation of the privilege against selfincrimination when the prosecutor or trial judge comments upon a
criminal defendant's failure to testify, 0 and the Miranda warnings.2 ' In
the area of double jeopardy, the Cofrt's most recent pronouncement
in Benton v. Maryland22 held that the double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment is applicable to the states. The Court's failure,
however, to state whether its holding was retroactive or prospective
allowed state and federal courts to rule upon Benton's retroactivity.
The first court to address itself to this question was the Missouri
Supreme Court in Spidle v. State,s which indicated that the purpose
of Benton was analogous to the purpose behind granting the right to a
jury trial in state criminal cases. 24 Because the Supreme Court had held
the latter right prospective,2 the Missouri Supreme Court similarly
2
held Benton prospective. 1
In determining whether Benton has retroactive effect, the instant
court applied the Linkletter test27 and assumed that the purpose of the
Benton rule was the decisive criterion. The court suggested that
Benton's purpose was twofold: (1) to prevent the state, with its superior
resources, from repeatedly attempting to convict the accused; and (2)
to avoid the social stigma, harassment, expense, and ordeal that
accompany a trial. 28 Since the effect of this purpose went to the
17. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,297 (1967).
18. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968),
does not apply retroactively).

19.

Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967),

and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), do not apply retroactively).

20. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965), does not apply retroactively).
21.

Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964),

and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), do not apply retroactively).
22.
23.

395 U.S. 784 (1969) (overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)). See note
VAND.'L. REv. 1394 (1969).
446 S.W.2d 793 (Mo. 1969).

24.

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial guaranteed in all criminal

4 supra;22

cases that would come within sixth amendment guarantee if tried in a federal court).
25. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).

26. A contrary conclusion was recently reached in Galloway v. Beto, 38 U.S.L.W. 2390
(5th Cir. Jan. 6, 1970).
27. Text accompanying note 17 supra.
28. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969), quoting Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); 22 VAND. L. REv. 1394, 1395 n.4 (1969).
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inherent fairness and integrity of the fact finding process, the Benton
rule fell within the category of constitutional law cases that has been
applied retroactively. 9 The court further reasoned that the reliance
factor and the effect on the administration of justice support a
retroactive application of Benton. Reliance by law enforcement
officials upon Palko, v. Connecticut,30 the. old standard, was not

sufficiently persuasive to apply Benton prospectively because Palko had
been under attack for several years. Relying upon the purpose of
Benton, the court concluded that it must be given retroactive effect and
applied to prior state criminal convictions.
In its opinion the instant court failed to discuss thoroughly the
merits and demerits of each element in the Linkletter test. The purpose
factor should be used to ascertain whether the underlying purpose of

the court's decision could be adequately effectuated without
retroactivity. Answering this question in the negative, the instant court
indicated that the purpose of Benton must be given retroactive effect

since it pertains to the integrity of the fact-finding process. 3 1Implicit in
this argument is the assumption that there is a "serious risk that the
32
issue of guilt or innocence may not have been reliably determined"
in the appellant's trial. Double jeopardy, however, has little relation to
the reliability of the determination of the accused's guilt,33 because the
29. Text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
30. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Even though under attack by scholars, Palko had allowed states
to subject the accused to double jeopardy in the absence of a controlling state constitutional
provision. See United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 913 (1966).
31. The argument stressing the integrity of the fact-finding process has firm proponents as
well as critics. Compare Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, Foreword: The High Court,
the Great Writ. and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965), with
Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process:A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHi.
L. REV. 719 (1966). A strict interpretation of this argument theorizes that new constitutional rules
apply prospectively unless a fair trial was totally impossible without this right. Despite the case
with which courts specify the integrity of the fact-finding process, its value as the sole factor for
granting retroactivity may be unjustified in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Tehan v.
United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966). In this decision, the Court denied retroactivity
to Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which prohibited judges and prosecutors from
commenting upon the accused's failure to testify. Certainly, this right goes to the essence of a
fair trial.
32. Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 295 (1968) (per curiam).
33. See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 741. It can be argued that facing double jeopardy
subjectively affects the fairness of a trial. For example, although the Tenth Circuit concluded that
the accused should have been charged with first degree manslaughter, the defendant was charged
with first degree murder in his retrial. The jurors, reasoning that the crime was not sufficiently
heinous to justify the charge, may have agreed upon a lesser degree of punishment. Thus the
degree of puinishment was possibly affected by the charge of first degree murder. If the accused
had faced the proper manslaughter charge, the punishment may have been even less. The strength
of this reasoning, however, may be too speculative to justify a retroactive application of Benton.
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right to be free from double jeopardy involves immunity from trial and
not the fairness of the trial.u In Benton, the Supreme Court suggested

a different interpretation of the purpose behind its ruling by
analogizing double jeopardy with the right to trial by jury.

Since the

Supreme Court denied retroactivity to the fundamental right to jury
trial, 8 the conclusion follows that the Court, reasoning that the
purpose of Benton can be accomplished without granting retroactivity,
will deny retroactivity to Benton. 37
Similarly, the reliance by law enforcement officials and the effect

on the administration of justice prescribe that Benton be ruled
prospective. The prosecutor in the instant case justifiably relied upon

the prior status of the law and could not have been reasonably expected
to act in accord with anticipated legal changes.3 Finally, the possibility

that the retroactive application of a constitutional rule will free many
convicted prisoners merits more consideration than the court's opinion
allowed.3 The floodgate problem, however, has been discounted in the

double jeopardy area since almost every state already has some type
of double jeopardy provision in its constitution.

0

This would seem to

militate against an alleged opening of the floodgates on the theory that
few convicts are in state prisons because they were erroneously

subjected to double jeopardy under state law. Even if this were true,
Benton may imply that federal standards of double jeopardy" must be
34. See Galloway v. Beto, 38 U.S.L.W. 2390 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 1970).
35. 395 U.S. at 794. The instant court and the Supreme Court in Benton both quoted
identical language relating to repeated state prosecutions from Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 187-88 (1957). The Supreme Court, however, immediately related such language to the right
to trial by jury. Id. at 796.
36. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
37. Another possible purpose for double jeopardy protection is to restrain the discretionary
power of prosecutors to choose the offense for prosecution of the accused. See, e.g., J. SIGLER,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 15, 155-87 (1969). This purpose could not be served by a retroactive ruling
that would have no effect on power already exercised.
38. The importance of the reliance factor in the area of constitutional rights has been noted.
See, e.g., Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42
N.Y.U.L. REV. 631, 646 (1967).
39. The court only indirectly mentioned this factor in its conclusion by holding that the
writ of habeas corpus should be granted or the prisoner should receive a third trial. If the
convicted person receives another trial, the instant court's own interpretation of Benton's purpose
as the avoidance of repeated trials would be defeated. Granting the writ frees the accused and
lends support to the floodgate argument. For an expression of the 2 views concerning the
importance of the floodgate theory, compare United States v. Clifton, 239 F. Supp. 49, 50-51
(D.D.C. 1965), with Schwartz, supra note 31, at 747. There are problems associated with a trial
many years after an event, such as proof that has been destroyed and witnesses who have died.
See United States ex rel. Angelet v. Fay, 333 F.2d 12, 21 (2d Cir. 1964); Comment, Linkletter,
Shott, and the Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64 MICH. L. REV. 832, 841 (1966).
40. J. SIGLER, supra note 37, at 78-79.
41. See, e.g., 22 VAND. L. REV. 1394, 1396 n.15 (1969).
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applied by the states, thus circumventing state definition of double
jeopardy.42 Even if a state had a double jeopardy provision, retroactive
application of Benton would allow prisoners to petition under the
federal double jeopardy standards with a consequent profusion of writs
of habeas corpus. In conclusion, a more thorough analysis of the three

elements in the Linkletter test suggests that the instant court erred in
holding Benton retroactive. Consequently, it is submitted that the
Supreme Court will deny retroactive application of Benton in accord
3
with the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Spidle v. State.

Copyright-Unfair Competition-Unauthorized Reproduction of
Another's Recording for Resale Violates State Unfair
Competition Doctrine
Plaintiff' sought a temporary injunction against the defendants 2 to
restrain the sale of.recordings allegedly pirated from plaintiff's
phonograph record. 3 After purchasing this record, the defendant
reproduced it without plaintiff's permission on magnetic tape
cartridges at relatively low cost, intending to sell the product in direct
competition with the plaintiff.4 Plaintiff contended that the defendant's
activities amounted to misappropriation' of his work product and
42. Two cases on the Supreme Court docket demonstrate the definitional problem
associated with double jeopardy by questioning the meaning of the phrase "same offense" in the
fifth amendment. See Ashe v. Swenson, 399 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1968); Waller v. State, 213 So. 2d
623 (Fla. 1968).
43. Text accompanying notes 23-26 supra
I. The plaintiff, Capitol Records, Inc., is one of America's leading producers of
phonograph records.
2. The defendants included 5 individuals doing business as Phoenix Tapes.
3. In March of 1968, Capitol distributed for sale a record album by the popular vocal
group, "The Lettermean," entitled "Goi.n' Out of My Head." This album enjoyed considerable
success, grossing $500,000 for Capitol in 4 months and appearing as one of the top 100 albums
on a music industry weekly survey of record sales for 16 weeks. Phoenix purchased the album
on the open market and made a master recording. The master was used to produce tape cartridges
that Phoenix sold to the general public. For a general discussion of record piracy, see Comment,
The Civil Remediesfor Disklegging, 33 S. CAL. L. REv. 190 (1960).
4. In May of 1968, a representative of Phoenix contacted a national tape distributor, told
him that Phoenix was in the business of reproducing records and tapes cartridges recorded by
other companies, and offered to sell the tape cartridge of "Goin' Out of My Head" by "The
Lettermen" for less than the price charged by Capitol Records. When the distributor confronted
the Phoenix representative with the question of record piracy, the representative responded that
since Phoenix intended "to test the law," purchase of their product by a national distributor
would be helpful. The distributor refused to buy the cartridge.
5. For a discussion of the doctrine of misappropriations, see notes 20-28 Infra and
accompanying text.
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provided an unfair trade advantage for the defendant. Asserting that
the plaintiff had no copyright in the record and that passing off6 was

not involved, the defendant claimed that the record was in the public
domain and that the state had no power to enjoin its copy. The

Superior Court, Los Angeles County, granted a preliminary injunction.
On appea 7 to the Court of Appeals, Second Division, held, affirmed.
The unauthorized reproduction by a competing tape manufacturer of

a record company's product for the purpose 'of resale is
misappropriation and subject to injunction under a state's unfair
competition doctrine. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App.
3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1969).
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power "to

promote the progress of Science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective

writings and discoveries." 8 Implementation of this power is found in
the Copyright Act,9 which enables the composer to secure a copyright

in his musical composition.

0

The mechanical reproduction of the

6. For an explanation of passing off, see notes 18 & 19 infra and accompanying text. As
evidence in support of its position, defendants produced the labels from one of the cartridges. On
the front of the cartridge, a label indicated the title of the recorded performance and the name of
the performer. On the back, a label disclosed the following information: "No relationship of any
kind exists between Phoenix and the original recording company nor between this recording
company and the original artists. The tape is not produced under a license of any kind from the
original company nor the recording artist(s) and neither the original recording company nor
artist(s) receives a fee or royalty of any kind from Phoenix. Permission to produce this tape has
not been sought nor obtained from any party whatsoever." Although Phoenix paid no fee or
royalty to Capitol or "The Lettermen," it did set aside the 20 royalty paid to the copyright
proprietor of the musical composition as required by the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1964).
7. Under California law, an order granting a preliminary injunction is appealable. CAL.
CIv. PROC.CODE § 904.1(0 (West Supp. 1969).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ch. 8.
9. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1964).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 5(e) (1964) (providing for the copyright of a musical composition). In
addition, 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1964) grants to the composer the exclusive right to perform his
musical work for profit and the right to make arrangements for the mechanical reproduction of
his composition. Under this provision, the composer is entitled to a royalty of 20 per tune
whenever the composition is reproduced mechanically.
Section 1(e), a provision of the 1909 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1964), was passed
in response to the Supreme Court's decision in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo
Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). The Court held that a perforated paper roll used by a player piano was
not a "copy" of a composer's musical composition. The Court stated that "a copy of a musical
composition. . .[is] 'awritten or printed record of it in intelligible notation.'" Id. at 17. Section
l(e) abrogated the Court's interpretation that "the plaintiffs have no exclusive right to the
production of the sounds indicated by or on those sheets of music; nor to the performance in
private of the music indicated by such sheets; nor to any mechanism for the production of such
sounds or music." Id. at 13.
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musical composition, however, is not copyrightable." Since their
records are not protected against pirates by federal statute,' 2 recording
companies must seek protection under state law. The owners of
noncopyrightable property interests have advanced several arguments
in seeking protection, but the theories of common law copyright and
unfair competition have been employed most frequently.' 3 At common
law, authors had the right of first publication of their literary work. 4
Similarly, recording companies have sought the protection of common
law copyright on the basis that recording is an art and that a record
is an artistic creation finding expression through the medium of
mechanical reproduction.15 Courts generally have rejected the
application of the common law copyright doctrine to records on two
grounds: 1) insufficient proprietary interest to warrant protection; 6 and
2) dedication to the public domain by the sale of records. 7 While this
11. E.g., Capitol Records, inc. v. Mercury Record Corp. 221 F.2d 657, 661 (2d Cir. 1955),
Jerome v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp., 67 F. Supp. 736, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), affd, 165
F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1948). The Copyright Office refused to admit a record for copyright in 1935
and the Register's ruling is quoted in Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433,
438 n.2, 194 A. 631, 633 n.2 (1937). This ruling is essentially embodied in 37 C.F.R. § 202.8
(6) (1959), which provides: "A phonograph record or'other sound recording is not considered a
'copy' of the compositions recorded on it, and is not acceptable for copyright registration."
12. A Congressional Rpport discussing 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1964), suggested the purpose of
the provision: "It is not the intention of the committee to extend the right of copyright to the
mechanical reproductions themselves, but only to give the composer or copyright proprietor the
control, in accordance with the provision of the bill, of the manufacture and use of such device."
H.R. RaP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1909). But see Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll
Co., 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912) (a recording company was successful in obtaining protection
for its music roll under the 1909 Act). The Aeolian decision has been discredited, however, because
it was a result of the court's faulty analysis of the relatively new Act. Note, Piracy on Records,
5 STAN. L. REv. 433,445 (1953).
13. In addition to common law copyright and unfair competition, copyright protection for
noncopyrightable records also has been based upon the right of privacy and the theory 9f equitable
servitude. For a discussion of these theories, see Note, "Copyright" Protection for
Uncopyrightables: The Common-Law Doctrines, 108 U.,PA. L. Rev. 699, 717-28 (1960). Another
author has suggested that protection could be based upon analogous trade name law. Comment,
supra note 3, at 204-06.
14. The concept of common law copyright in the United States was articulated by the
Supreme Court in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834), holding that the author's rights
in his creation do not survive publication. Thus publication of an artistic work deprives the author
of his copyright and places the work in the public domain where it can be freely copied. See Note,
supra note 3, at 702-09.
15. See Traicoff, Rights of the Performing Artist in His Interpretation and Performance,
I1 AIR L. REv. 225, 257 (1940); Comment, 64 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1951).
16. E.g., R.C.A. Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Whiteman, 28 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), rev'd on
other grounds, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding that the recording process was not such an
artistic creation as might be deemed an intellectual property right). See Note, supra note 12.
17. R.C.A. Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712
(1940); Shapiro, Berstein &Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 195Q).
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approach has afforded little protection, the doctrine of unfair
competition has provided substantial protection to the recording
companies against record pirates. The theory of unfair competition was
initiated by equity to prevent a person from profiting "from the labor,
skill, expenditures, and reputation of others."18 Originally, the concept
of unfair competition was synonymous with a seller's passing off-the
representation of another's product as his own. Courts granted relief
because of the two wrongs which were inflicted: 1) the deceit and fraud
on the public; and 2) the misappropriation of the benefit of a name,
reputation, or business good will belonging to another. 9 Subsequent
cases extended the concept of unfair competition beyond passing off,
finding that the misappropriation alone of another's work product was
sufficient to warrant relief from an unfair business practice. 2 This
trend was initiated by the Supreme Court in International News
Service v. Associated Press,2' where the Court found that even in the
absence of misrepresentation, the INS could not appropriate news
dispatches from A P papers and bulletin boards. Broad language in that
cise, 2 however, evoked the fear that states, under the guise of the
misappropriation doctrine, could create monopolies in areas that

Congress had not intended the courts to protect. As a result of this
18. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 796, 101
N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), affd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1951);
accord, Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937);
Lehrenkrauss v. Universal Tours, 262 N.Y. 332, 186 N.E. 802 (1933).
19. In their zeal to do equity when dealing with unfair competition, courts often fail to
distinguish between the following: 1) passing off; 2) wrongful injury, without misrepresentation,
to another's established reputation or good will; and 3) misappropriation of another's
expenditures and industry. Comment, supra note 15.
20. "'Unfair competition,' as known to common law, is a limited concept. Primarily, and
strictly, it relates to-the palming off of one's goods as those of a rival trader. . . . In recent years,
its scope has been extended. It has been held to apply to misappropriation as well as
misrepresentation, to the selling of another's goods as one's own,-to misappropriation of what
equitably belongs to a competitor." A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 531-32 (1935).
Implicit in the early unfair competition cases were 3 necessary elements: 1) passing off; 2)
misappropration; and 3) competition. With the growth of the misappropriation doctrine in
International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S., 215 (1918), the necessity for passing off
was eliminated. Furthermore, after Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder
Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1950), affd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d
.795 (1st Dep't 1951), the competition requirement was attenuated at best. Goldstein, Federal
System Orderingof the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 49, 57-61 (1969).
21. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
22. The Court concluded that a person cannot reap what he has not sown and cannot
appropriate to himself the harvest of those who have sown precisely at the point where the profit
is to be reaped. Id. at 239-40. Furthermore, the Court indicated that if rights and privileges of
competitors are likely to conflict, each party is under a duty to conduct business so as to avoid
unnecessary harm to the other party. Id. at 235.
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fear, the doctrine of INS has been judically restricted to analogous
3 In 1964, Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Stiffel Co.24
pirating situations?2
and
Compco v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.25 called into question the efficacy
of the protection given to noncopyrightable materials by the common

law unfair competition doctrine.26 It has been held that although these
cases did not refer to the INS case, they have abrogated state
protection based on the misappropriation theory. For example, one
court relied on the cases in holding that the remedy of
misappropriation no longer exists because the INS case was a federal

common law decision and the theory was clearly overruled by Sears
and Compco.2Y Several other post-Sears and Compco cases, however,

have distinguished these two decisions on their facts and granted
injunctive relief in misappropriation cases

s

In the instant case, the court utilized the common law doctrine of
misappropriation2 1 to reach its decision. Citing a long line of authority
23. E.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956)
(telecast of fight film without fighter's permission); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (use of a
news broadcast without broadcaster's or company's consent was misappropriation); Metropolitan
Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct.
1950), affd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1951) (the sale of records made
from radio broadcast was unfair competition); Mutual Broadcasting Sys. v. Muzak Corp., 177
Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (transmission of radio broadcast over telephone lines
was misappropriation); Twentieth Century Sporting Club v. Transradio Press Serv., 165 Misc.
71, 300 N.Y.S. 159 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (supplying of ringside description of a fight was unfair
competition); Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133 (1921) (unauthorized use of comic
strip characters was misappropriation).
24. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
25. Id. at 234 (1964).
26. In both cases, the Court held that articles which were not given patents by the
government were in the public domain and could be freely copied without prohibition by state
unfair competition law. For a discussion by several scholars of the Sears and Compco decisions,
see Symposium, Product Simulation: A Right or Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1178 (1964). See
also Note, UnfairCompetition after Searsand Compco, 22 VAND. L. REv. 129 (1968).
27. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1007 (1967). See Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964); Aerosol
Research Co. v. Scoville Mfg. Co., 334 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1964). One author has suggested that
Sears and Compco mark the "final demise" of the INS misappropriation doctrine. Treece, Patent
Policy and Preemption:The Stiffel and Compco Cases, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 80, 95 (1964).
28. See, e.g., Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 781 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1964); Capitol Records; Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878,
252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964); CBS v. Documentaries Unlimited, 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248
N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Flamingo Telefilm Sales v. United Artists Corp., 141 U.S.P.Q.
461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 22 App. Div. 2d 778, 254 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Ist Dep't
1964).
29. See notes 20-28 supra and accompanying text. The court cited as persuasive authority
a provision of the California Penal Code: "(a) Every person is guilty of a misdemeanor who: (I)
Knowingly and willfully transfers or causes to be transferred any sounds recorded on a
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beginning with International News Service v. Associated Press,3" the
court acknowledged that the law protects competition in business, but
recognized that this protection does not give a competitor the right to
usurp the product of another's expenditure and industry.3' The court
concluded that the defendant had appropriated the plaintiffs product
for his own benefit and had not merely copied or imitated that
product.32 Applying this distinction between copying and appropriating,
the court distinguished the Sears and Compco cases since "[n]either of
those learned decisions stands for the proposition that the plaintiff is

not entitled to protection against the unauthorized appropriation,
reproduction, or duplication of the actual performance contained in its
records. ' 33 Finally, the court emphasized that allowing such
appropriation would have a discouraging effect on invention and free
34

competition.
When a court is asked to grant common law copyright protection
to noncopyrightable articles based upon a theory of unfair competition,

a fundamental socio-economic conflict looms before the court.3 1 On
one hand, a sense of equity urges the court to grant relief to prevent

the unjust enrichment of the defendant .3 s On the other hand, the court
may be tempted to deny relief because of a fear of monopoly and
consequent injury to consumers and the public interest.37 In the typical
phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, film or other article on which sounds are recorded, with
intent to sell or cause to be sold, or to use or cause to be used for profit through public
performance, such article on which sounds are so transferred, without the consent of the owner."
CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 653 (h) (West Supp. 1969).

30. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
31. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798, 801 (Ct. App. 1969).
32. Id. at 806.
33. Id. at 804, quoting Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878,
881, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553, 556 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
34. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798, 806 (Ct. App. 1969).
35. For a discussion of this conflict, see Note, supra note 12, at 457-58. Recent challenges
of the state's role in providing copyright protection have raised some doubt as to the viability of
state copyright protection. See Goldstein, supra note 20; Treece, supra note 27; Note, supra note
13, at 728-34.
36. See Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the
Law of Unfair Competition, 55 HARV. L. REV. 595 (1942). The basis for this position is that
courts are unwilling to allow a person to appropriate another's business as his own.
37. The granting of a copyright by definition permits a limited monopoly to encourage
creativeness and inventiveness. One author has stated that "[tihe federal statute should surely be
held to preclude free-wheeling protection under the name of unfair competition. The INS case,
even if there be a disposition no longer to confine it to its facts, cannot be allowed to range very
far." Kaplan, Performer's Right and Copyright: The Capitol Records Case, 69 HARV. L. REv.
409, 439 (1956). In this common law copyright situation, a fear of monopgly is created since the
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record piracy case, 38 however, the threat of the creation of a pionopoly

for the recording company is nonexsistent since the Copyright Act
provides that upon the composer's mechanical reproduction of his
musical work, any other person may benefit from the performance
subject to the royalty requiremet. 39 In basing its decision upon the
theory of misappropriation, the instant court chose the only method
presently available to protect recording companies from record pirates.
Although the court reached the correct result, the utilization of the

misappropriation theory does not offer a permanent solution to the
piracy problem.

0

Obviously, this area calls for statutory regulation.

The Copyright Revision Act 4' would afford the recording companies
statutory protection from record pirates. The proposed Act makes
records copyrightable 2 and gives to the owner of the copyright in a
sound recording the exclusive right to reproduce the work.4 3
state's protection could effectively circumvent the Constitution's provision for copyrights of
limited duration., See note 8 supra and accompanying text. "Judge [Learned] Hand viewed the
copyright clause of the Constitution, particularly in its restriction of congressional protection to
'limited times,' as a mandate with which both state and federal regulation must comply."
Goldstein, supra note 20, at 51.
38. In the typical record piracy case, the pirated record is in current production. In the case
at bar, Phoenix Tapes could have lawfully attempted to contract with "The Lettermen" or any
other singers to perform the songs at issue in this case. Furthermore, Phoenix could have lawfully
used its own equipment to capture that performance on tape, provided it paid the composer
royalty. See note 39 infra. A different situation, arises when the pirated records are out of print
since the fear of monopoly in such cases is quite valid. For a discussion of the effect that limited
production of "'collector's" records can have on the market, see Note, supra note 12, at 433-43.
39. 17 U.S.C. § I(e) (1964) provides in part that upon reproduction mechanically of a
musical work by a composer, "any other person may make similar use of the copyrighted work
upon the payment to the copyright proprietor of a royalty of 2 cents on each such part
manufactured, to be paid by the manufacturer thereof. . . ." For a limited discussion of the
history of § l(e), see note 10 supra.
40. The utilizatipn of the unfair competition theory as a basis for relief in this and similar
cases is an ad hoc approach which the courts use "to fill the interstices occasioned by the
application of an outdated copyright law in a culturally and economically expanding society."
Goldstein, Copyrightingthe New Music, 17 BUFFALO L. REv. 355, 369 (1968). Consequently, this
approach engenders neither uniform regulation nor adequate remedy. As in the case at bar, the
injunction granted applies to the pirate in one jurisdiction, but will not prevent his moving to
another jurisdiction and pirating again. If the injunction is granted after the pirate has marketed
his record, the harm may have already been done to the recording company. Finally, if the
recording company seeks damages, it has a difficult burden in proving damages. The adequacy
of these remedies is discussed in Note, 49 YALE L.J. 559, 560-61 (1940).
41. S.543,91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
42. "Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authority fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories: . . .(7) sound
recordings." Id. § 102 (7).
43. The exclusive right to the reproduction of sound recordings would be regulated
by § 106 as modified by § 114 ofthe proposed Act. Id. §§ 106, 114.
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Furthermore, the proposed Act would furnish nationwide uniformity of
regulation by specifically preempting the state's right to provide

common law copyrights in sound recordings44 and by providing the
specific remedies available for copyright infringements." Indeed, such

legislation is long overdue."

Corporations-Attorney-Client Privilege-Corporate Employee's
Communication to Attorney at Direction of Corporation Held to
be Privileged
Plaintiffs, state and local governments, public schools, and public

libraries, sought treble damages from defendants, publishers and
wholesalers, in more than 40 separate antitrust actions for alleged

conspiracies to inflate the prices for children's editions of library
books.1 The actions were transferred to the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois for consolidated discovery
and pretrial proceedings. 2 Since many of the events central to the
alleged price fixing occurred several years prior to the instigation of
these actions, plaintiffs, in order to aid discovery, moved under Rule
34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for production of debriefing

memoranda summarizing grand jury testimony of prospective
deponents.3 Defendants contended that the debriefing memoranda were
44. The appropriate section of the Act provides in part: "[A]I1 rights in the nature of
copyright in works that come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102
and 103 . . .are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to copyright,
literary or property rights, or any equivalent legal or equitable rights in any such work under the
common law or statutes of any State." Id. § 301 (a).
45. Copyright infringements are defined in § 507 of the proposed Act. Id. § 507. The
specified remedies include: injunctions (id.- § 502); impounding and disposition of infringing
articles (Id. § 503); damages and profits (id. § 504); and the imposition of criminal penalties

(id. § 506).
46. The last major change in copyright law, which was basically a reshuffling of existing
law, came in 1947 when copyright was codified in Title 17 of the United States Code. The last
substantive change of copyright law was enacted in 1909. See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35

Stat. 1075.
1. In the late 1950's, the publishing industry introduced a library edition of children's books
with a reinforced binding specifically designed for use by public schools and libraries. Plaintiffs
averred that defendants only quoted "net" prices for the library editions and overcharged them
as a result of either (I) a horizontal agreement among the industry's book publishers, or (2) a
series of vertical conspiracies between each publisher and its wholesalers.
2. The transfers were made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. IV, 1969).
3. The memoranda were prepared by defendants' attorneys while "debriefing" employees
and former employees shortly after each had testified before a federal grand jury investigating
the price fixing. Each employee made his disclosure at the direction of his corporate employer in
order to assist in defending against antitrust actions.
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protected by the attorney-client privilege or, alternatively, as attorney's

work products. 4 The district court held that since the employees
interviewed were not in a position to influence the corporation's

litigation response to the price fixing actions, the documents were not
protected by the attorney-client privilege5 and must be produced.

Defendants sought mandamus to compel the district judge to vacate his
order for production. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, held, petition for writ of mandamus granted. When a
corporate employee, at the direction of the corporation, makes a
communication to the corporation's attorney concerning the
employee's performance of his duties of employment, the
communication is privileged. Harper and Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).

The application of the attorney-client privilege6 to corporations
has raised a number of analytical difficulties because the privilege
concept originally was developed to protect the individual client. 7 The
initial problem has been whether the privilege is available to a
corporation. 8 A substantial line of authority has treated corporations
as clients for purposes of the privilege9 on the assumption that no good
reason exists for denying corporations the availability of the privilege.
However, the district court in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
4. Two facets of the attorney-client privilege were invoked. Defendants maintained that
either a personal attorney-client privilege or an attorney-corporate client privilege existed between
counsel and the interviewed employees.
5. The lower court found that defendants failed to present any factual support for their
assertion of a personal privilege. Also, it noted that plaintiffs' need for discovery established good
cause when compared to defendants' minimal work product claims.
6. In order for a communication to be protected by the privilege, the common law requires:
(1) that a professional relationship be established between the client and his legal adviser; (2) that
the communication be relevant to the legal problem involved; (3) that the communication be
confidential; and (4) that the communication originate with the client or his authorized agent. 8
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (MeNaughton Rev. 1961).
7. For an extensive discussion of the history and policy of the privilege, see Garner, A ReEvaluation Of The Attorney-Client Privilege(pts. I & II), 8 VILL. L. REv. 279,447 (1963).
8. If the privilege is available to protect a corporate communication, the communication
must still satisfy the general common law requirements. See note 6 supra. See generally Comment,
The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the Role of Ethics, and Its Possible
Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 235 (1961).
9. Corporations are specifically included in the definition of "clients" who arc entitled to
claim the privilege in one state statute and the model acts. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-20(3)(a)
(Supp. 1969-70); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 209(a) (1942); UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE

26(3)(a). A number of federal and state cases have allowed corporations to assert the privilege as
a client. See, e.g.. Cole v. Hughes Tool Co., 215 F.2d 924, 931 (10th Cir. 1954); Belanger v.
Alton Box Bd. Co., 180 F.2d 87, 93-94 (7th Cir. 1950); Holm v. Superior Ct., 42 Cal. 2d 500,
267 P.2d 1025 (1954); Stewart Equip. Co. v. Gallo, 32 N.J. Super. 15, 107 A.2d 527 (L. Div.
1954).
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Association0 found good reason to deny the privilege. It held that
corporations could not invoke the privilege because an attempt to fix
complex corporate structures into the traditional framework of the

privilege raised impossible problems. Although reversed on appeal, this
holding has caused subsequent cases to discuss more carefully the

problems inherent in an application of the privilege to corporate
clients." A second and more complex problem has been defining the
class of persons entitled to speak for the corporate client.,2 Since the
privilege only protects communications made by the attorney's client,
and a corporation, as merely a legal entity, cannot speak except

through its employees and agents, the relationship between the
communicating agent and the corporation has to be analyzed to

determine whether the agent acts for the corporation as the client.
Much of the confusion in the federal courts regarding the proper test
3
for client status stems from the landmark case of Hickman v. Taylor

and its offspring. In dealing with the protection against discovery of
privileged matters under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 many

of the lower federal courts had failed to separate two overlapping
10. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
929 (1963). In Radiant Burners plaintiff brought an antitrust suit against defendant corporation
and sought discovery of certain documents. Defendant alleged that the documents were privileged
material. The decision denying the privilege to corporations was made the subject of extensive
commentary, most of it critical. See, e.g., 48 CORNELL L.Q. 551 (1963); 61 MICH. L. REv. 603
(1963).
11. Compare American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del.
1962) (disagreeing with Radiant Burners hut recognizing the perplexity and problem of applying
attorney-client privilege to corporations), with Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F.
Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandate denied sub nom., General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742
(3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963) (stating that availability of privilege to
corporations is so generally accepted that it must be recognized as entrenched in American law).
See also Maurer, Privileged Communications And The Corporate Counsel, 28 ALA..LAw. 352,
368 (1967).
12. For good discussions of all facets of the problem of who is the client, see Pye,
Fundamentalsof the Attorney-Client Privilege, 15 PRAC. LAW. 15, 18 (Nov. 1969); Simon, The
Attorney-Client Privilegeas Applied To Corporations,65 YALE L.J. 953, 956-63 (1956).
13. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hickman the client was a partnership whose attorney
interviewed employees of the partnership in contemplation of litigation, and recorded his
observations of these interviews. These observations were among the materials plaintiff sought to
discover. Defendant partnership argued that the attorney-client privilege extended to the
employees as third party witnesses. There was no mention of the possibility that the employees
were speaking to the attorney on behalf of the partnership. Supplemental Memorandum for
Respondent at 2-3, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b), 34 (permitting depositions or discovery as to designated matters
if "not privileged"). The term "privileged" seems to be intended in its traditional evidentiary
sense. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953); 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE
26.22 (2d ed. 1969). As to whether state law defining privilege applies, see note 19
infra and accompanying text.
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principles-the attorney-client privilege and the protection from
discovery afforded certain documents and prospective witnesses'
statements. 5 The Supreme Court in Hickman refused to apply the
attorney-client privilege broadly to cover statements made by the

client's employees to its attorney in the course of the attorney's
preparation for trial; 6 instead, the Court recognized a qualified

immunity from discovery for the "work product of the lawyer" and
clarified the distinction between the two principles. Despite this

apparently authoritative declaration by the Court of the proper scope
of the attorney-client privilege, the lower courts have continued to
formulate tests to determine the extent of the privilege.

Some of the

courts have suggested as a test the mere presence of an agency
relationship between the communicating agent and the corporation; 8
thus whenever any employee or corporate spokesman originates a
communication for the advice of corporate counsel, the corporation is
the client and the communication is privileged. A few federal courts
have adopted the state law on the question of privilege as a test of client
status. 9

Most federal courts have followed the "control group"

15. See Gardner, supra note 7, at 501. The author asserts that the confusion which has
developed in the general law of privilege has resulted from this failure to recognize the distinction
between the classical privilege and the quasi-privilege.
16. Summarily disposing of the argument that the privilege protected the statements, the
Court declared: "For present purposes, it suffices to note that the protective cloak of this privilege
does not extend to information which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client
in anticipation of litigation. Nor does this privilege concern the memoranda, briefs,
communications and other writings prepared by counsel for his own use in prosecuting the client's
case; and it is equally unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney's mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions or legal theories." 329 U.S. at 508.
17. Most authorities consider the statement in Hickman concerning the attorney-client
privilege dictum. The opinion itself remarked that "it [was] unnecessary here to delineate the
content and scope of the [attorney-client] privilege as recognized in the federal courts." Id. at
508. See Simon, supra note 12, at 958; 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 1046, 1050 & n.18 (1968).
18. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). The
opinion of Judge Wyzanki can be read for the broad proposition that any persons not
"strangers"-anyone "affiliated with the corporation as employees, officers, directors"-are
qualified to speak for the corporate client. United Shoe and Hickman are factually
distinguishable, but their ratio de~idendi conflict since the latter stands for withholding the
privilege from employee statements, the former for extending it. Compare Zenith Radio Corp. v.
RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954) (following United Shoe test in relation to the
confidentiality requirement). Substantial authority has rejected the test as creating too great an
immunity from discovery.
19. There exists a great deal of controversy as to whether a federal court is bound by state
law in applying privileges, especially in federal question litigation. Most federal courts in diversity
cases have considered themselves compelled to follow state law viewing the claim of privilege as
substantive rather than procedural. The Seventh Circuit has clearly stated that a privilege granted
by statute in the forum state is substantive and must be recognized in diversity litigation. Palmer
v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 765 (1956) ((statutory privilege

19701

RECENT CASES

test2° enunciated' in Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.21 In
that case the court held that if a communication from an employee is to

be privileged, the employee making the communication must be in a
position to-play a substantial role in making the corporation's decision
after receiving advice from the attorney-the employee must be a
member of the "control group" of the corporation.22 Despite judicial
acceptance, the control group test has been criticized as an
unsatisfactory method of determining the extent of the corporate
attorney-client privilege. 23

The court in the instant case found that the district judge had
followed substantially the "control group" test24 and had not erred in

his application of it. 2 The court determined, however, that the control
group test is not wholly adequate, and that the communications of
for accountants). Quaere as to a privilege granted .bystate judicial decision? See Golminas v. Fred
Teitelbaum Const. Co., 112 111.App.2d 445, 251* N.E.2d 314 (Ct. App. 1969) (adopting "control
group" standard in Illinois as adequately defining the scope of privilege as applied to the
corporate client). In federal question cases the majority of courts appear to adhere to the view
that neither state statutes nor judicial decisions necessarily control. But see Baird v. Koerner, 279
F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960) (state privilege rule applicable in an administrative proceeding before
the IRS); Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 438, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (the
court in an antitrust suit looked to state law in construing the attorney-client privilege under FED.
R. CIv. P. 26). Generally, state law has been more restrictive on the admissionof evidence; hence
the application of state law by the federal courts results in a broader privilege. For an excellent
analysis of whether a federal court must apply state law of privilege, see Note, Evidence: Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations,48 CORNELL

L.Q. 551, 552 (1963).
20. See, e.g., Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968) (test is whether person has
authority to control a decision regarding action to be taken); Garrison v. General Motors Corp.,
213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (an employee not a member of a control group is not an agent
of the corporation within the scope of privilege).
21. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandate denied sub nom., General Elec. Co. v.
Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). Defendant's counsel
had interviewed employees in connection with violations of the antitrust laws; plaintiff propounded
interrogatories to defendant concerning information derived from these interviews. Defendant
claimed the privilege, but the court ordered answers to include all such information received.
22. A similar test appears in Rule 5-03(a)(3), Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of
Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, March, 1969.
23. See Burnham, Confidentiality and the CorporateLawyer: The Attorney-Client Privilege
and "Work Product" in Illinois, 56 ILL. B.J. 542, 545-48 (1968); Lasky, Lawyer-Client Privilege,

38 CALIF. ST. B.J. 427, 442 (1963). Broader tests have been suggested. See, e.g., D.I. Chadborne,
Inc. v. Superior Ct., 60 Cal. 2d 723, 388 P.2d 700, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1964) (sets forth specific
instances when privilege extends beyond control group); Maurersupranote 1I, at 375; Pye, supra
note 12, at 19.
24. 423 F.2d at 491. The court acknowledged that the test has been followed by other
courts and appears in the Proposed Rules.
25. Although some of the employees had supervisory and even policy-making
responsibilities, the court concurred with the lower court's finding that the employees were not
members of the control group. Id. at 491.
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some corporate agents who are not within the control group are

protected by the corporation's attorney-client privilege.2 1 It held that
when, as in this case, the employee makes the disclosure to the attorney

at the direction of his corporate employer and the subject matter is
germane to his duties of employment, his communication to the
corporation's attorney is privileged.21 Since the district judge's order
for production rested entirely upon the control group test, the court
concluded that the extraordinary remedy of mandamus was
28
appropriate.
The control group test has been justified on the grounds that

without such a restriction on corporate use of the attorney-client
privilege a vast "zone of silence" would be created, insulating great
numbers of corporate documents from discovery.29 On the other hand,

the test has been denounced as limiting the corporate privilege to the
extent that the purposes of the privilege are negated.3 The test

unjustifiably denies the privilege to communications made by middlemanagement executives not in the control group, but who have
responsibilities for making recommendations that are adopted by
higher management as a matter of course. 3 1 Furthermore, the
Philadelphia test is especially inadequate in the antitrust area, where
low-ranking employees who are engaged in actions for which the
corporation may be liable often are interrogated by corporate

attorneys.3 2 The instant decision by the Seventh Circuit tacitly
26. The court did not analyze the criticisms that have been made, nor did it discuss wily
the control group test was deemed by it inadequate.
27. The instant communications were distinguished from those where the agents act as third
parties or witnesses: "It is clear we are not dealing in this case with the communications of
employees about matters as to which they are virtually indistinguishable from bystander
witnesses." Id. at 49 1.
28. Consideration of defendants' work product claims was not necessary, inasmuch as the
debriefing documents were protected from discovery by the corporation privilege; nonetheless, the
court noted that the district judge had also improperly restricted the application of the work
product doctrine.
29. See 44 B.U.L. REV. 123, 129 (1964). Since the privilege does not bar the employee's
testimony as to facts embodied in the communication, but only disclosure of the contents of the
communication itself, the dimensions of the "zone of silence" have been exaggerated. The effect
of the privilege lies in counsel's ability to make the opposition do its own work.
30. The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage open and candid disclosure
between client and attorney. If the number of persons within a corporation who can represent it
is limited, the purpose of the privilege is defeated by encouraging the corporation to be silent,
31. This observation is especially true in the instant case, for some of the employees
interviewed were in policy-making positions and could have been ultimately responsible for the
alleged price fixing policy.
32. Application of the test may discourage corporations from carrying on a vigorous
program of antitrust compliance, since they may be developing evidence against themselves.
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recognizes these inadequacies by abandoning the control group test in
favor of a test that emphasizes the purposes for disclosure and the
subject matter of the communications made. This test, proximating
that of many state courts,3 does not suggest distinctions among types
of corporate agents, but rather seems to assume that any employee
might speak for the corporate client if the disclosure is attributable to
a corporate purpose. Such a view of not limiting the persons who can
make communications avoids some of the problems inherent in the
more restrictive tests but leaves a number of difficulties unresolved.
First, the instant test flies in the face of the conflicting assumption in
Hickman that some employees can only speak as third-party
witnesses.34 Secondly, the new test is susceptible to abuse, since nothing
restricts the corporation from placing too much information within the
.protection of the privilege. The state courts have limited the "zone of
silence" by a strict application of other requirements of the privilege,
35
such as that the communication be legal in nature and confidential.
The only qualifications on the privilege set forth in the instant
case-directed disclosure and germane subject matter-are incapable of
preventing misuse. All employees of the corporate client could be
directed to channel their regular business reports to the corporate
attorney and, under the new test, such reports would then be privileged.
The instant court's departure from the control group test reflects
a growing judicial awareness of the inequities that result from a
mechanical application or non-application of absolute privilege.3 6 The
court recognizes the inadequacy of the control group test, but,
unfortunately, fails to recognize that no test can be adequate to
determine in all instances the applicability of the corporate privilege.
33.

See Simon, supra note 12, at 960-62 for an analysis of state courts' handling of the

corporate privilege.
34. See note 16supra and accompanying text.
35. In applying the privilege, state courts have relied upon a number of tests to prevent
ordinary business records from masquerading as attorney-client communications. The tests defy

logical analysis but for classification purposes fall roughly into 3 groups: (I) the sole purpose test;
(2) the multi-purpose test; and (3) the anticipation-of-litigation test. See Gardner, A Personal
Privilegefor Communications of Corporate Clients-Paradoxor Public Policy? 40 U. DEr. L.J.
299, 389 (1963); Simon, supra note 12, at 960-62.
36. In reversing Radiant Burners, the Seventh Circuit did not attempt to set out a test to
which each communication would have to comply in order to fall within the privilege. "In
balancing the competing goals of the free and unobstructed search for the truth with the right

and absolute necessity for confidential disclosure of information by the client to its attorney to
gain the legal advice sought thereby, the courts will realize they are not dealing with a blanket
privilege. The limitation surrounding any information sought must be determined for each
document separately considered on a case-by-case basis." Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas

Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1963).
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It is submitted that the most appropriate analysis is a case-by-case
balancing approach, the application of the corporate privilege
depending on- whether the harm resulting from restricting discovery
outweighs the benefit derived from the privilege. Utilizing this
approach, the courts could look to the relative inaccessibility of other
sources of information to the party seeking discovery in order to
ascertain the harm in ruling the communicaition privileged. 3 7
Correspondingly, the social utility of the privilege and its incentive
towards complete disclosure by the corporate client could be considered
to determine the benefit of the privilege. Contemplating a change in the
nature of the corporate privilege from absolute to discretionary, the
balancing approach creates a corporate privilege distinct from the
individual privilege. This is justifiable and desirable as a solution to the
substantially different problems that are raised in applying the
attorney-client privilege to corporations.

Criminal Law-Homicide- Fetus is a Human Being Within
Meaning of the Homicide Statutes When it Reaches the State of
Viability
Petitioner, charged with aggravated assault upon his divorced wife
and the murder of the 31 to 36 week-old unborn child she was carrying
when the alleged assault took place, sought a writ of prohibition to stay
his prosecution on the murder charge. The facts established that the
petitioner told the mother that he was going to destroy the unborn child
by beating her up and then proceeded to do so in a savage fashion.,
the hostility and availability of witnesses
37. Factors apposite in this analysis would be: (1)
to the moving party; (2) the lapse of time and its effect upon the witnesses' memories; and (3)
the public policy desired in a particular type of litigation. These criteria are analogous to those
now employed in determining good cause for the -work product doctrine. See generally Hunt,
Corporate Law Department Communications-Privilegeand Discovery, 13 VAND. L. REV. 287

(1959).
1. "Mrs. Keeler had secured an interlocutory degree of divorce from petitioner . . . . On
February 23, 1969, she was driving on a narrow mountain road . . . enroute to Stockton where
she was living with another man in a nonmarital relationship. She was pregnant by this man. As
she drove along, petitioner drove his own car in front of her, blocking her passage. She stopped,
and he walked over to her and said he had heard of her pregnancy. He opened the door of her
car and drew her out by the arm. He looked at her abdomen and said: 'You sure are. I'm going
to stomp it out of you.' He pushed her back against the car with his hands on her shoulders and
kicked his knee into her abdomen. He then struck her in the face several times. She lost
consciousness. After the attack he left." Keeler v. Superior Ct. for County of Amador, 80 Cal,
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Petitioner contended that a fetus is not considered in law a human
being and that therefore, no homicide can be committed by one who
terminates its fetal development.' On appeal to the California Court of

Appeals, held, petition denied. A fetus which has reached the stage of
viability, when premature separation from the mother would not end

the child's life, is a human being within the meaning of the California
homicide statutes. Keeler v. Superior Court for County of Amador, 80

Cal. Rptr. 865 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
The early common law did not attach human status to a fetus for
the purposes of protection under the homicide statutes until quickening

had occurred. 3 Quickening, or animation, usually occurs between the
sixteenth and twentieth week of pregnancy.' By the mid-nineteenth

century, however, the common law had shifted to the "born alive"
theory. This theory stated that the unborn child is not a human being

and hence cannot be the victim of homicide unless it is subsequently
born alive.5 Early cases under the rule required a complete live birth6
as evidenced by an independent circulation. 7 The rule was rather

ambiguous, however, since there was no recognized standard of what
Rptr. 865-66 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969). When the doctors examined her injuries she was bleeding
extensively from the nose and mouth, had lacerations on her face requiring stitches, a fractured
nose, and a tooth knocked out. On her abdomen were two or three crescent-shaped marks which
appeared to be heel imprints. The doctor performing the Caesarean section to remove the fetus
said its head "was constricted like a bag of mush." Id.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1955) defines murder as "the unlawful killing of a
human being, with malice aforethought."
3. "A woman is said to be pregnant with a quick child, or quick with child, when the
motion of the fetus becomes perceptible.
...
State v. Patterson, 105 Kan. 9, 10, 181 P. 609,
610 (1919).
4. T. STEDMAN, MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1340-41 (1966).
5. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 29 (2d ed. 1969). Sir Edward Coke described the "born.
alive" theory as the English law in the 18th century: "If a woman be quick with childe, and by
a potion or otherwise killeth it in her wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in
her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprision, and no murder; but if
the childe be born alive, and dieth of the potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder: for in
law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum natura, when it is born alive." 3 E. COKE,
THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 (1797) (misprision, as used
by Coke, means misdemeanor).
6. Rex v. Poulton, 172 Eng. Rep. 997 (Nisi Prius 1832). In this case the defendant was
accused of killing her infant by strangulation, but the facts were unclear as to whether the child
had died before or after the birth was completed. The Court at Old Bailey told the jury that a
conviction of homicide was not possible unless the infant had been born alive. Being born alive,
the court continued, requires, "that the whole body is brought into the world; and it is not
sufficient that the child respires in the process of birth." Id. at 998.
7. In the case of Rex v. Enoch, 172 Eng. Rep. 1089 (Nisi Prius 1833), the court again held
the complete live birth a prerequisite for a child to be sufficiently alive to be the subject of murder.
That court's criterion of live birth was the establishment of "an independent circulation in the
child." Id.; accord,Regina v. Wright, 173 Eng. Rep.- 1039 (Nisi Prius 1841).
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constituted a complete live birth or an independent circulation., Despite
these difficulties the supposed medical criterion of an independent
circulation was the favorite view in England from 1780 until the
passage of the Infanticide Acts of 1922 and 1938.0 No authoritative

view of infanticide had been adopted by the courts in the United States
by the end of the nineteenth century." By the middle of the twentieth

century, however, the now prevailing view requiring live birtl had been
established. 2 Basically, this majority American view is an elaborate
version of the old common law rule, and a flood of cases have appeared

trying to determine the exact moment when live birth actually occurs. 3
A minority of states have attempted to resolve this question by

statutory enactment, making the abortion of a quick child
manslaughter. 4 Two jurisdictions, perhaps in a reaction to the
vagueness of the common law rule, have eliminated the fine distinctions
frequently drawn by courts trying to determine the exact moment of
8. The case of Rex v. Brain, 172 Eng. Rep. 1272 (Nisi Prius 1834), again required that
the child be "wholly in the world in a living state to be the subject of a charge of murder," but
the court did not consider breathing to be essential since "many children are born alive, and yet
do not breathe for some time after their birth." Id. The rule was also particularly difficult in its
use by the English courts because the juries were often sympathetic with the defendants in these
cases and looked for some excuse to acquit them. Meldman, Legal Concepts of Human Life: The
Infanticide Doctrines, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 105, 107 (1968).
9. Winfield, The Unborn Child, 8 CAMB. L.J. 76, 79 (1944).
10. After the legislation, the doctrine of live birth became largely irrelevant, for the courts
could prosecute on the charge of manslaughter for the killing of a fetus, and no proof of live
birth was necessary.
i1. Atkinson, Life, Birth, and Live-Birth, 20 L.Q. REV. 134 (1904).
12. Montgomery v. State, 202 Ga. 678, 44 S.E.2d 242 (1947); Shedd v. State, 178 Ga. 653,
173 S.E. 847 (1934); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 295, 96 S.W.2d 1014 (1936); Morgan
v. State, 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433 (1923); State v. Merrill, 72 W. Va. 500, 78 S.E. 699 (1913);
Benett v. State, 377 P.2d 634 (Wyo. 1963). See also Note, Proving Live Birth in Infanticide, 17
Wyo. L.J. 237, 242 (1963).
13. Note l2supra.
14. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.09, 782.10, 797.01 (1965). Section 797.01 is a
general statute which makes abortion criminal at any stage of pregnancy. Section 782.09 is as
follows: "The willful killing of an unborn quick child, by any injury to the mother of such child
which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, shall be deemed manslaughter."
See Williams v. State, 34 Fla. 217, 15 So. 760 (1894). Section 782.10 is as follows: "Every person
who shall administer to any woman pregnant 'with a quick child any medicine . . . with intent
thereby to destroy such child . . . shall, in case of the death of such child . . . be thereby
produced, be deemed guilty of manslaughter." For other statutes with similar provisions, see
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2223 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-9920a to -9925a (1969); MicH.
STAT. ANN. §§ 28-554 to -555 (1954); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2222 (1957); Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 559-090, 559-100 (1959); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 200.210, 200.220 (1967); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 585:13 (1955); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125A0, 125.45 (McKinney 1967); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 12-25-02 to -03 (1960); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21-713 to -714 (1958); PA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 18-4718 to -4719 (1963); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-82 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 94004 (1958).
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live birth." Leading this development was the California case of People

v. Chavez"6 which first rejected the precedent of the absolute live birth
requirement by holding that a fetus is a human being under the

homicide statutes when the process of labor and delivery, which has
already started, would naturally produce a living infant. In a persuasive

argument, the court's dictum indicated that viability should be the
determining factor in deciding when to consider a fetus a human being
7
for the purposes of homicide law.

Relying on Chavez, the court in the instant case refused to apply
the "born alive" theory to twentieth-century America. The court

recognized that modern advances in obstetrics and pediatrics have
produced the expectation that premature infants delivered after 30

weeks of pregnancy will live."8 Furthermore, the majority pointed out
that, even though viability of the fetus will still be the subject of expert
medical testimony and will be submitted to the jury as a question of

fact demanding proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the criterion of
viability is more in keeping with the realities of continuous human

development than the medically unrealistic tests used in applying the
"born alive" rule. 9 The court determined that a rule which recognizes

the slaying of a viable fetus as homicide would not conflict with the
state's present abortion law since abortions are not sanctioned after the
twentieth week of pregnancy 20 and a fetus reaches the stage of viability
15. These 2 jurisdictions are Alabama and California. Singleton v. State, 33 Ala. App. 536,
35 So. 2d 375 (1948); People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947).
16. 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947).
17. The court stated: "There is no sound reason why an infant should not be considered a
human being when born or removed from the body of its mother, when it has reached that stage
of development where it is capable of living an independent life as a separate being, and where in
the natural course of events it will so live if given normal and reasonable care. It should equally
be held ihat a viable child in the process of being born is a human being within the meaning of
the homicide statutes, whether or not the process has been fully completed." Id. at 625-26, 176
P.2d at 94.

18.

8 ENCYCLOPEDIA

BRITANNICA

327 (1968) states: "Infants born before 6

months (27

weeks) are rarely viable; from 6 /4 to 7 months they may survive with good care, and after 7
months (30 weeks) they are generally viable." A set of 1954 statistics shows an 80% rate or
survival for infants delivered after 32 to 33 weeks of pregnancy, weighing 1500 to 1750 grams;
an 88% rate when delivered after 33 to 34 weeks of pregnancy and weighing 1750 to 2000 grams;
a 96% rate when delivered after 34 weeks and weighing 2000 to 2500 grams, 5 LAWYERS' MEDICAL
CYCLOPEDIA § 37.17 at 420 (1960). Demonstrating the rapidly developing medical technology is
a set of 1961 statistics which shows a 98% survival rate for infants weighing 2000 to 2500 grams.

7

THE CYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE, SURGERY, AND SPECIALTIES

275 (1939-40). The fetus in the

instant case weighed 2205 grams (about 5 pounds) at the time of its death.
19. See Meldman, supra note 8, at 110; Keeler v. Superior Ct. for County of Amador, 80
Cal. Rptr. 865 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).

20. Therapeutic Abortion Act,
1970).

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§§ 25950-54 (West Supp.
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only after a minimum of 26-27 weeks. Noting that petitioner's actions
evinced a general disposition to harm and destroy both the mother and
the fetus, the court added that the.evidence supported a finding of his
malicious intent directed against the infant, a necessary element of first
degree murder. In distinguishing its ruling from the recent decision of
the California Supreme Court in People v. Belous,2 ' the majority in the
instant case interpreted as dictum that part of the supreme court's
opinion which stated that the intentional destruction of a fetus was
never treatod as murder and rarely as manslaughter, but rather as the
lesser offense of abortion. 2 That section was dictum, the court stated,
because it was merely a description of the state of the law in most
jurisdictions in the United States, not a statement of California law.
In mentioning manslaughter, the Belous court was only noting that few
states have adopted statutes defining feticide as manslaughter, the court
added, and those statutes do not contemplate feticide coupled with a
malicious intent against the mother, infant, or both.
This case marks the first application in the United States of the
viability test to a feticide case for a murder prosecution. In doing so,
the court has formulated a more reasonable criterion in view of the
substantial advances of modern medicine. The viability standard,
however, is not entirely free from ambiguity. Although the age of
viability is generally believed to-be about seven months,2 there is no
way to be certain that the fetus has reached viability in any particular
case. 2' Therefore, while the question of whether a child is viable is less
likely to be a problem than the question of live birth, the determination
may become more difficult as the use of incubators and artificial
wombs increases.25 When that happens, the states using the viability
rule will once again face the problem of integrating medical knowledge
with judicial decision. 2 Another problem is that the concept of viability
is only an attempt by medical science to describe conceptually a
21.

80 Cal. Rptr. 354,458 P.2d 194 (Sup. Ct. 1969).

22. The Belous court's holding 'was actually confined to finding California's pre-1967
abortion law-void for uncertainty. Id.
23.

West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 375, 105 S.E.2d 88, 91 (1958); Chapman, Wrongful

Death of Stillborn Kiable Fetus, 1965 TRIAL
24.

LAW. GUIDE

283, 294.

Atkinson, supra note 11, at 136.

25. Recent developments in medicine have already begun to lower the time when viability
is achieved. Many fetuses only 24 weeks old have been able to survive with intensive care. See
LIF, Sept. 10, 1965, at 59.

26. Other new developments in post-mortem enzyme analysis may soon make it possible
to pinpoint every detailed biological fact surrounding a peri-natal death. Majorska, The
Determination of Time of Death in a Case of Suspected Infanticide, 5 J. FORENSIC ScIEN E 33
(1960).
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biological process. Thus, legally distinguishing between killing a fetus
that is viable and killing one that is not viable is presumptuous because
medical science never intended for the term to carry such significant
legal consequences. Because it represents an arbitrary cut-off point, the
viability concept is not sufficient to deal with homocide cases. In other
words, malice, not viability, should determine whether destruction of a
fetus is murder. Since medical science, in the very early stages of
pregnancy, cannot determine if life exists, a practical cut-off point
would have to be formulated to avoid the problem of trying to
determine if life has been extinguished in the case of a very young fetus.
Probably the simplest and best method to determine this cut-off point
would be the use of the existence of a fetal heartbeat. If a fetal hearbeat
exists, the fetus is protected under the homocide statutes as a human
being; if no heartbeat exists, then no homocide can be committed on
that fetus. On the other hand, viability is the best way to achieve a
compromise in cases when no malice is present, that is, when we are
dealing with the conflicting rights of a nonviable fetus and a pregnant
woman. In considering the liberalization of abortion laws, the right of
the mother to decide whether to have children must be balanced with
the right of the fetus, once conceived, to continue its development.
Although the right of the fetus to develop from conception should be
absolute in relation to a party with a malicious intent to destroy it, that
right must be compromised in the absence of malice and in relation to
the rights of the mother.

Criminal Law- Resentencing-Jury May Impose a Harsher
Sentence on Retrial
Appellant, Isaiah Pinkard, was convicted of the unlawful carnal
knowledge of a female under the age of twelve years and was sentenced
by the jury to a term of twenty years in the state penitentiary.
Successful in having his conviction set aside and a new trial granted,
appellant was reconvicted and received a jury-imposed sentence of 99
years in prison. After serving more than the originally imposed twenty
years, appellant sought his release by a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, contending that his constitutional rights' were violated when,
upon reconviction he received a sentence harsher than that given at the
1. In his brief appellant alleged that the court, by allowing the imposition of a harsher
sentence on retrial, denied appellant's right to a fair trial. Appellant also asserted the equal

protection clause and the double jeopardy clause as a bar to harsher sentences on retrial.
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first trial. In defense, the State asserted that appellant lost the right to
rely on the original sentence when he sought and was granted the
dismissal of his original conviction and the right to a new trial.' Before
the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, held, petition denied. Where
an appellant by his own initiative seeks and obtains the reversal of his
original conviction and the right to a second trial for the same offense,
the sentence imposed by the jury upon reconviction is not limited by
the first but may be harsher in degree. Pinkard v. Henderson, 6 Crim.
L. Rptr. 2148 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
The propriety of imposing a more severe punishment upon retrial
does not present a novel issue but rather one that has been often
litigated to different results. Among those federal circuits allowing a
harsher sentence to be imposed on retrial, the First Circuit will permit
the harsher sentence only when justified by conduct of the defendant
subsequent to the original conviction, provided the reasons for
increasing the sentence, be made to appear affirmatively in the record; 3
the Second Circuit 'will uphold the harsher sentence if it is justified by
newly revealed evidence and is supported in the record;4 the Seventh
Circuit allows the harsher sentence if justified by circumstances
disclosed in a presentence report unless the lower court is apparently
penalizing appellant for having exercised his right of appeal;' and the
Third, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits allow the judge, in his
discretion, to impose whatever sentence is deemed warranted unless he
appears to be penalizing the appellant for exercising his right of
appeal.' The states are similarly divided in the resolution of this issue
with the great majority finding no absolute prohibition barring harsher
2.

The State based its case on Murphy v. State, 221 Tenn. 351, 426 S.W.2d 509 (1968),

which held that the defendant who seeks a new trial faces a new court and'a new jury with no
limitation placed on their action, and state ex rel. Austin v. Johnson,'218 Tenn. 433, 404
S.W.2d 244 (1966), which held that by seeking a new trial appellant loses the defense of double

jeopardy. The briefs for this case were prepared and filed before the Supreme Court handed down
its opinion in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
3. Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir.-1967).
4.

United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968). The Second Circuit refuses to limit

the imposition of harsher sentences, as the First Circuit does, to only those situations where the
-defendant's conduct since the first trial warrants the increase. Id. at 845-46.

5. United States v. White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1967). This view makes no requirement
that the justification for the increase be made a part of the record.
6. United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1967); Newman v.
Rodriques, 375 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1967); Short v. United States, 344 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

Contra, Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Adams, 362
F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 1966). Two circuits have not ruled on this question but have indicated that
they would prohibit the harsher sentence on double jeopardy grounds. See Castle v. United States,
399 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1968); Jack v. United States, 387 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1967).
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penalties.7 The rationale of a rule allowing more severe punishment to
be imposed upon reconviction has been frequently attacked as contrary
to the constitutional restrictions imposed by the equal protection,
double jeopardy, and due process clauses of the federal constitution.
Courts have held, on equal protection grounds, that this rule creates

an arbitrary classification,8 because it increases only the sentences of
those who have successfully resorted to appeal,' while there are equally

valid reasons for increasing the punishment of those who have not. The
threat of a harsher sentence acts as an invidious discrimination against
those availing themselves of a fair trial'0 and thereby frustrates the
pursuit of the post conviction remedies -provided by the states." The
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, 2 consisting of three

related rules prohibiting retrial after acquittal,' 3 retrial after
7. E.g., Moon v. State, 250 Md. 468, 243 A.2d 564 (1968); State v. Young, 200 Kan. 20,
434 P.2d 820 (1967); State v. Squires, 248 S.C. 239, 149 S.E.2d 601 (1966).
8. "Classification must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just
relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be made
arbitrarily and without any such basis." McLaughlin v. Florida,'379 U.S. 184, 190 (1964). See,
e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-66
(1957).
9. "In none of the states permitting harsher sentences upon retrial, is there a procedure
established to increase the sentence of any other convict originally sentenced in accordance with
the appropriate statute. The risk of a harsher sentence is borne exclusively by those who pursue
some postconviction remedy." Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the
"Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606, 638 (1965). See also Honigsberg,
Limitations Upon Increasing a Defendant's Sentence Following a Successful Appeal and
Reconviction, 4 CRIm. L. BULL. 329, 335 (1968).
10. "The risk of a harsher sentence is borne exclusively by those who pursue some
postconviction remedy. Yet there is no reason to suppose that the original sentences of this group
are any more likely to warrant review as a class than the sentences of other convicts who are not
subject to the same risk. The vulnerable class appears to be .quite equivalent to a class described
by race, right-handedness, indigence, or some other factor equally irrelevant in any proper
determination of those whose sentences might appropriately be reviewed." Van Alstyne, supra
note 9, at 638. See, e.g., Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967); Texas v.
Gundstrom, 404 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1968). Contra, United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836 (2d Cir.
1968). "It is not a denial of equal protection for the state to effectuate a proper policy . . on
those on whom it constitutionally can, simply because there are others on whom it constitutionally
cannot." Id. at 845.
I1. See Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967); VanAlstyne, supra note
9, at 639.
12. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (holding that the double jeopardy prohibition of the fifth amendment is enforceable against the states through the fourteenth amendment).
Compare Spidle v. Missouri, 446 S.W.2d 793 (Mo. 1969) (holding Benton rule does not apply
retroactively), with Galloway v. Beto, 38 U.S.L.W. 2390 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 1970), and Booker v.
Phillips, 38 U.S.L.W. 1081 (10th Cir. Nov. 12, 1969) (both cases holding that Benton rule applies
retroactively to retrials held before the Benton decision).
13. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671-72 (1896). See also Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957) (extended the federal rule to bar prosecution after an "implicit
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conviction," and multiple punishments for the same offense, 5 has been

held to prohibit an increase of sentence once service has commenced,
regardless of any new or additional adverse evidence that may be
produced."6 Because some courts have extended this restriction to

prohibit increases in punishment following retrial, 17 it has been argued
that an appellant may be given a harsher penalty on retrial if he
"waives" his double jeopardy protection;" however, such a "waiver"
requirement places an impermissible condition upon the enjoyment of
a constitutional right."9 Courts have also held that the due process

clause of the fourteenth amendment demands that a defendant denied
a fair trial be permitted to vindicate his right to a new trial without
risking a harsher resentence. Since this risk unreasonably burdens his
exercise of the right to appeal, 0 and any procedure which substantially
deters an individual from the exercise of his constitutional rights is
acquittal"); People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677 (1963) (extended the double
jeopardy limitation to include punishment as well as degree of offense). Contra, Stroud v. United
States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919) (allowing the imposition of death sentence on retrial where original
sentence was imprisonment).
14. E.g., In re Nielson, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
15. "Why is it that, having once been tried and found guilty, he can never be tried again
for that offense? Manifestly it is not the danger or jeopardy of being a second time found guilty.
It is the punishment that would legally follow the second conviction which is the real danger
guarded against by the Constitution. But if, after judgment has been rendered on the conviction,
and the sentence of that judgment executed on the criminal, he can be again sentenced on that
conviction to another and different punishment, or to endure the same punishment a second time,
is the constitutional restriction of any value?...
The argument seems to us irresistible, and we do not doubt that the Constitution was
designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offense as from
being twice tried for it." Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1873). See, e.g., Patton
v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 643 (4th Cir. 1967); Comment, Twice in Jeopardy. 75 YALE
L.J. 262 (1965).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931); United States v. Adams,
362 F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 1966); Kennedy v. United States, 330 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1964).
17. "We perceive no constitutionally significant distinction between the increases prohibited
[once service has commenced] and an increase in punishment following retrial." Patton v. North
Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 645 (4th Cir. 1967). See also Whaley v. North Carolina, 379 F.2d 221
(4th Cir. 1967); Walsh v. United States, 374 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1967).
18. "[U]nless a defendant is held to waive this double jeopardy protection in seeking a new
trial, a harsher penalty may not be imposed." Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 645 (4th
Cir. 1967).
19. See Whaley v. North Carolina, 379 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Walker,
346 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184 (1957).
20. "This Court has never held that the States are required to establish avenues of appellate
review, but it is now fundamental that, once established, these avenues must be kept free of
unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts." Rinaldi v.
Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310-11 (1965). See, e.g., Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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invalid, 2 the risk of a harsher sentence will unconstitutionally deter

those entitled to a new trial because of error in the first proceeding
from exercising that right. 22 While the courts, both state and federal,
have responded to the question with differing answers, the Supreme
Court of the United States has been reluctant to issue a pre-emptory

decision.

However, in North Carolina v. Pearce2 1 the Supreme Court

issued a ruling which in theory would effectively inhibit the power of

trial judges to impose harsher sentences on retrial. Speaking for the
majority, Mr. Justice Stewart stated that while neither the equal
protection2 nor the double jeopardy 2 clauses pose any restriction on a
21. E.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511,
514 (1967); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-

96(1961).
22. Following is a reproduction of the often cited letter received by United States Circuit
Judge Craven, Fourth Circuit.
"Dear Sir:
"I am in the Mecklenburg County jail. Mr.
__
chose to re-try me as I knew he
would.

"Sir the other defendant in this case was set free after serving 15 months of his sentence,
I have served 34 months and now I am to be triedagain and with all probility I will receive
a heavier sentence than before as you know sir my sentence at first trite was 20 to 30 years.
I know it is usuelly the courts prosedureto give a largersentence when a new trite is granted
I guess this is to discouragePetitioners.
"You Honor.I don't want a new trite I am afraidof more time * * *
"Your Honor, I know you have tried to help me and God knows I apprecete this but
pleasesir don't let the state re-try me if there is any way you can prevent it.
"Very truly yours"
Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225, 231 n.7 (W.D.N.C. 1966). See Note, Increased
Sentence and Denial of Credit on Retrial Sustained Under Traditional Waiver Theory, 1965
DUKE L.J. 395, 399 n.25.
23. Certiorari has been repeatedly denied by the Supreme Court in cases dealing with this
problem. E.g., United States v. White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1052
(1968); Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968);
United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967).
24. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). This case was decided on Chief Justice Warren's last day on the
Court.
25. The majority rejected in toto the equal protection argument as inapplicable: "It simply
cannot be said that the State had invidiously 'classified' . . . those prisoners whose conviction
are not set aside by denying the members of that group the opportunity to be acquitted." Id. at
722-23. See United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968).
26. The majority based its holding that a harsher sentence may be imposed on retrial on
"the premise that the original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been wholly nullified and
the slate wiped clean." 395 U.S. at 721. Acknowledging that this premise is inconsistent with
the requirement that credit be given for that portion of the sentence already served, the majority
relied on "an unbroken line of decisions that have followed that principle for almost 25 years"
and held the premise valid in resentencing situations. Id. at 721.
In rendering its decision the Court distinguished Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957),
by restricting the Green holding to only prohibit the conviction on retrial of an offense of which
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court's power to impose harsher sentences on retrial, the due process
clause prohibits the practice of vindictively "imposing a heavier
sentence upon every reconvicted defendant for the explicit purpose of
punishing the defendant for his having succeeded in getting his original
conviction set aside. ' 27 Consequently, the Court established a
constitutional rule allowing the trial judge to impose a harsher sentence
only for reasons "based upon objective information concerning
identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant and occurring after
the time of the original sentencing proceeding, ' 2 provided these
reasons be made a part of the record."
In the instant decision, the court concluded that since the appellant
by his own initiative sought and obtained the dismissal of his
conviction and the right to a new trial, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment would not prohibit the imposition of a harsher
sentence on retrial. Similarly, the court ruled that since the appellant
had procured the dismissal of his conviction, thereby avoiding the
jeopardy in which he stood, he was precluded from asserting double
jeopardy as a bar to a subsequent sentence. The majority further stated
that since the appellant was resentenced by a jury rather than a judge,
and since there was no hint of vindictiveness on the part of the jury in
imposing the harsher sentence, the rule of North Carolina v. Pearce"
did not restrict the sentence imposed by the jury. The court therefore
held that the Pearce rule was limited only to judge-imposed sentences
and that the appellant must take the "burden with the benefit."
Dissenting, Judge Galbreath argued that the Pearcerule was applicable
the defendant was earlier acquitted. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas contended that
Green was not distinguishable. "From the point of view of the individual and his liberty, the risk
here of getting from I to 15 years for specified conduct is different only in degree from the risk

in Green of getting life imprisonment or capital punishment for a specified conduct." Id. at 728.
Mr. Justice Douglas agreed with Van Alstyne that "when a particular penalty is selected from a
range of penalties prescribed for a given offense, and when that penalty is imposed upon the
defendant, the judge or jury is impliedly 'acquitting' the defendant of a greater penalty ....
Van Alstyne, supra note 9, at 634-35.

27. 395 U.S. at 723-24.
28.

Id. at 726.

29. The Court stated that the purpose for requiring the "factual data upon which the
increased sentence is based" to be made part of the record is to allow "the constitutional

legitimacy of the increased sentence" to be "fully reviewed on appeal." Id. In other words, the
Court was saying that in view of the constitutional guarantee of the due process clause, appellant's

sentence can legitimately be increased only when justified by his conduct since the time of his
original conviction. Therefore, the Court, in adopting the narrow ruling of the First Circuit in
Marano. intended to prohibit all but the extraordinary judge-imposed harsher sentence. For a
criticism of the workings of the Pearce rule, see The Supreme Court, 1968 Term. 83 HARv. L,
REv. 7, 187 (1969).
30. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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to the facts of this case and that in the absence of affirmative
justification in the record for the increased sentence, such harsher
3
sentence must be considered unconstitutional .

The rule enunciated in the instant decision, granting juries a free
hand in setting penalties upon retrial, denies to appellants retried and
sentenced by a jury the same coistitutional rights enjoyed by those
resentenced by a .judge. While srch a rule is not inconsistent with the
narrow holding. of the Pearcecase, which dealt only with judge-imposed

sentences, this decision clearly yields a resul.-t that is contrary to the
policy underlying the Pearce decision. In Pearce the Supreme Court

was faced with the dilemma of balancing the societal interest in having
the punishment fit the offense against the individual's interest in having
an unfettered right of appeal. Seemingl.y" swayed by the policy interest

in adequate sentencing, the.Court refused to find a constitutional
prohibition barring harsher punishment. In truth, however, the Court

took away with one hand .what it gave with the other by stipulating
that the harsher sentence is constitutionally valid only when based upon

evidence of appellant's conduct occurring since the time of the original
trial. In so doing,,the Supreme Court promulgated the most restrictive

rule possible without absolutely barring judge-imposed harsher
sentences.32 Conversely, the Tennessee court has given the jury a carte
blanche in resentencing. In refusing to extend Pearce to jury situations,

this court attempted to distinguish between judge-imposed and juryimposed harsher 'sentences.3 However, in due process terms, the
31. Judge Galbreath felt that vindictiveness might have influenced the resentencing jury to
impose the harsher sentnce on retrial causing the harsher sentence to be invalid. "I must further
disagree with my brethern who in the majority opinion said 'it is practically inconceivable that
the second jury had such knowledge' (of the original conviction for raping a child). To me, it is
completely, not practically, inconceivable that in rural Maury County a jury impaneled some two
weeks after the first trial and a few days after the setting aside of its result (the first trial was
April 6, 1948; the second April 24, 1948) did not know of the prior proceeding! That there might
exist a strong resentment on the part of the members of the second jury that the defendant was
trifling with justice and should be severely punished for his audacity in trying to escape his just
desserts is too strong a probability to dismiss lightly. If the United States Supreme Court does
not believe it proper for a judge to double or triple a man's punishment without some affirmative
showing that facts not known during the first trial justify such increase, I cannot agree that such
awesome power of vindictiveness should be entrusted to laymen." 6 Crim. L. Rptr. at 2149.
32. The Supreme Court followed the precedent set by the First Circuit. See note 3 supra.
It is submitted that the Court intended to cause harsher resentencing to be an extraordinary result
justified only in the exceptional situation. But see The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 7, 187 (1969) for a recognition of the possibility that this rule "will result more in
demonstrating the ingenuity of sentencing judges than in restraining such vindictiveness as they
may entertain." Id. at 192.
33. But see May v. Peyton, 398 F.2d 476, 477 (4th Cir. 1968), where in recognition of the
artifical distinction between judge-imposed and jury-imposed harsher sentences, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals extended its ruling in Patton to situations where the jury is the sentencing
body.

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23

convicted is no less deterred at the prospect of a harsher sentence
whether imposed through the vindictiveness of the court or the jury.34
This case brings into sharp focus the need for the Supreme Court to
supplement its decision in Pearce and set forth a constitutional rule
applicable to jury situations."
Disregarding the artificial distinctions between judge and jury
sentencing,31 the rationale of the Pearce restriction is equally applicable
to jury situations. Although this is the reasonable extension of the
Pearce policy, 37 since most states forbid evidence of the appellant's
prior conviction and subsequent conduct to be presented to the jury, it
is an extension fraught with procedural problems. Therefore, if, as
Pearce states, the appellant's constitutional right to be free of the
inhibiting threat of vindictiveness prohibits increased punishments
unless justified by objective information concerning conduct of the
appellant occurring after the time of the original sentencing procedure,
in these states the jury is incapable of constitutionally imposing a
harsher sentence in accord with the Pearce restrictions. In view of this
inherent limitation, the Court could cast on the trial judge the
additional task, prior to sentencing, of determining whether the
appellant's conduct subsequent to the original conviction warrants an
increase in punishment. Under such a procedure the judge would still
be bound by the Pearce restriction and would rule on the validity of
any additional punishment imposed by the jury. As an 'alternative, the
Pearce rule can be extended directly to the jury in those states providing
a separate sentencing procedure in jury trials." In these states the jury
first determines the guilt of the defendant and then in a separate
34. The dissent discerned this inconsistency and noted that "[a] jury should not be allowed
to violate the Constitution any more than a court." 6 Crim. L. Rptr. at 2149.
35. That this rule is inadequate and that there is a need to set forth sufficient guidelines is
evidenced by the contrary holding of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Branch v. State,
445 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (ruling on motion for rehearing, the court held the Pearce
rule limited to judge sentencing, but by implication held the Pearce reasoning applicable to jury
situations by requiring that jury-imposed harsher sentences be justified by additional proof).
36. Surely it cannot be honestly contended that the jury is incapable of exercising
vindictiveness. Granted that in many circumstances the jury will not know of the original
conviction and retrial, but this concession does not insure against the possibility of vindictiveness.
See note 31 supra.
37. In his definitive article regarding harsher sentencing, Professor Van Alstyne opts for a
rule barring harsher sentences by the judge, jury, or other sentencing authority. Van Alstyne,
supra note 9, at 611.
38. Such a procedure is in effect in 5 states for capital offenses. See CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 190.1 (West Supp. 1968); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-10 (1968); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 125.30
(McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963); TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art 37.07
(Supp. 1969). The two-trial procedure for capital cases is advocated in MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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hearing admits additional evidence of the defendant's background. The
extension of the Pearce rule to these two-trial situations obviously will
not present a complete solution unless the traditional rules of evidence
are modified so that the fact of appellant's prior conviction and
subsequent conduct tan be admitted in the second proceeding.39 In
summary, while not responsible for prescribing a uniform sentencing
procedure, the Court should issue a pre-emptory decision applying the
Pearce restriction to those states allowing evidence of appellant's prior
conviction and subsequent conduct to be presented to the jury and to
those judges who, even in jury sentencing, determine the justification
of an increased sentence. In the absence of such state procedure, the
Court should apply an absolute prohibition barring harsher sentences.
It is submitted, however, that neither this proposed rule nor the
rule in Pearce adequately rebuts the arguments for an uninhibited right
to appeal. In discussion of the due process question, the Pearce Court
0 stating that
quoted with approval from Worcester v. Commissioner"
a court "is without right to . . . put a price on an appeal. A

defendant's exercise of a right of appeal must be free and unfettered."'4'
It is arguable whether a court can place a prisoner in a position
whereby he runs the risk of receiving a harsher sentence on retrial and
simultaneously give him an unrestrained right of appeal. The Supreme
Court affirmatively indicated that an unfettered right of appeal requires
only that the appellant be free of the vindictiveness of the trial judge.
In the last analysis, however, it matters not to the appellant whether
he be subjected to the vindictiveness of the court or the jury. What
concerns and deters him is the possibility of a harsher sentence for
whatever reason imposed. Therefore, the reasons for an increased
sentence in any particular case are constitutionally irrelevant; what
remains critical is the possibility that the risk of an increased sentence
deters the exercise of the right to secure a fair trial.

Labor Law-Civil Rights- Employer's Invidious Racial
Discrimination Violates Section 8(a)(1) of NLRA
The United Packinghouse Workers instituted unfair labor practice
proceedings against a Texas cotton processing corporation, contending
39. The California and Pennsylvania courts have interpreted their trial statutes to permit
introduction of evidence at the sentencing proceeding only when that evidence is admissible under
the rules of evidence. See, e.g., People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal. 2d 194, 373 P.2d 4(2 (1963);
Commonwealth v. McCoy, 305 Pa. 23, 172 A.2d 795 (1961).
40. 370 F.2d 713 (1st Cir. 1966).
41. Id. at 718.
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in part that the company had refused to bargain in good faith over

conditions of racial discrimination existing at one of its plants.' The
National Labor Relations Board found that the employer's conduct
constituted a violation of section 8(a)(5) 2 of the NLRA and issued an
appropriate bargaining order. On a consolidated appeal to the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the employer argued

that the Board's order was not supported by the evidence, while the
union contended that the decision by the Board had not gone far
enough. Specifically, the union asserted that the Board should also

have found that the employer's persistent discrimination against Negro

and Latin American workers 3 in itself violated section 8(a)(l) 4 of the

NLRA by inhibiting the exercise of their statutory right to act
concertedly for their mutual aid and protection. 5 'The Court of Appeals,

sustaining the validity of the union's position, held, order affirmed and
case remanded for further proceedings.' An employer's policy and
1. The union submitted 2 additional complaints: first, that the employer had
violated § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA through use of interrogations, threats, and promises in an effort
to impair the union's bargaining power and capacity for mounting a successful strike; and
secondly, that the employer had violated § 8(a)(5) because of its refusal to bargain over certain
wage and cost matters. Both of these contentions were upheld by the Board. United Packinghouse
Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1129 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903
(1969).
2. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer. . . to refuse to bargain collectively
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
with the representatives of his employees ....
3. The union produced 3 independent indicia of the employer's racial discrimination: first,
Negro and Latin American workers were paid less for doing the same work as whites; secondly,
nonwhite employees were consistently excluded from overtime assignments; and third, minority
group employees received less advantageous vacation benefits. 416 F.2d at 1132. It should be
noted, however, that the contention that the employer's discrimination violated § 8(a)(1) was not
specifically raised until the appeal. The Board considered the discrimination only in connection
with one of the § 8(a)(5) charges. Id. at 1134 n.12.
4. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or
" 29
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title ....
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1964).
5. To violate § 8(a)(1) an employer's conduct must interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by § 7 of the NLRA, which provides that
"[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargainingor other mutual aid or protection
.'9 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964) (emphasis added).
6. The posture of the case led the court to remand on the issue of whether the employer's
racially discriminatory conduct violated § 8(a)(l). In the unfair labor practice hearing against
the company, evidence of racial discrimination was produced only to aid in finding whether there
had been an § 8(a)(5) bargaining violation. The Board's Generaf Counsel did not proceed on the
theory that the discrimination itself violated § 8(a)(1). Therefore, although the company's racial
policies had been considered and found to be discriminatory by both the Board and the trial
examiner, the court felt "that in fairness to the company it should have an opportunity to have
the matter more fully litigated, with notice that the question of a § 8(a)(1) violation is specifically
to be determined." 416 F.2d at 1134 n.12.
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practice of invidious discrimination on the basis of race or national
origin constitutes an unfair labor practice within tie ainbit of section
8(a)(l) of the National Labor Relations Act. United Packinghouse
Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 903 (1969).
Whether racial discrimination by an employer can in itself
constitute an unfair labor practice represents a novel question under the
National Labor Relations Act. Although the area of employee civil
rights is by no means new to the NLRB, previous litigation on racial
7
issues has been confined primarily to union discriminatory practices.
In 1944, the first'significant decision involving racial discrimination in
a labor context was handed down by the Supreme Court in Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R. 8 There the Court recognized that under the
.Railway Labor Act, 9 unions owe a duty of fair representation to the
collective interests of the employees they represent. 0 Later, in Syres v.
Oil Workers Local 23," the Supreme Court established that the union
duty of fair representation extends to cases brought under the NLRA.
The National Labor Relations Board has more recently applied the
doctrine of fair representation 2 and has found that its violation
constitutes a union unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1) of the
7. The NLRB has, however, considered the effect of employer racial discrimination during
union election campaigns. For instance, it has held that if an employer makes flagrant and
inflammatory appeals to racial prejudice in an attempt to defeat a union in a certification election,
the election will be set aside. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962). Otherwise employer racial
discrimination has been only collaterally involved in decisions under the NLRA. See, e.g., NLRB
v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965) (employees wrongfully discharged-for
protesting company's discriminatory hiring policies); Ozan Lumber Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1942)
(company rules and action based on racism prevented employees from exercising their § 7 rights).
8. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
9. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964).
10. "We hold that the language of the [Railway Labor] Act ...
read in light of the
purposes of the Act, expresses the aim of Congress to impose on the bargaining representative of
a craft or class of employees the duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of
all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against them." Steele v. Louisville &
N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (944). For incisive discussion of the union duty of fair
representation, see Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 22 OHIo
ST. L.J. 39 (1961); Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957); Sovern,
The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 576-614
(1962).
II. 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
12. Independent Metal Workers Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964). The courts have
consistently upheld the extension of Board jurisdiction into the area of union racial
discrimination. E.g., NLRB v. Local 1367, ILA, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 837 (1967); Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 837 (1967).
13. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . to
restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 . . . or

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23

NLRA. Thus both the courts and the NLRB have consistently

enforced a union's duty to refrain from racial discrimination. By
contrast, employer racial discrimination has heretofore been proscribed

exclusively by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 4
pursuant to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.' 5 While the

legislative history of the NLRA is regrettably uninstructive as to
whether section 8(a)(l) was intended to comprehend employer acts of
racial discrimination,' 6 it is generally well established that Congress
intended to endow the NLRB and EEOC with concurrent jurisdiction
to interdict conduct violating both the NLRA and Title VII.

7

In the instant case, the court of appeals initially recognized that
there has been no previous judicial determination of whether an
employer's racial discrimination can constitute an unfair labor
(B) an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining
or the adjustment of grievances.
...
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1964).
14. But see note 7 supra.
15. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . .to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... " 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (1964). This mandate applies only to employers having 25 or more
employees.
16. Congress has rejected amendments to the NLRA which would expressly make both
union and employer racial discrimination unfair labor practices. E.g., S. 1897, 83d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1953); S. 1831, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). However, it should not be inferred from these
rejections that Congress intended to exclude the possibility that racial discrimination might ever
violate the act. The courts have interpreted the legislative history of both the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and the NLRA as permitting a finding that racial discrimination by a union can constitute
an unfair labor practice. See Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 24 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
17. The 1964 Civil Rights Act says nothing to indicate that the NLRB is ousted of
jurisdiction over cases involving racial discrimination. The legislative history of Title VII clearly
indicates that it was not intended to detract from the jurisdiction of the NLRB in such cases. A
memorandum prepared by the Department of Justice and read to the Senate by Senator Clark
(D-Pa.) stated in part: "Of course, title VII is not intended to and does not deny to any
individual, rights and remedies which he may pursue under other Federal and State statutes. If a
given action should violate both title VII and the National Labor Relations Act, the National
Labor Relations Board would not be deprived of jurisdiction. . . . [T]itle VII would have no
effect on the duties of any.employer or labor organization under the NLRA or under the Railway
Labor Act, and those duties would continue to be enforced as they are now." 110 CONG. Rcc,
7207 (1964) (remarks of Senator Clark (D-Pa.)). Later, Senator Tower (R-Tex.) proposed an
amendment to the Civil Rights Act which would have made the provisions of Title VII the
exclusive means of relief from racially discriminatory practices, precluding any executive or
independent agency from granting relief. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 59 to 29. 110
CONG. REC. 13650-52 (1964). The Fifth Circuit in Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d
12, 24 n.24 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967), noted that "1]egislative history
and specific provisions of the [Civil Rights Act] . . . make it apparent that Congress did not
intend to establish the enforcement provisions of Title VII as the exclusive remedy in [the area
of union discrimination]." See Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.31 BROOKLYN L. REv. 62, 95-96 (1964).
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practice. Turning its attention to analogous decisions involving union
racial discrimination, 8 the court concluded that there was no
compelling reason why an employer's conduct should be exempted
from Board scrutiny as a possible 8(a)(l) violation. As a subsidiary
matter, the court pointed out that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act does not purport to deprive the NLRB of jurisdiction to interdict
racial discrimination which violates the NLRA.19 Giving section 8(a)(1)
its logical construction, the court observed that this provision could
have been violated only if the employer's conduct, in addition to being
unjustified, was shown to have inhibited the exercise of employee
section 7 rights to act concertedly for their mutual aid and protection z0
In this regard, the court reasoned that an employer's racial
discrimination has a twofold effect: "(1) racial discrimination sets up
an unjustified clash of interests between groups of workers which tends
to reduce the likelihood and the effectiveness of their working in
concert to achieve their legitimate goals under the Act; and (2) racial
discrimination creates in its victims an apathy or docility which inhibits
them from asserting their rights against the perpetrator of the
discrimination." ' 21 Consequently, the court concluded that the
confluence of these two factors deters employees in exercising section
7 rights and therefore violates section 8(a)(l).
The impact of the Packinghouse decision in the area of employee
civil rights will undoubtedly be profound. Not only does the decision
22
open a new statutory avenue for the vindication of workers' rights,
but in doing so it facilitates a more prompt procurement of redress
through the medium of the National La'bor Relations Board. An
employee will no longer be compelled to resort to the cumbersome and
expensive procedures of the EEOC2 3 to obtain relief from his
18. 416 F.2dat 1134-35.
19. Id. at 1133-34n.11.
20. See note 5 supra,
21. 416 F.2d at 1135.
22. Section 8(a)(l) is a broad and pervasive "avenue" having been frequently interpreted
as being violated whenever an employer's conduct has a natural tendency to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights. Time-O-Matic, Inc. v. NLRB,
264 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1959); NLRB v. Ford, 170 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1948). See NLRB v.
Clearfield Cheese Co., 322 F.2d 89, 94 (3d Cir. 1963) (holding that actual intimidation or

influence is immaterial).
23. See, e.g., Rosen, Division of Authority Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
A Preliminary Study in Federal-State Interagency Relations, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 846 (1966).
Professor Rosen points out that "[p]rimarily because the NLRB bears the expenses of
enforcement of the NLRA,offers the other general advantages of administrative enforcement, has
a backlog time before the NLRB six months shorter than before the federal district courts, and
has no express requirement to defer to state FEP [Fair Employment Practices] agencies,
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employer's racially discriminatory practices, provided he can
demonstrate that such practices interfere with or restrain the exercise
of his rights guaranteed by section 7 of the NLRA. In addition, a
broader and more flexible spectrum of remedies is available under the
NLRA 24 for workers aggrieved by racial discrimination. Hence the

instant decision is both significant and admirable from a policy
standpoint.
Unfortunately, however, there are two apparent shortcomings in
the court's-attempt to formulate a standard 25 for determining whether
an employer's racial discrimination violates section 8(a)(l). In the first
place, the language of the majority opinion is unclear as to whether
invidious racial discrimination by an employer inevitably results in
divisiveness and docility and is thus a per se violation of 8(a)(l), 26 or
representatives of civil rights organizations have preferred NLRB enforcement over Title VII
enforcement of FEP." Id. at 887.
24. In the landmark case of Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941), the
Supreme Court construed the NLRA as conferring on the Board broad and flexible power to
fashion remedies necessary to effectuate the purposes of the act. While the remedies afforded by
the Board may vary, normally a cease and desist order is issued to sanction an unfair labor
practice. Such an order, when enforced by a federal court of appeals, is backed up by the court's
contempt power. M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
161 (1966). Title VII originally conferred enforcement powers on the EEOC, but these powers
were deleted so that the title could pass, and the Commission was limited essentially to the
function of conciliation. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 62, 64-68 (1964). Amendments have been proposed that would give
the EEOC enforcement powers, but thus far none has been successful. See, e.g., S. 3465, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R. 10065, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Senator Javits (R-N.Y.) has
made the following appraisal of the remedial efficacy of Title VII and the EEOC: "ITlitle VII
pays lip service to the idea of equal employment opportunity, but the hard fact is that the
compromise worked out in 1964 under which the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
was emasculated, has gone far to destroy the act as an effective tool to end discrimination in
employment in this country." 114 CONG. REC. 16,910 (1968) (remarks of Senator Javits (RN.Y.)).
25. The standard referred to is that of employee divisiveness and docility. See text
accompanying note 21 supra.
26. The following statements from Judge Wright's majority opinion indicate that the court
intended to adopt'a per se rule: "Thus in the context of employer racial discrimination the
question reduces to whether that discrimination inhibits its victims from asserting themselves
against their employer to improve their lot.
We find that an employer's invidious discrimination on account of race or national origin
has such an effect. The effect is twofold: (1) racial discrimination sets up an unjustified clash of
interests between groups of workers . . . and (2) racial discrimination creates in its victims an
apathy or docility which inhibits them from asserting their rights against the perpetrator of the
discrimination." 416 F.2d at 1135. "IT]he employer's policy of discrimination inevitably sets
group against group, thus frustrating the possibility of effective concerted action." Id. at 1136
(emphasis added). "[W]e conclude that an employer's policy and practice of invidious
discrimination on account of race or national origin is a violation of section 8(a)(1)." Id. at 1138
(emphasis added). Nowhere do these unequivocal assertions suggest that employer racial
discrimination may not produce docility and divisiveness. Judge Prettyman's concurring opinion
intimates that he too interprets the majority opinion as adopting a per se view. Id.
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whether such discrimination merely tends to precipitate divisiveness

and docility and hence violates 8(a)(l) only upon sufficient proof of this

effect. 27 Secondly, assuming that the court intended a per se approach, s
it is highly questionable that the natural consequence of an employer's
discrimination would in all cases be either divisiveness or docility. On
the contrary, there is some authority to the effect that racial

discrimination may tend to encourage cohesiveness within minority
groups, 29 and it is conceivable that this factor could lead to collective

employee action with nonminority union members. Furthermore, in
light of the growing pressure for racial equality in all phases of
American life, accompanied by increasing militancy of minority

groups, it is slightly presumptuous for the court to forecast that an
employer's racial discrimination will necessarily occasion docility.0 In

view of the fact that divisiveness and docility cannot be deemed
inevitably to flow from racial discrimination, the Packinghouse

decision should preferably be construed as establishing only the
proposition that an employer's invidious racial discrimination may

under some circumstances violate section 8(a)(l).

31

An independent

factual determination should thus be made in each case to ascertain
whether the particular discrimination involved did in fact inhibit the

exercise of section 7 rights.
27. The following language implies that the court did not intend a per se rule: "We turn
now to the question: can an employer's policy and practice of invidious discrimination against
its employees on account of race or national origin violate section 8(a)(l) of the National Labor
Relations Act? When established as hereinafter discussed, we -answer this question in the
affirmative .

. . ."

Id. at 1134 (emphasis added). In addition, Judge Danaher in his concurring

opinion did not interpre't the majority as employing a per se approach. Id. at 1138-39.
28. At least one writer has interpreted the Packinghousedecision as "apparently" holding
that an employer's invidious racial discrimination is a per se violation of § 8(a)(l). 57 GEO. L.J.
1313, 1316 (1969).
29. See, e.g., New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938). "This
process of group coalition and group identification on the basis of interests is obviously more
important when a group is a disadvantaged minority." L. MASSOTTi, J. HADDEN, K.SEMINATORE
& J. CORSI, A TIME TO BURN? 156 (1969). See generally N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1969, at 1,
col. 5.
30. The court thoroughly documented the well established proposition that racial
discrimination in general can produce both divisiveness and docility. 416 F.2d at 1136-37 nn.1621. However, these represent only possible reactions and should not be presumed to inevitably
result from discrimination. There is substantial evidence that by the end of the 1960's, the
formerly apathetic and submissive attitude of American Negroes in general had vanished, having
been largely displaced by a sense of racial pride and an increased willingness to retaliate against
unjustified discrimination. For a thorough discussion of the revolution in Negro attitudes, see L.
MASSOTTI, J. HADDEN, K. SEMINATORE & J. CORSI, supra note 29; M. KING, WHERE Do WE
Go FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY 18 (1967).
31. For suggested procedural alternatives to a per se rule, see 57 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1319
(1969).
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Labor Law-NLRB May Not Order Employer to Include
Checkoff Provision in Collective Bargaining Agreement as
Remedy for His Refusal to Bargain
H.K. Porter Co. refused to accede to the United Steelworkers'
demands for a checkoff' provision during collective bargaining
negotiations. The union sought relief from the NLRB which found that
the company's refusal was not motivated by a valid business reason but
was based upon an intention not to "aid and comfort" the union. 2 The
Board then issued a cease and desist order after finding that this refusal
to bargain was.a violation of the "good faith" requirement of section
8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act.3 The court of appeals
upheld the order and directed the company to engage in further
bargaining on the checkoff.4 In the following negotiations the company
offered to discuss alternative arrangements,5 but the union insisted that
the court's order required Porter to agree to the checkoff provision.
Because of this dispute over the interpretation of the order, the union
filed a motion for clarification which the court of appeals denied,
indicating that contempt proceedings would be the proper means to test
the employer's compliance. The Regional Director declined to
prosecute, stating that "the employer had 'satisfactorily complied with
the affirmative requirements of the Order."'" The union then filed a
motion in the court of appeals for reconsideration of the earlier motion
to clarify. The court granted the motion, and in a new opinion7 held
that under certain circumstances the Board might impose a checkoff
provision as a remedy for "bad faith" bargaining.8 The case was
remanded to the Board, which issued an order requiring H.K. Porter
to "[g]rant to the Union a contract clause providing for the checkoff
of union dues." 9 The court of appeals affirmed.10 On certiorari to the
1. A checkoff is the periodic deduction of union dues from the employee's paycheck by the
employer, with subsequent payment made directly to the union. See CCH, GUiDEBOOK To LABOR
RELATION S 64-66 (1968).
2. H.K. Porter Co., 153 N.L.R.B: 1370, 1372 (1965).
3. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-... (5) to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees.
... 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
4. United Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
851 (1966).
5. The company offered to give the union space in their payroll office where they could
collect union dues.
6. H.K. Porter Co., v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99,100 (1970).
7. United Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
8. Id. at 298.
9. H.K. Porter Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 72 (1968).
10. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. Where the National
Labor Relations Board finds that an employer has repeatedly refused
to bargain in "good faith," the Board has the power to order the

employer and employee to negotiate in "good faith," but it cannot
compel either party to agree to any substantive contract provision of
the collective bargaining agreement. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397
U.S. 99 (1970).
In 1935 Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act,"
giving employees a federally protected right to organize and bargain
collectively through their representatives. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act

insures this right by requiring that an employer meet and bargain in
"good faith" with his employees' representatives.12 The legislative

history indicates that Congress did not conceive this provision as a

sweeping obligation to require agreement." In NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.," the Supreme Court by implication restricted the

Board's power to govern the substantive contract provisions. 5 In 1947

the fear was expressed that notwithstanding the Supreme Court's

language in Jones & Laughlin the Board was extending its influence
over the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements, and this

control would become more expansive if guidelines were not placed
in the law."

In amending the Act, Congress included section

11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964).
12. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 484 (1960); S. REP. No.
573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935). See generally Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to
Bargain" Concept In American Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1065 (1941); Wellington, Freedom of
Contract and The Collective BargainingAgreement, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 467 (1964).
13. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935). "The committee wishes to dispel
any possible false impression that this bill is designed to compel the making of agreements or to
permit governmental supervision of their terms . . . . [T]he duty to bargain collectively does not
carry with it the duty to reach an agreement, because the essence of collective bargaining is that
either party shall be free to decide whether proposals made to it are satisfactory." Id. (emphasis
added). "Let me say that the bill, requires no employer to . . . make any agreement ...
Nothing in this bill allows the Federal Government or any agency. . . to effect or govern working
conditions in any establishment or place of employment." 79 CONG. REC. 7659 (1935) (remarks
of Senator Walsh).
14. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
15. "The Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees. It does not
compel any agreement whatever. . . .The theory of the Act is that free opportunity for
negotiation . . . may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does
not attempt to compel." Id. at 45.
16. "Notwithstanding this language [in Jones & Laughlin] of the Court, the present Board
has gone very far, in the guise of determining whether or not employers had bargained in good
faith, in setting itself up as the judge of what concessions an employer must make. . . . [U]nless
Congress writes into the law guides for the Board to follow, the Board may attempt to carry this
process still further and seek to control more and more the terms of collective-bargaining
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8(d), 17 which provides, among other things, that the obligation imposed
"does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession.' 8 In NLRB v. American National Insurance
Co., 9 the Supreme Court indicated that the amendment prevents the
Board from either directly or indirectly controlling the substantive
terms of the collective bargaining agreement.2 Even the dissent acknowledged that the Board lacked the power to compel either of the
parties to make any concessions. 21 Likewise, in NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' Union1" the Court, speaking without a dissent, stated, "it remains clear that section 8(d) was an attempt by Congress to prevent
the Board from controlling the settling of the terms of collective
bargaining agreements.'" '
The NLRB is provided with broad remedial powers by section 1024
of the Act, but the use of these powers is limited to carrying out the
policies of the Act. 25 It has long been recognized that freedom of
contract is basic to the entire Act.25 Section 10(c) charges the Board
with the duty of molding remedies to effectuate the policies of the Act.2 7
Congress gave the NLRB broad discretion and flexibility in
formulating its orders; 28 an order will not be set aside unless it can be
agreements." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1947). See Adams & Coleman,
Can Collective BargainingSurvive the Board? 52 GEO. L.J. 367, 372 (1964).
17. "For purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet . . . and confer in
good faith with respect to . . . conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement
. . . but such obligation does not compel eitherparty to agree to a proposalor require the making
of a concession." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964) (emphasis added).
18. Id.
19. 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
20. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 513 (1960) (concurring
opinion); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 395, 401-02, 404 (1952). See Terminal R.R. Ass'n
v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen., 318 U.S. 1, 6 (1943).
21. "Certainly the Board lacks power to compel concessions as to the substantive terms of
labor agreements." 343 U.S. 395, 412 (Minton, J., dissenting joined by Douglas, J.). See Local
24, Teamster Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959).
22. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
23. Id. at 487.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964). "If... the Board shall be of the opinion that any person
. . . has engaged in or is engaging in any . . . unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state
its findings of fact and shall issue . . . an ordir requiring such persons to cease and desist from
such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies
of [the Act] . .. ."
26. See McCulloch, Past, Present and Future Remedies Under Section 8(a)(5) of the
National Labor Relations Act, in 1968 LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 114, 115 (Mr. McCulloch
is chairman of the NLRB; Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 467 (1964).
27. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953).
28. See generally NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Phelps Dodge Corp.
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shown that it is an attempt to achieve ends other than those that can
2
be fairly said to carry out the policies of the Act. 1
The instant Court found that the principal purpose of the Act was
to insure that employers and employees could bargain together
voluntarily to establish working conditions. It was not intended to
allow the government to regulate the terms and conditions of
employment or to become a party to the negotiations if the parties
failed to reach an agreement. It further found that the legislative
history of the Act indicates that Congress never intended for the Board
to impose substantive contract provisions upon the parties. The
majority also stated that section 8(d) of the Act limits the scope of the
Board's remedial powers under section 10. Therefore, the Court
concluded that the National Labor Relations Board was without the
power to impose substantive contract provisions upon the parties as a
remedy for an employer's failure to bargain in "good faith." The
dissent found that in a situation where the employer has no valid
business reason for refusing to include a checkoff provision in the
collective bargaining agreement, and his sole reason was to prevent
reaching any agreement with the union, then section 10(c) of the Act
empowers the Board to order the inclusion of the checkoff as a remedy
for the employer's failure to bargain in good faith.
In this case the Supreme Court reversed the first attempt by the
Board in the history of the National Labor Relations Act to order an
employer to include a substantive contract provision in a collective
bargaining agreement. In the past, however, the Board has achieved
almost the same result in other cases without directly ordering
agreement by finding that an employer's refusal to grant a concession
was unreasonable, constituted a refusal to bargain, and consequently
was an unfair labor practice." To remedy this finding, the employer
3
was forced to grant the concession. '
In issuing the order in the instant case, the Board relied upon the
opinion of the circuit court, which reasoned that section 8(d) defines
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); NLRB v. Local 138, Operating Eng'rs, 380 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.
1967); J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1966).

29. See Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1964); Virginia
Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943).
30. See generally General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964); Radiator Specialty Co., 143
N.L.R.B. 350 (1963); Dallas Cartage Co., 14 N.L.R.B. 411 (1939); Globe Cotton Mills, 6
N.L.R.B. 461 (1938); Dodd, From Maximum Wages to Minimum Wages: Six Centuries of
Regulationof Employment Contracts,43 COLUM. L. REv. 643, 675 (1943).
31. See American Nat'l Ins. Co. 89 N.L.R.B. 185 (1950) (employer insisting on a
management rights clause) rev'd on other grounds, 343 U.S. 395 (1952); Dixie Culvert Mfg. Co.,
87 N.L.R.B. 554 (1949). See also United Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 272, 276
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion).
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collective bargaining and relates only to the determination of whether

32
an 8(a)(5) violation has occured, and not to the scope of the remedy.
This reasoning seems anomalous, since it prohibits the Board from

relying on an employer's refusal to reach agreement as the sole evidence

of bad faith, yet it allows the Board to order the employer to accept a
provision as a remedy in the same dispute. The Board also has utilized
the settlement procedure 3" to force contract provisions on the parties.
In the case of Memphis Plywood Corp.,3

the International

Woodworkers Union filed unfair labor practice charges with the
NLRB. Before prosecuting the case, the employer was given the
opportunity to accept an informal settlement agreement, 35 which he did.
This agreement was prepared by the NLRB 36 and sent to the employer
for his acceptance. It included a clause requiring the employer to

include a provision providing for a checkoff in any collective
bargaining agreement executed with his union. 3 Had the employer not
complied with the agreement, the NLRB would have proceeded to
1
prosecute the charges.

The government's labor policy is not erected on a foundation of
governmental regulation of the substantive results of negotiations. 3 The
Act does not contemplate that unions will always be secure or be able

to reach agreement. It does not prohibit the employer or union from
ultimately resorting to economic force to accomplish what they have
been unable to achieve through bargaining; indeed, the Act itself
provides for the use of economic weapons. A number of writers have
argued that encroachments by the Board have stifled the collective

bargaining process.4 Even if the present remedial powers of the Board
are inadequate to cope with labor problems today, it is not for the
32. United Steel Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
33. See L. SILVERBERG, How To TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 209 (3d ed. 1967).
34. This case was assigned number 26-CA-2531 by the NLRB, Region 26, Memphis,
Tennessee. The case was never heard because the employer accepted the settlement agreement.
35. An informal settlement is an agreement whereby the party charged undertakes to
remedy the unfair labor practice. It always provides for withdrawal of the charge as soon as the
charged party complies. L. SILVERBERG, supra note 35, at 209-10.
36. Various types of preparedsettlement notices are available at the regional office, and
each is worded to fit a particular unfair labor practice. Id. at 209-20.
37. The settlement agreement is subject to the approval of the regional director. Id. at 210.
38. Id.
39. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947); see NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l,
361 U.S. 477, 490-91 (1960).
40. See Adams & Coleman, supra note 16; Kuelthau, The NLRB and the Duty to Make
Concessions in Bargaining, 18 LAB. L.J. 201 (1967); Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the
Collective BargainingAgreement, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 467 (1964).
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Board or the courts to expand those powers as they attempted to do

in this case.4 Congress should determine when to allow governmental
review of collective bargaining proposals and compulsory submission
to one side's proposals. The present Act does not envision such action.

Securities Regulation- Pre-filing Corporate Press Release Which
Includes the Value of the Securities to be Offered in a Proposed
Exchange Offer Violates Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of
1933 and Is Not Protected by Rule 135
Plaintiff, Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. (Chris-Craft), brought a
motion for a preliminary injunction to restrain Bangor Punta
Corporation (Bangor Punta) from gaining control' of Piper Aircraft
Corporation (Piper) 2 pending a trial on the merits of whether Bangor
Punta violated section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933. 3 Plaintiff
41.

See generally

SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, ORGANIZATION AND

PROCEDURE OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

(1960);

SUBCOMM.

ON

NLRB

S. Doc. No. 81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.

OF HOUSE COMM. ON ED. AND LABOR, 81sT CONG.,

IST SESS.,

ADMINISTRATION OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT BY THE NLRB 16-26

(Comm.

Print 1961); McCulloch, supra note 26.
I. This litigation comes at the end of a hard fought battle between Chris-Craft and Bangor
Punta for control of Piper Aircraft Corporation.
2. Piper Aircraft was also a defendant in this action as it also issued a press release on
May 8.
3. The court held that Bangor Punta violated Rule l0b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1969),
of the 1934 Act when it purchased Piper shares between May 14 and May 23, since it was
participating in the distribution. The court based its decision on the language "any right to
purchase any such security." Since Piper shares carried the right to acquire Bangor Punta
securities as a result of Bangor Punta's exchange offer, Bangor Punta could not purchase these
securities. It might be noted that the majority could cite no authority for the proposition that an
offeror in an exchange offer could not buy securities of the target company. The purpose of Rule
lOb-6 was to prevent an issuer of stock from manipulating the market for that stock. Comment,
The SEC's Rule lOb-6: Preservinga Competitive Market During Distributions, 1967 DUKE L.J.
809, 812. Bangor Punta argued that its purchases of Piper stock would serve to drive up the price
of Piper stock and therefore make the Bangor Punta shares 6ffered in exchange appear less
attractive. This is not the effect which Rule lOb-6 was supposed to prevent. Rule 10b-13, not
effective as to the present controversy, was adopted to prevent an offeror of an exchange
offer from buying shares of the target company during distribution. The court relied on the
language of the SEC's release which stated that this rule was a mere codification of existing
interpretations under Rule lOb-6. SEC Securities Act Release No. 34-8995 (May 5, 1969),
77,706, at 83,617. It seems tenuous at most that the SEC
[Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
would adopt a rule prohibiting a transaction already prohibited by Rule 10b-6 especially in light
of the fact that no cases have held that Rule lOb-6 prohibits an offeror company from buying
target company stock.
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contended that the publication 4 by Bangor Punta of its intention to
offer securities valued at 80 dollars in exchange for Piper stock
constituted an "offer to sell" before filing a registration statement in
violation of section 5(c) and that defendant is not protected by Rule
135 of the Securities and Exchange.Commission (SEC).5 Defendant
contended that the present state of the law concerning disclosure and
the rules of the New York Stock Exchange require disclosure of this
information even prior to the filing of a registration statement. The
district court denied the motion for an injunction and held that Bangor
Punta had not violated section 5(c). On appeal to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, held, affirmed as to the injunction but reversed and
remanded as to the 5(c) violation.' A pre-filing press release
announcing a corporation's proposed exchange offer which includes the
value of the securities to be offered violates section 5(c) of the Securities
Act of 1933 and is not within the protection of Rule 135. Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L.
92,510 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 1969).
REP.
The Securities Act of 1933 was designed by Congress to insure
accurate disclosure by preventing premature disclosure of pertinent
information concerning publicly offered securities. This would put all
investors in a position to exercise equally informed judgment about
securities offered to them for sale.7 Section 5(c) declares it unlawful to
make any kind of "offer to sell" before a registration statement
regarding the securities has been filed. 8 This section attempted to
eliminate the practice of "beating the gun" or "conditioning the
market" 9 with advance publicity bef6re the filing of a registration
4. The portion of the press release complained of reads as follows: "Bangor Punta has
agreed to file a registration statement with the SEC covering a proposed exchange offer for any

and all of the remaining outstanding shares of Piper Aircraft for a package of Bangor Punta
securities to be valued in the judgment of The First Boston Corporation at not less than $80 per
Piper share. The registration statement covering all securities to be issued will be filed as soon as
possible and a meeting of the shareholders of Bangor Punta Corporation will be called for

approval." Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,510, at 98,374 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 1969).
5. Rule 135 was promulgated by the SEC under § 5(c) setting forth certain categories of
information to be included in an announcement which does not constitute an offer to sell. Plaintff
contended the categories of information privileged under Rule 135 are exclusive and, since price

was not one of the categories, Bangor Punta made an offer to sell when it included the price.
6. The court, citing Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966), affirmed the
denial of the motion for an injunction since the plaintiff would not suffer any irreparable harm.
7.
8.
181, 210
9.

H.R. REP.No. 1542, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1954).
Roe v. United States, 316 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1963); 1 L. Loss, SEcURiTIES REGULATION
(2d ed. 1961).
SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (purpose

is to protect public investors by requiring registration); I L. Loss, supra note 8, at 215.
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statement. Early publicity could lead to a premature opinion of the
security's value without the benefit of a complete disclosure. 0 Section
2(3)" defines the term "offer to sell" or "offer" broadly to include
every attempt or offer to dispose of a security for value in conjunction

with section 5(c). In order to exempt certain disclosures of forthcoming
issuances from the definition of an "offer to sell" prohibited by section
5(c), the SEC has promulgated Rule 135.12 The purpose 3 of this rule
was to enable an issuer to furnish certain factual information to its
security holders in advance of the actual offering and to illustrate

exactly what information was permitted without constituting an offer
to sell. In an exchange offer, the name of the issuer, the title of the

securities, and the basis upon which the exchange is to be made are
categories of privileged information." The SEC has left the courts
apparently free to interpret the language, the "basis upon which the
exchange is to be made," as they see fit. The SEC's only utterances
concerning the Rule characterized it as an "interpretative" rule. 5 In

contrast to these provisions militating against premature disclosure, the
securities laws contain specific sections that require the disclosure of

any material facts. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 was intended to empower the SEC to regulate or prohibit any

manipulative or deceptive practices which it finds detrimental to the
interests of the investor." Rule lOb-5,'17 promulgated under section

10(b), makes it unlawful to employ any manipulative device or to make
any untrue statement or omission concerning any material facts in the
purchase or sale of a security. In 1968, the Second Circuit made its

important decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.' 8 that insiders
10. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,510, at 98,376 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 1969).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1964): "The term 'offer to sell,' 'offer for sale,' or 'offer' shall
include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest
in a security, for value."
12. Rule 135 provides: "(a) For the purposes only of section 5 of the Act, the following
notices sent by an issuer in accordance with the terms and conditions of this rule shall not be
deemed to offer any security for sale: . . . (2) A notice to any class of security holders of such
issuer or of another issuer advising them that it proposes to offer its securities to them in exchange
for other securities . . .(c) The notice shall . . . contain no more than the following additional
information: . . . (4) In the case of an exchange offering, the name of the issuer and title of the
securities to be surrendered in exchange for the securities to be offered, the basis upon which the
exchange is proposed to be made and the period during which the exchange may be made .
17C.F.R. § 230.135 (1969).
13. 25 SEC ANN. REP. 16 (1959).
14. Rule 135(c)(4), 17C.F.R. § 230.135 (1969).
15. 21 SEC ANN. REP.4(1955).
16. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934); see Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: Its
Holdingsand Implications, 22 VAND. L. REV. 359, 364 (1969).
17. 17C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1969).
18. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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in possession of nonpublic material information cannot purchase or sell
securities for their own benefit on the basis of that material
information before it has been made public. 9 The test for "material"

was described as "whether a reasonable man would attach importance
• . .to the information in determining his choice of action in the
transaction in question and whether the fact might affect the value of
the securities. '20 The declared policy under the securities laws is to
guarantee "that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have

relatively equal access to material information"'2 and therefore when
information may affect investors' desires to sell or buy, nondisclosure

may result in a violation of the securities laws.22 It is also recognized
that a corporation itself has no right to trade on the basis of inside

information.2 3 The New York Stock Exchange in the wake of Texas
Gulf Sulphur dedicated itself to the policy of complete, timely
disclosure by adopting a Stock Exchange Rule on July 18, 1968.4

Because negotiations leading to acquisitions or exchange offers are the
types of developments where untimely and inadvertent disclosure occur,

corporations are required to disclose quickly to the public any news or
information which might reasonably be expected to materially alter the

market for securities.21
19. Address by Manuel F. Cohen, Baltimore Securities Analysts Society, Jan. 6, 1969;
[1967-69 Decisions] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
77,652, at 83,414; see Bromberg, Corporate
Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its Implications, 22 Sw. L.J. 731 (1968). This decision was
actually predictable from earlier such holdings. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (object of the securities law is to substitute philosophy of full disclosure for
that of caveat emptor); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) (10b-5 was intended to
cover devices which take undue advantage of investors).
20. 401 F.2d at 849. These definitions were based on language taken from other decisions.
List v. Fashion Park Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965). The court held that a "reasonable" man
includes not only the conservative investor but also the speculator so that information which
might persuade investors to buy, sell, or hold securities would also include facts which affect the
future of the company. Note, supra note 16, at 369.
21. 401 F.2d at 849; Appellee's Brief for Petition for Rehearing at 3, Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,510 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 1969).
22. SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 460 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 920 (1969).
23. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1963).
24. New York Stock Exchange Company Manual, at A-19 (July 18, 1968).
25. This disclosure is not required if such information can be restricted to a small group
of top management officials. Since it is necessary to bring in other persons to conduct preliminary
studies and consultations, it is almost impossible to maintain security. The extent of such
disclosures depends upon the state of negotiations, but usually they should be definite as to price
and ratio. Id. The Exchange could have delisted the Bangor Punta securities or instituted other
sanctions against Bangor Punta if it had not issued the May 8 press release. Brief for Appellee
at 23, Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SaC. L. REP.
92,510 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 1969).
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In the instant case the court addressed itself to whether Bangor
Punta violated section 5(c) when it issued the May 8 press release by
declaring that Rule 135 provides an exclusive checklist as to what is
and is not an offer. 21 Since the Rule'does not specifically mention
disclosure of the value of the securities to be offered, the court held that
Bangor Punta's inclusion of the 80 dollar value overstepped the
exemption and constituted an offer to sell in violation of 5(c). 2 Noting
that the evil of a premature offer is its tendency to supply the offeree
with an opinion of the value of the securities before a registration
statement is filed, the majority directed its attention to the defendant's
argument that an immediate disclosure of market value was required
by Texas Gulf Sulphur and by the rules of the New York Stock
Exchange. The court declared that the only material fact in this case
was the exchange offer itself and that by including the price Bangor
Punta went too far. Finally, the majority regarded the disclosure policy
of the Exchange as not binding upon the SEC and the court. The
dissent noted that the need for fair and equal access to information
about the terms of a tender offer must be balanced against premature
disclosure of an exchange offer in contravention of the registration and
disclosure requirements.28 Relying on the language of Rule 135(c)(4)
that requires notification of "the basis upon which the exchange is
proposed to be made," the dissent declared that the 80 dollar figure
was an essential part of the basis and thus was allowed under Rule 135.
In light of Texas Gulf Sulphur which requires immediate disclosure of
material information, the dissent felt that the 80 dollar figure was a
material fact and its disclosure was required. The dissent noted the
possibility of damage to Piper shareholders due to trading by a number
of persons who acted as consultants for Bangor Punta.2 1 Citing the
disclosure policy of the New York Stock Exchange, the dissent
concluded that the May 8 announcement was proper and a fair
accommodation of section 5(c) and Rule 135 and the obligation to
disclose material facts.
The instant case represents an affirmation of the policy behind
26. [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,510, at 98,376.
27. The majority strictly interpreted the language of Rule 135 in finding price not to be a
privileged disclosure.
28. The dissent did not base its decision on any single proposition but wisely sought an
accommodation between 2 seemingly conflicting policies.
29. The dissent was very interested in the danger of putting investors on a different par as
far as information was concerned. If the price had not been announced, any Piper shareholder
who tendered his shares to Chris-Craft for a smaller amount before Bangor Punta's offer was
effectively announced would suffer damage and might well have an action against Bangor Punta
and Piper. [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,510, at 98,380 n.2.

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23

section 5(c) by strictly and literally interpreting its language. Although
the attempt to protect the investor is meritorious, numerous difficulties
concerning the obligations of disclosure are ostensibly created. In order
to protect the investor from forming a premature opinion of the value
of a security before a registration statement is filed, the court strictly
interpreted Rule 135 to find that Bangor Punta was not within its
protection .3 The reasoning of the majority's holding creates a head-on
collision with the disclosure requirements of Texas Gulf Sulphur. In
light of the policy to place all investors on the same level and provide
equal access to material information, 31 and considering Texas Gulf
Sulphur3 2 and Kohler v. Kohler Co.,3 3 it seems logical that a
corporation would be under a duty to disclose any material
information it might possess if it planned to purchase the stock of a
target company. Bangor Punta was placed in an irreconcilable
dilemma. Various Bangor Punta consultants who gained knowledge of
the exchange offer would be in a position to buy up Piper shares and
later exchange them for Bangor Punta shares. At the time of the press
release, Piper shares were selling in the 60's on the Stock Exchange,
thus giving a decided advantage to those persons who learned of the
exchange offer before it was publicly released. The dissent wisely
adopted a balancing approach which led to the conclusion that the
benefits of insuring equal access to information about the terms of the
tender offer in this case outweighed the potential evils of premature
disclosure. The SEC policy on disclosure as espoused by its former
chairman, is that once news of a material pending development has
gone beyond the top management of a company and their individual
confidential advisers, the company takes a dangerous risk in not
making prompt disclosure so as to insure that no market advantage is
created for anyone.Y Bangor Punta's somewhat dubious position was
exacerbated by the immediate disclosure policy of the New York Stock
Exchange.35 If it failed to comply with these rules, Bangor Punta faced
the possibility of being delisted or of suffering other sanctions at the
hands of the Exchange.36 In the midst of this utter confusion, the SEC
30. Id. at-98,380.
31. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cerl. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969). For a discussion of disclosure requirements, see J. Flom, B. Garfinkel & J.
Freund eds., DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES AND INSIDERS (1967).
32. See Coates v. SEC, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
33. 319 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1963).
34. Address by Manuel F. Cohen, Baltimore Securities Analysts Society, Jan. 6, 1969,

[1967-69 Decisions] CCH

FED. SEC.

35. See notes 24-25 supra.
36. Id.

L.

REP.

77,652, at 83,419.
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adds to the misery by contributing Rule lOb-13 which prohibits any
person who is making a tender offer or an exchange offer from going
outside of that offer to purchase securities of the target company from
the time such exchange offer is publicly announced until the expiration
3
of the period of exchangeY.
Numerous inconsistencies attach vividly to
this new regulation. Rule lOb-13 is susceptible to two- interpretations
of when the purchase of target company stock is prohibited: (1) only
after the public announcement of the actual exchange offer itself, or (2)
after any public announcement that an exchange offer will be made in
the near future. Under the first interpretation, lOb-13 seemingly would
allow a corporation to buy target company shares from the time of
public announcement that it will make -an exchange offer in the future
until public announcement of the actual exchange offer itself; the
question is whether such an announcement of a future exchange offer
will be deemed an offer to sell in violation of 5(c). Under the second
interpretation, all purchases of target company stock would be
prohibited after any public announcement of an exchange offer to be
made in the future even though lOb-5 prevents market purchases before
disclosure. The policy engrained in lOb-13 is to protect the target
company's shareholders by assuring equal treatment during an
exchange offer, 3 thus avoiding a situation where certain shareholders
of target company stock who sell early on the open market are paid
one amount for their shares while other shareholders of target company
stock are paid a greater amount.3 9 These conflicts were created by the
Congress and the SEC, and the courts are unable satisfactorily to
reconcile them. -It is time for the SEC and. Congress to deal with these
problems and construct workable guidelines that are clear,
understandable, and effective in light of the opposing policy
considerations.

Securities Regulation-Standing- Defrauded Tender-Offeror
May Sue Under Rule lOb-5 When Made a "Forced Seller"
Under Threat of Antitrust Action
Plaintiff, Crane Company, sought an injunction to prevent the
consummation of a proposed merger of the Westinghouse Air Brake
37. See note 3 supra.
38. Lowenfels, Rule IOb-13, Rule Iob-6 and Purchases of Target Company Securities
Duringan Exchange Offer, 69 COLuM. L. REv. 1392, 1407 (1969).
39. Id. at 1395.
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Company (Air Brake) into defendant, American Standard, Inc.
(Standard), on the grounds that defendant manipulated the price of Air
Brake stock to defeat plaintiff's tender offer to Air Brake

stockholders.' Having refused a Crane merger proposal, Air Brake's
directors, upon learning that Crane was accumulating Air Brake stock,

agreed to merge into Standard to resist the Crane take-over attempt,
Crane then mailed an offer to Air Brake shareholders to exchange

Crane stock and debentures for Air Brake stock. On April 19, 1963,
the expiration date of Crane's tender offer, Standard purchased
170,000 shares of Air Brake stock on the New York Stock Exchange

and that same day secretly sold 120,000 shares off the market at an
average price per share about ten percent lower than the purchase

price. 2 Crane's tender offer failed, and the Air Brake-Standard merger

became effective. Thereafter Crane was forced to sell its Air Brake-

Standard stock under threat of an antitrust divestiture action by
Standard.3 Crane contended that Standard's purchases and undisclosed
sales constituted a violation of sections 9(a)(2)1 and 10(b) ' of the
I. Air Brake was also named a defendant in an action charging that it made false and
misleading statements in soliciting proxies from its shareholders in support of the Air BrakeStandard merger. This complaint was consolidated for trial with the claim against Standard. For
a review of the target company's duty of disclosure, see Krasik, Tender Offers: The Target
Company's Duty of Disclosure, 25 Bus. LAW 455 (1970).
2. In February 1968, when Air Brake began considering Standard's merger proposal, Air
Brake stock was listed at $36 per share on the New York Stock Exchange. Two weeks later it
jumped to $44 per share when Air Brake publicized its intent to merge into Standard, and by
April 10, 1968, while the Crane offer to exchange Crane security worth $50 for each share of
Air Brake stock was outstanding, Air Brake stock had risen to $49 per share. Standard's
purchases of Air Brake stock on April 19, 1968, were at an average price per share of $49.50,
and its undisclosed off-the-market sales returned $44.50 per share.
3. Crane is a substantial company in the plumbing industry and Standard is its largest
competitor.
4. Securities Exchange Act § 9(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1964) makes it unlawful:
"To effect, alone or with one or more other persons, a series of transactions in any security
registered on a national securities exchange creating actual or apparent active trading in such
security or raising or depressing the price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the
purchase or sale of such security by others." Liability for a violation of § 9(a)(2) is provided
by § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1964): "Any person who willfully participates in any act or
transaction in violation of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section, shall be liable to any person
who shall purchase or sell any security at a price which was affected by such act or transaction,
and the person so injured may sue in law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction to
recover the damages sustained as a result of any such act or transaction."
5. Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j (1964) provides: "It shall be unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . .(b) To use
or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as market manipulation designed to
increase the price of Air Brake stock for the purpose of deterring
tenders of Air Brake stock under the Crane exchange offer. Defendant
argued that its acquisitions were made solely for the purpose of voting
in favor of the Air Brake-Standard merger and that even if the activity
was unlawful, Crane had no standing to sue since sections 9(a)(2) and
10(b) protect only a defrauded "purchaser" or "seller". The district

court found no fraudulent market manipulation and dismissed the
claim after trial on the merits. On appeal to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, reversed. One acting in concert
with a target company has a duty to disclose transactions in that
company's stock designed to frustrate the tender offer and is liable
under Rule lOb-5 to a defeated tender-offeror who is subsequently
forced by the antitrust laws to sell his target company stock. Crane Co.
v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
The interpretation of Rule lOb-51 as providing a private cause of

action for fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security" 7 has resulted in judicial efforts to delimit actions under the
Rule through restraints on lOb-5 claimants. 8 Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp.' limited standing under lOb-5 to defrauded purchasers or
6. Rule lOb-5 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the
authorization of § 10b, provides: "itshall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b)
To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1969).
7. Rule lOb-5 does not expressly provide a civil remedy, but Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), held that lOb-5 implies a private cause of action for
defrauded sellers, and Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), recognized
a private right for purchasers. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), confirms by analogy
this construction of Rule lOb-5. In holding a private right of action exists under proxy
regulation § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(a) (1964), the Borak Court stressed that although § 14(a)
does not expressly provide for a private remedy, judicial relief will be available when necessary
to effect the purpose of the securities laws. See Comment, The Decline Of The Purchaser-Seller
Requirement Of Rule lOb-5, 14 VILL. L. REv. 499, 501-02 (1969).
8. For example: (I) Privity-Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp.
701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), affdper curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952). But see Note, Civil Liability
Under Section lob and Rule lOb-5: A Suggestion For Replacing The Doctrine Of Privity, 74
YALE L.J. 658 (1965). (2) Scienter-Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). But see
Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). (3) Reliance-List v. Fashion Parks
Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). (4) Foreseeability-see Vine v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
9. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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sellers.' 0 The apparently rigid prerequisite which Birnbaum established

has been the subject of severe academic" and administrative criticism"
and has been significantly qualified by judicial interpretation. For
example, it has been held that a corporate issuer is a "seller" when it
is defrauded into issuing shares of its stock. 13 Vine v. Beneficial Finance
Co. broadened

the definition of a "purchase or sale" by finding

"forced sale," even though no sale had been consummated, when a
short-form merger left a dissenting shareholder with no alternative
other than. surrendering his stock for the price agreed upon in the
merger. Support for a liberal construction of the purchaser-seller
requirement was found in the statute itself; sections 3(a)(13)" and
3(a)(14), 6 which include executory contracts in the definition of
purchase and sale, have been held applicable to section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5.17 A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow8 marked a shift in emphasis from
10. But see McManns v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 5 SEC Jud. Dec. 810 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
Although Birnbaum did not label the purchaser-seller requirement, later decisions have properly
categorized the rule as a limitation on standing. Chashin v. Mencher, 255 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); see SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d
764 (2d Cir. 1964), has been most often cited as a recent reaffirmation of Birnbaum although it
has been pointed out that O'Neill was based on the requirement of deception rather than the
"purchaser-seller" doctrine. Lowenfels, The Demise Of The Birnbaum Doctrine:A New Era For
Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268, 270 (1968). The November, 1969 decision in Iroquois Indus.,
Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), however, seems to be a conclusive
reassertion of Birnbaum'scontinuing vitality. See text accompanying note 24 infra,
i1. E.g., Note, Inroads On The Necessity ForA Consummated PurchaseOr Sale Under
Rule lob-5, 1969 DuKe L.J. 349; Lowenfels, supra note 10.
12. Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d
Cir. 1967); Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d
Cir. 1967). In both of these cases, the SEC urged that the language of lob-5 does not require the
purchaser-seller limitation.
13. Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960); accord, Ruckle
v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964) (injunctive relief granted in connection with the
issuance of Treasury stock by a corporation on the grounds that such an issuance was a "sale").
14. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); cf. Dasho v. Susquehanna
Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1964) states: "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include
any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire."
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1964) states: "The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any
contract to sell or otherwise dispose of."
17. M.L. Lee & Co. v. American Cardboard & Packaging Corp., 36 F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Pa.
1964) (holding that the promisee of an executory contract to purchase capital stock may bring a
lOb-5 action against the recalcitrant promisor).
18. 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) (allowing suit against a defendant who ordered securities
from a broker and refused to pay for them). Although the requisite "purchase" was found in
the broker's buying the securities to sell to a defendant, the court stressed that the broad remedial
purposes of the securities laws should be the dominant consideration in viewing new forms of
deception. Id. at 397. This emphasis on the broad federal prohibition of fraud in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities, is the core of the only Supreme Court decision construing,
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the purchaser-seller requirement to the "in connection with" language
of lOb-5, finding that a private cause of action should not be precluded
simply because the deceptive device is atypical. Mutual Shares Corp.

v. Genesco, Inc.19 made it clear that for injunctive relief no

consummated purchase or sale of any description is necessary for a

lOb-5 action if defendant's fraudulent market manipulation is

threatening irreparable harm to the plaintiff. Impliedly accepting the
view that Mutual's attenuation of Birnbaum should extend beyond
petitions for coercive relief,20 Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec,
Inc. 21 held that in using the phrase "in connection with" Congress

intended that an unconsummated transaction 22 be sufficient basis for
federal relief when damages can be demonstrated. This apparent

emasculation of the purchaser-seller requirement prompted a district
court to observe that the Second Circuit's decisions in Vine and Brod
"seriously challenge, if not overrule, its decisions in Birnbaum and
O'Neill."" The accuracy of this observation, however, is still open to
question. Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp.24 has
2
recently reasserted "the result and reasoning of Birnbaum"1
1 by
though not for standing purposes, the "purchase or sale" language of Rule lOb-5. SEC v.
National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
19. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967) (shareholders successful in enjoining outsider who had
gained control of corporation through tender offer from depressing market by minimizing
dividends). As to the related question of the corporate issuer's rights against an outside market
manipulator, see Moore v. Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (granting
injunction under lOb-5). Contra, General Time Corp. v. American Investors Fund, Inc., 283 F.
Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
20. It has been urged that lOb-5 claimants should not be barred from attempting to prove
damages even though the affected securities are retained. For example, it may be shown that a
business opportunity was lost through inability to secure a loan because of the diminution in the
value of the securities as collateral. Comment, supra note 7, at 513; see Lowenfels, supra note
10, at 276-77.
21. 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
22. In light of the fact that the Commerce court declined to rely primarily on a subsequent
contract which would come within the § 3 definition of a purchase or sale, the interpretation that
the court intended that even unconsummated transactions which are not "contracts" be sufficient
basis for federal relief seems correct. Note, supra note 11, at 354 nn.30 & 31, 356-57; see
Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (relying entirely on the "in
connection with" language of lOb-5 and ignoring a "contract to purchase" in allowing a lOb-5
action notwithstanding the fact that the transaction was incomplete). But see Keers & Co. v.
American Steel & Pump Corp., 234 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (suggesting that an aborted
contract will not sustain a lob-5 action).
23. Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); see Symington Wayne Corp. v.
Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1967) (assuming standing "arguendo" where neither
a purchase nor sale existed before dismissing the complaint on the merits).
24. 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969).
25. Id. at 970. But Iroquois apparently did not repudiate Mutual's abrogation of Birnbaum
in equity. The court cited Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968), for the proposition
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holding that a tender-offeror whose take-over bid had been defeated by
misrepresentations to the offeree shareholders had no standing to sue
the target company.
In the instant case, the court found that Standard's position as a
major stockholder in Air Brake coupled with the intimate relation
between Standard and Air Brake's management in operating to defeat
Crane's tender offer made Standard an insider with a corresponding
duty of disclosure under Rule lOb-5. 2 6 Having found a lOb-5
violation,2 . the court addressed itself to a consideration of whether
Crane was the proper party to bring suit.8 On the issue of standing,
the court recognized that it adhered to a strict construction of the
purchaser-seller requirement in Birnbaum and Iroquois, but
distinguished Birnbaum on the ground that there was no causal
connection between the alleged violation of 1Ob-5 and the injury to the
corporation in that case. Iroquois was summarily treated as simply
being a case in which no purchase or sale was found. The court
reiterated its refusal to decide whether one who is neither a purchaser
nor a seller can attack a transaction under Rule lOb-5. Instead it was
held that the instant case met the purchaser-seller requirement in that
it involved a sale analogous to the forced sale precipitated by a shortform merger in Vine? The court reasoned that the effect of Standard's
market manipulation was to deter tenders of Air Brake stock to Crane,
thereby facilitating the Air Brake-Standard merger. Crane was then
forced to sell its stock in the surviving corporation under threat of an
antitrust divestiture action.
Although apparently mooted on their facts by the new section
14(e), 30 the Iroquois and Crane cases are nevertheless excellent
that Birnbaum is still the rule at least insofar as actions for damages are concerned. For a

discussion of the Birnbaum doctrine which is oriented toward the distinction between actions for
damages and actions for coercive relief, see Note, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to SEC Rule
lOb-5, 53 CORNELL L.Q. 684 (1968).
26. 419 F.2d at 796.

27. The couit also found a violation of § 9(a)(2) since the defendant acted for the "purpose
of inducing sale" as he knew that his fraud would make the plaintiff a "forced seller". Id. at
794.

28.

Before addressing itself to the standing question, the court held that the requirements

of reliance, deception, and causation were satisfied. Id. at 796-97.

29.

Id. at 798.

30.

15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (Supp. IV, 1965-68) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person

to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipultive acts or practices, in

connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security
holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation." Electronic Specialty
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examples of the hazards inherent in the application of the purchaserseller requirement. The cases represent virtually identical situations of
fraudulent activity-by a target company to defeat a take-over bidder's
tender offer. 3' Yet because the plaintiff in Crane was forced by the
antitrust laws to sell his stock in the surviving company, he was found
to have standing to sue under lOb-5 while his less fortunate counterpart
in Iroquois was without federal remedy. Whether a broad or a narrow
view of the purpose of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is adopted,
extrinsic fortuities should not control the implementation of that
purpose.3 1 If, as Iroquois asserts, the enactment of section 14(e) is
evidence that Congress never intended that section 10(b) give a private
right of action to defrauded tender-offerors, 33 then it must be assumed
that Crane's literal construction of Birnbaum reached the very result
that the purchaser-seller requirement was formulated to
avoid-overreaching the purpose of section 10(b).3 4 While it seems clear
that Birnbaum was correct in determining that Congress did not intend
to regulate the internal management of corporations through the rule
making power in section 10(b),35 the broad federal prohibition of fraud
Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), held that this provision gives
standing in a cash tender offer case regardless of whether there has been a purchase or sale of
securities and Butler Aviation Int'l, lhc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., [current] CCH FED.
92,557 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 1970), confirmed an exchange tender offeror's standing
SEC. L. REP.
under § 14(e).
31. Although in Crane the defendant is an outsider rather than the target company, the
court's finding of concert between Standard and Air Brake as the basis for holding Standard to
the duty of an insider renders the distinction insignificant. Standard is not the traditional type of
third party insider, such as a "tippee," who acquires corporate information and then acts on it
without disclosure, since Standard generated its own "inside" information by its stock
transactions. Nevertheless the categorization is a logical extension of the decision in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) and might be viewed as expanding the coverage
of Rule lOb-5. It should be noted, however, that all that is required to find a lOb-5 violation is
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities and insider status is not a necessary
prerequisite. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1445 (1961); see A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375
F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) (failure of defendant to pay for securities ordered from broker held
actionable under lOb-5). Since Standard's actions clearly constituted a fraud in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities, finding it to be an insider was not required and reinforces the
use of an unnecessary label nowhere used in the Rule or the Act.
32. The Supreme Court has stated that the federal securities laws should be construed "not
technically and restrictively, but flexibily to effectuate [their] remedial purposes." SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
33. Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 969 (2d Cir. 1969).
34. The decision in Birnbaum has been attributed to fear that a broader pronouncement
would open to federal scrutiny charges of corporate mismanagement that traditionally have been
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states. Leech, Transactionsin Corporate Control, 104 U.
PA. L. REv. 725, 833 (1956).
35. Id. at 834. Historically it has been the policy of Congress to reject attempts to place
generally applicable federal controls on the internal workings of corporations. Note, supra note
8, at 681. An extensive federal common law of corporations based on the slim structure of § l0b
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in connection with the purchase or sale of securities cannot be effected
without expanding the narrow approach of Birnbaum. Mechanistic

adherence to Birnbaum has led to liberalization by fiction through the
courts' creative findings of a purchase or sale" and has perpetuated a

rule of law that has resulted in essentially contrary decisions in Crane
and Iroquois. The problem of limiting lOb-5 plaintiffs should be

resolved by replacing the Birnbaum doctrine with a standard that will
more clearly reflect in its application the broad purposes of the federal
securities laws. The reliance of recent decisions on the "in connection

with" language suggests a limitation of greater flexibility. If the
primary target of the fraud is a transaction the essence of which lies

in the trading of securities, and if the claimant can demonstrate that
the deception was the cause in fact of his injury then a lOb-5 action
37

should be allowed.

Selective Service Law-Criminal Procedure-Local Board Must
Give Miranda Warning Before Requesting Registrant to Produce
Evidence Necessary for Prosecution
Defendant, classified as a conscientous objector,' was convicted of
failing to report for civilian work as ordered by his local board.2
During the pre-trial administrative process within the Selective Service
System, state officials were advised that the defendant could not be

prosecuted without clerical evidence 3 of his having been sent a Notice
is conceivable only by attributing minor substantive significance to the phrase "in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities." Leech, supra note 34, at 835. But cf. Ruckle v. Roto Am.
Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of
Corporationsby Implication Through Rule J0b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185 (1964).
36. See, e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
970 (1967).
37. See Leech, supra note 34, at 835. For a suggestion that the deception requirement of
O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964), serve as the new standard, see Lowenfels, supra
note 10, at 277. See also Note, supra note i1, at 363-65.
I. Defendant had claimed a ministerial.deferment, but his local board classified him as a
conscientious objector available for civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national
health, safety, or interest.
2. Such a failure constitutes a violation of the Universal Military Training and Service Act,
50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (Supp. 1968).
3. The assistant general counsel of the Selective Service System informed the state director
that notations on defendant's file did not indicate whether a Notice of Classification had ever
been mailed. Therefore, because of the local board's incomplete record, prosecution was not
recommended at that time.
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of Classification4 informing him of his right to appeal.5 The local board
thereafter requested and received from defendant the Notice of
Classification which made it possible to initiate prosecution. At the
time the request for production of the form was made, defendant was
not informed that the procedure was part of a criminal investigation."
Contending that he was entitled to be warned of his right to remain
silent, defendant moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, a
judgment of acquittal. The United States District Court for the District
of Colorado, held, judgment of acquittal. Information in the form of
a governmentally required document representing a vital part of a
contemplated Selective Service prosecution obtained directly from the
defendant, though not in custody, is inadmissible as evidence unless
defendant is first warned of the prospective criminal prosecution and
his privilege to refuse to supply such evidence. United States v. Casias,
306 F. Supp. 166 (D. Colo. 1969).
In the 1966 landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona,7 the
Supreme Court set forth the procedural safeguards8 necessary to
protect the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination when
criminal suspects have been taken into custody or otherwise
significantly deprived of their freedom? The development of the law
since Miranda has been determined by interpretation of the following
two questions necessary for deciding whether the specified warnings
should be applied in a particular factual situation: (1) at what stage in
the proceeding should the Miranda warnings be given; and (2) what
type of evidence should be protected by the privilege against selfincrimination. In answering the first question, courts have generally
decided that formal custody, or at least significant limits on the
4.

SSS Form 110, the Notice of Classification, contains a statement of a registrant's right

to a personal appearance or appeal. The mailing of a notice by a local board to a registrant at

the address last reported by him constitutes notice of the contents of the communications, whether
or not it is actually received. 32 C.F.R. § 1641.3 (1969).
5.

Each registrant has the right to appeal a newly issued classification.

32

C.F.R. § 1625.13 (1969). Without evidence of a registrant's having been mailed a Notice of
Classification there is no evidence of his having been given an opportunity to appeal, and any

subsequent board order is invalid unless the breach in procedure is corrected. Robertson v. United
States, 404 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1968).

6. After the recent decision of Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295 (1970), the Selective Service can no longer enforce its orders by forced induction of a registrant but must prosecute

him criminally.
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. The Miranda warnings require that a criminal suspect be informed, prior to any
questioning, that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used as
evidence against him, that he has a right to presence of counsel, and that if he is indigent, the

government will appoint counsel for him. Id. at 442-45, 467-73.
9. Id. at 467.
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accused's freedom of action, are prerequisites to a Miranda situation. 0

Consequently, it has been held that an individual's protection against
self-incrimination is not violated by his failure to receive a Miranda
warning when interrogated by investigators for the Internal Revenue

Service" or when questioned by the Selective Service System as to

refusal to submit to induction. 2 However, some courts have applied the
Viranda privilege to non-custodial interrogations in which a taxpayer

was questioned by an Internal Revenue Service special agent seeking
to uncover.possible evidence of criminal tax evasion.

When concerned

with the kind of evidence afforded protection under the Miranda
decision, the courts have often limited the privilege to evidence of a

testimonial or communicative nature. 4 Thus, evidence of a purely
physical nature such as blood tests, 5 fingerprints, and handwriting
exemplars 17 may be obtained without violating the privilege against
10. E.g., Medved v. United States, 411 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1969); Davidson v. United States,
411 F.2d 75 (10th Cir. 1969); Freije v. United States, 408 F.2d 100 (lst Cir. 1969); Williams v.
United States, 381 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1967).
11. E.g., United States v. Jernigan, 411 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1969); Agoranos v. United
States, 409 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1969); Cohen v. United States, 405 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1968). Despite
the holding of Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (taxpayer already incarcerated on
another charge must be given Miranda warning prior to questioning concerning criminal tax
investigations, the trend of decisions seems to be against applying the Miranda safeguards to tax
fraud investigations. L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 551 (3d ed. 1969).

12. Pittman v. United States, 411 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1969); United States v. Holmes, 387
F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1968); Noland v. United States, 380 F.2d 1016 (10th Cir. 1967). See also
United States v. Toussie, 410 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1969) (privilege against self-incrimination not a
bar to prosecution for breach of continuing duty to register with the Selective Service System).
13. E.g., United States v. Wainwright, 284 F. Supp. 129 (D. Colo. 1968); United States v.
Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. 111.1967) (Mirandawarning required when special agent takes
over investigation). Although the above decisions seem to represent a minority view (see note I I
supra), a recent IRS News Release requires the special agent (criminal tax investigator) to give
his identity and inform the taxpayer that he need not make any statements or produce any
documents, that anything he does say may be used against him in criminal proceedings, and that
he has a right to counsel. IRS News Release, IR-949 (Nov. 26, 1968). These protections have
clearly not been applied within the Selective Service System, and one regulation expressly provides
that no person may be represented before the local board by anyone acting as legal counsel.
SELECT. SERv. L. REP. Practice Manual
1003, at 1027 (1968).
14. "We hold that the privilege [against self-incrimination] protects an accused only from
being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature.
... Sehmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
"Since the blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither
petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the
petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds." Id. at 765. See United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967); Cassady v. United States, 410 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Pelensky, 300 F. Supp. 976 (D. Vt. 1969).
15. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
16. United States v. De Palma, 414 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1969).
17. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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self-incrimination. Official requests for the display of motor vehicle
operator's licenses have also been held to be outside the scope of a
mandatory Miranda warning. 8 The statutory provisions requiring a
driver to present his license to a law enforcement officer are upheld as
a reasonable implementation of a valid state regulatory policy, 9
irrespective of whether a Miranda warning is given, even though the
license check is directly incriminating to a driver who has no license.
On the other hand, access -to certain kinds of information in the form
of governmentally required documents which are themselves direct
indicators of criminal activity has been limited by the privilege against
20
self-incrimination.
The instant court held that when evidence essential to prosecution
is obtained directly from a suspect, the Miranda warning must be
given. Reasoning that the warning is essential because there can be no
intelligent exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination without an
awareness of its availability, the court established a prerequisite for the
admissibility of evidence derived from the accused. In analyzing the
application of Miranda in analogous situations, the court noted that
prior Selective Service cases involving statements made at the time a
registrant refused induction 2' or failed to report for civilian work 22 were
distinguishable since those statements were either incidents of the crime
itself or made voluntarily. The court also determined that although
cases which concerned the need for Miranda warnings during Internal
Revenue Service investigations 23 were analogous to the principal
18. Myricks v. United States, 370 F.2d 901 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1015 (1967);
Kennett v. Municipal Ct., 290 F. Supp. 746 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
19. Myricks v. United States, 370 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1015

(1967).
20. The situation, in which the individual is prosecuted for failing to file the required
documents yet is made subject to prosecution for another crime when he does file, had often been
held violative of the privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395
U.S. 6 (1969) (fifth amendment complete defense in prosecution for failure to file form under
the Marihuana Tax Act); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) (claim of privilege under
fifth amendment complete defense to prosecution for failure to pay excise tax on proceeds from
wagering); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (fifth amendment complete'defense to
prosecution for possession of unregistered weapon); Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965) (fifth amendment complete defense against prosecution for failure to
register as Communist party member). But see Witt v. United States, 413 F.2d 303 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 932 (1969) (prosecution for failure to make border declaration of
marihuana not protected by fifth amendment); United States v. Boggus, 411 F.2d 110 (9th Cir.
1969) (failure to declare smuggled gold not protected by fifth amendment).
21. See, e.g., Pittman v. United States, 411 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1969); Noland v. United
States, 380 F.2d 1016 (10th Cir. 1967).
22. See United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1968).
23. Cases cited note 11 supra.
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situation, those decisions which required actual custody as a
prerequisite to such a warning 4 had construed Miranda somewhat
narrowly. The instant case was differentiated on the ground that here
there was a vital nondisclosure under circumstances calling for
disclosure. On the other hand, decisions applying Miranda to tax
investigations without custody25 were approved by the court to justify
its conclusion that an individual, whether suspected of tax evasion or
murder, is entitled to knowledge of his contemplated prosecution on the
basis of fundamental standards of fairness.26 The court thus concluded
that the evidence obtained from defendant, absent his knowing and
voluntary waiver of his rights, was inadmissible under the Miranda
requirement. Since the only evidence of defendant's having been
informed of his right to appeal was inadmissible, there could be no
conviction.
By requiring that a Miranda warning be given an individual who
is neither in custody nor significantly deprived of his freedom of action,
the instant court seems to make a marked departure from the weight
of precedent. Such departure is especially apparent in light of earlier
27
Selective Service cases decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which denied the applicability of Miranda when the accused was not
in custody. 2s The great majority of criminal tax investigation cases have
also determined custody of the individual to be a prerequisite to the
2
However, even disregarding the custodial
right to a Miranda warningY.
limitation applied by many courts, the evidence involved in the
principal case is not of the type protected by the privilege against selfincrimination; "the Fifth Amendment related only to acts of the person
to whom the privilege applies. ' 30 While a defendant is not generally
required to produce-private documents in his possession, 31 if the form
24. See, e.g., Cohen v. United States, 405 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
943 (1969).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
26. The court stated that the tax violator should perhaps be more entitled to protection than
a suspected murderer or thief since he is often unaware that his interrogators are seeking evidence
to convict him of a crime.
27. The Federal District Court for the District of Colorado is within the 10th Circuit.
28. Defendant-registrant had claimed the benefit of the privilege against self-incrimination
for statements he made upon his refusal to be'inducted. The court, in denying the privilege, held
that since there was neither custody nor a significant deprivation of freedom no Miranda warnings
are required. Pittman v. United States, 411 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1969); Noland v. United States,
380 F.2d 1016 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 945 (1967).
29. See cases and text note II supra.
30. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 n.5 (1966).
31. Jones v. Superior Ct., 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
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sought is required 2 to be in the holder's personal possession, then it
seems doubtful that an individual may refuse to surrender it upon
request by the proper official.3 Thus the requirement that defendant be
warned of possible criminal prosecution seems futile if after the
warning the defendant still has no right to refuse to produce the
required form. On the other hand, limitations on the administrative
power of government to require possession of certain documents have
been made in several instances where the information contained in the
form is directly indicative of criminal activity.3 4 The Notice of
Classification, however, did not directly indicate criminal activity; it
merely indicated that defendant had been given notice of his right to
appeal, not that he criminally refused to obey a board order. The notice
is thus analogous to items of physical evidence taken from the
defendant's personal possession at the time of interrogation, such as
blood tests 35 and clothing.3 6 Although the defendant may be forced to
submit to an attempt to discover evidence that might be used to
prosecute him for a criminal offence, since the form sought does not
involve a written or oral utterance of the defendant himself, it is nontestimonial and unprotected by the fifth amendment.3 Therefore, both
as to the requirement of custody and as to the type of evidence
privileged by the fifth amendment, the court seems to have ignored the
developing case law based on Miranda.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that such an extension is
unwarranted in light of the purposes to be served by the Miranda
warnings. The Miranda holding itself was decided with respect to an
in-custody police interrogation and therefore emphasized the necessity
for safeguards to protect against the psychologically compelling
pressures of a hostile atmosphere.3 8 As a result of this emphasis, it
32. "Every person who has been classified by a local board must have in his personal
possession at all times . . . a valid Notice of Classification (SSS Form No. 110)." 32
C.F.R. § 1623.5 (1969).
33. See cases cited note 18 supra.
34. See cases cited note 19 supra.
35. A blood sample indicating intoxication was taken from defendant despite his failure to
consent thereto on the advice of counsel. The Supreme Court held that there was no violation of

the fifth amendment privilege since there was no testimonial compulsion. Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
36. In Cassady v. United States, 410 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1969), defendant, while in custody
and without Miranda warnings, was asked to and did turn over his shoes to the authorities. The
shoes were used by the prosecution to connect defendant with footprints found at the scene of
the crime. The court held that defendant's rights under the fifth amendment were not violated
since this was evidence of a noncommunicative nature.

37. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761-65 (1966).
38.

"An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23

appears that later court decisions requiring custody as a prerequisite
to the need of a Miranda warning are assuming that protection from
overt governmental oppression is the only purpose to be served by
Miranda. This court, 39 however, has seen an extended purpose to be
filled by balancing governmental prerogatives and individual liberties
on the scale of "fundamental fairness."40 Whether an individual is
induced to incriminate himself by a combination of ignorance of his
rights and the coercive atmosphere of custody, or by ignorance of his
rights combined with the inference that the purpose of the request for
information is purely administrative, the result is the
same-involuntary self-incrimination. Therefore, a court using such a
"fundamental fairness" approach is sound in requiring the Miranda
warning to enforce fifth amendment rights.

Taxation-Treasury Regulation Service 20.2031-8(b) Invalid-Mutual Fund Shares Valued at Redemption Price for
Estate Tax Purposes
Plaintiff executor valued decedent's mutual fund shares' at their
redemption price2 on decedent's estate tax return. The Commissioner
valued the shares at the public offering price 3 and assessed a deficiency,
relying on Treasury Regulation section 20.2031-8(b).4 On petition for

refund in the district court, held, for plaintiff. Treasury Regulation
section 20.2031-8(b) is invalid; for estate tax purposes, mutual fund
antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be
otherwise than under compulsion to speak." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966).
39. See also United States v. Wainwright, 284 F. Supp. 129 (D. Colo. 1968); United States
v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill.
1967).
40. United States v. Casias, 306 F. Supp. 166, 170 (D. Colo. 1969), citing United States
v. Wainwright, 284 F. Supp. 129, 132 (D. Colo. 1968).
I. Open-end investment companies, commonly called mutual funds, are discussed in Lobell,
The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. REv. 181, 182-83 (196 1).
2. The redemption price is computed twice daily by totaling the current market value or
the securities held by the fund, subtracting therefrom its liabilities, and dividing this figure by
the number of shares outstanding. Id. at 183 n.6.
3. The public offering price of a mutual fund share represents the redemption price plus
the "sales load"-a charge which is earmarked as compensation for distributors of the mutual
fund shares. The load is sometimes as high as 9.3% of the redemption value of the fund. See
Warren, The Federal Estate Tax Return-Some Problems in Valuations, Deductions and
Elections, N.Y.U. 26TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1193, 1202-03 (1968).
4. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(b) (1963): "The fair market value of a share in an open end
investment company. . . is the public offering price of a share. .....
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shares are properly valued at their redemption price. Davis v. United

States, 306 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
In dealing with valuation problems, the Treasury Regulations
provide that "value" for estate tax purposes 5 means "fair market value
at the time of decedent's death," ' and, in section 20.2031-8(b), that the
"fair market value" of mutual fund shares is their public offering
price.7 The validity of section 20.2031-8(b) was first tested in Estate of
Wells,' in which the Tax Court refused to characterize the regulation
as unreasonable 9 and upheld the valuation provision. The Wells court

relied on two gift tax cases 0 in concluding that replacement cost was
the proper basis for valuation. Mutual fund shares were analogized to

single-premium life insurance policies on the theory that, like mutual
fund shares, such policies have a cash redemption value which is
substantially less than the cost of acquiring the policy;" it has been held
that single-premium life insurance contracts are properly valued at
replacement cost.' 2 The Wells court further relied on cases, involving
valuation of jewelry, which have held that a retailer's excise tax must

be included in determining the value of the property."3 Mutual fund
shares were distinguished from ordinary stocks and bonds; the court
adopted the Commissioner's argument that the redemption price is a
5. "INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2031(a) provides in part: "The value of the gross estate of
the decedent shall be . . .the value at the time of his death of all property.
...The
corresponding gift tax provision is § 2512(a). See note 10 injraand accompanying text.
6. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965). This subsection goes on: "The fair market value is
the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts."
7. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(b) (1963). Prior to 1963, the Treasury Department accepted
valuations at the mean between public offering and redemption prices and valuations at the
redemption price. Warren, supra note 3.
8. 50 T.C. 871 (1968), noted in 22 VAND. L. REV. 429 (1969) and 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 416
(1969), af.fd, Ruehlman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1969).
9. To be invalidated, a Treasury Regulation must be found to be unreasonable and plainly
inconsistent with the revenue statutes. Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496
(1948). In Wells, the Tax Court intimated that perhaps the taxpayer's contention was also
reasonable. 50 T.C. at 875-76.
10. Reliance on gift tax cases is appropriate, in that gift and estate tax provisions of the
Code are properly construed in pari materia. Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106, 107 (1950);
Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 313 (1945).
11. 50 T.C. at 876-77.
12. Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254 (1941). The replacement cost valuation for gift
tax purposes was justified by pointing to the additional value attributable to the insurance element
of the contract.
13. 50 T.C. at 877, citing Estate of Gould, 14 T.C. 414 (1950). See'also Publicker v.
Commissioner, 206 F.2d 250 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 924 (1953); Duke v. Commissioner,
200 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953).
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fixed price not affected by purely economic market activity, and
concluded that the "willing buyer-willing seller" test" for market value
was satisfied only at the public offering stage."5 The dissent in Wells
urged consideration of what the estate "could reasonably be expected
to be able to obtain" for the shares."6 Distinguishing the life insurance
and excise tax cases, 17 the dissent, in support of a valuation at
redemption price, compared the redemption arrangement to the
situation in which a third party holds an option to purchase the shares
if the owner chooses to sell them. In such an instance, the option price
is generally regarded as the maximum for valuation purposes.' 8 The
objectors further noted that certain United States Government bonds
which can be applied at par in payment of estate taxes are valued at
par, their effective redemption value, regardless of their market price.,'
Although the Wells dissent's displeasure with Treasury Regulation
section 20.2031-8(b) has been echoed on other fronts," the rationale of
2 areas.
Wells has been followed in both the estate2' and gift tax1
The instant court noted that, unlike life insurance contracts which
have cash redemption and risk protection value, the only "value"
ascribable to mutual fund shares is their value upon redemption;
therefore, to value mutual fund shares at their public offering price
was, in effect, to impose "an estate tax penalty" upon mutual fund
investors.2 To distinguish the cases involving excise taxes on jewelry,
14. See note 6 supra.
15. Quoting from the Commissioner's brief, the Tax Court declared that the obligation of
the company to redeem the shares at their net asset value removed the company from the "willing
buyer" category, thus rendering redemption "not a true willing buyer-willing seller transaction."
50 T.C. at 876.
16. Id. at 878.
17. The dissent stated that the predominant element of value in a life insurance policy is
the eventual collection of the face amount. 50 T.C. at 879. In distinguishing the excise tax cases,
they relied on the fact that there was no evidence of value other than replacement cost. See 44
N.Y.U.L. REv. 416,422 (1969).
18. 50 T.C. at 878.
19. Id., citing Bankers Trust Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 903 (1961); Candler v. United States, 303 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1962).
20. The wrath of the American Bar Association was put forth at 19 ABA TAXATION
SECrIoN 73 (1966). Representative Craig Hosmer (R-Cal.) introduced a bill on January 3, 1969,
to amend § 2031(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide for valuation of mutual
fund shares at the redemption price. H.R. 844, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The bill has yet to
be reported out of the Committee on Ways and Means.
21. Estate of York, 28 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 1271 (1969).
22. Howell v. United States, 414 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1969), affg 290 F. Supp. 690 (N.D.
Ind. 1968), noted in 20 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 917 (1969). The Howell court referred to Wells
only briefly; nonetheless, it handed down a practically identical opinion.
23. 306 F. Supp. at 955. The court recognized that the "additional value" of mutual fund
shares-the right to hold them, alluded to by the Wells majority-is fallacious, in that such
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the court relied on the Wells dissent. 24 The court then pointed out that
the public buys and sells mutual fund shares in two separate and
distinct markets and impliedly concluded that the proper frame of
reference for estate valuation purposes is the seller's market, since to
hold otherwise would be "to create an artificial value that cannot
possibly be obtained by the estate in any. . . realistic market. 2 The
court further stated that the analogy of an option contract situation
was applicable, again noting that redemption price was the highest
price obtainable.2 1 On the basis of these findings, the instant court
declared Treasury Regulation section 20.2031-8(b) invalid,2 7 dismissing
Wells and the cases decided thereunder as resting on "logical
infirmities. ' ' 28
The instant court's distinction of the analogies presented in
existing precedent is sound. Although the Davis court did not mention
it, the willingness of the Treasury Department to depart, in certain
bond valuation cases, from the market price in favor of amounts
realizable both strengthens the present decision and reveals the
arbitrariness of the regulation in question. 9 While the instant decision
is laudable for its result, this court, by analogizing to the valuation of
other items, proceeded along the same analytical lines as those meeting
the question before-a procedure of questionable propriety.30 It is
suggested that, because of the disparate nature of the mutual fund
market, a more theoretical approach to the term "value," detached
from the influence of case law, is warranted. The opinion did not
adequately treat the major problem in the mutual fund valuation
area-a determination of the proper frame of reference for arriving at
incidents of ownership accrue to every property owner. It would be no less appropriate to use

replacement cost with respect to all marketable securities.
24. See note 17 supra. A better basis of distinction lies in the fact that jewelry is an article
of consumption; as such, it is not normally resold, and any "redemption value" is hardly a
germane consideration. In contrast, the power of resale is the dominant incident of ownership of
mutual fund shares. See44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 416,424 (1969).
25. 306 F. Supp. at 955.
26. Id. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra. See also Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h)

(1958). Since practically the only means of disposition of mutual fund shares was by redemption,
the court found the comparison of redemption price with an option price persuasive.

27. 306 F. Supp. at 952.
28. Id. at 956.
29. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
30. Because of the unique dual-market situation surrounding mutual fund share trading,
comparison of those shares to life insurance, retail sales involving excise taxes, or even ordinary
stocks and bonds, seems inappropriate. Because of the factual distinctions, a better analysis would
concentrate on more theoretical considerations of "value" as applicable to mutual funds in the

estate tax context.
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"fair market value"-a buyer's market or a seller's market.3 ' The
better approach would cast the holder of the property to be valued in
the role of the seller. This assertion is supportable on two grounds.
First, at decedent's death, the property is in the hands of the estate;

therefore, for a willing buyer and a willing seller to trade for the
property, the estate must necessarily be viewed as the willing seller.32

It seems unreasonable, in analysis of value, to reverse the contextual
positions of the parties rather than to look to the prevailing factual
situation. Secondly, one must realize that in the normal course a large
part of the assets of an estate may be liquidated to meet the costs of
death taxes and administrative expenses, or to effectuate distribution
of the estate.3 These normally existing circumstances lead Professor

Bonbright 4 to comment:
[A]n appraisal under the death duties requires a strict adherence to the standard
of market value, defined . . . as the price . . . which the property would actually
command if presently offered for sale in the manner available to executors and
trustees.

The forte of this assertion is an implied recognition of the distinction

between "value" and "cost"-a distinction expressed by Professor
Bonbright as follows:
The contrast between 'value' and 'cost,' as fundamental concepts, is that the
former term refers to the advantage that is expected to result from the ownership
of a given object of wealth (or to the market price that this advantage will
command), whereas the latter term refers to the sacrifice involved in acquiring this
object. 6

Since both the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury Regulations

speak exclusively in terms of "value,1 3 this distinction brings into
focus the unreasonableness of Treasury Regulation section 20.20318(b)'s requirement of valuation at replacement cost, and clearly

illustrates its inconsistency with section 2031(a) of the Code.
31. In this regard, issue should be taken with Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965) for its
failure to state what market constitutes the proper frame of reference. See note 6 supra.
32. The Wells court's refusal to view the mutual fund as a "willing buyer" upon
redemption simply overlooks the basic fact that, given the statutory provisions in existence at the
inception of the fund, the very establishment of the fund acts as an acknowledgment that the fund
stands "willing" to redeem shares at the net asset value. Further, the Tax Court's statement that
the redemption price is an arbitrary figure does not take into account the fact that the net asset
value is determined by the "cumulative" market activity of all securities held by the fund.
33. 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 695 (1937).
34. Professor of Finance, Columbia University. Professor Bonbright's two-volume treatise
on valuation problems, reprinted in part from the Columbia Law Review, is an excellent and
exhaustive study of both the legal and economic aspects of the area.
35. 2 BONBRIGHT, supra note 33, at 695.
36. 1 BONBRIGHT, supra note 33, at 19.
37. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2031(a), supra note 5; Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965),
supranote 6; Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(b) (1963), supra note 7.

